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RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE 1960 ELECTIONS*

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"I'm so confused this election year." (How is that?) "I'm a Republican and a Catholic, and religion and politics are important to me. I'll have to make a decision, looks like I'll have to go against my church." (Is there anything you like about the Democratic Party?) "Well no...it is just like religion." (How do you mean?) "Politics is something wide and deep--no end to it--you get it in your system so deep." (Is there anything you like about the Democrats?) "No, there isn't. I am Republican Committeewoman for this district."

...(Is there anything about Kennedy that might make you want to vote for him?) "No, there is not. The only thing he is a Democrat. I could not vote for him for that reason. I couldn't. On the other hand he is a Catholic--oh, dear!! Why does it have to be that way?

The respondent was atypical. She was a Catholic woman in an otherwise Baptist family, living in a border state in the American heartlands. Well above average in education, political interest and sophistication, she was serving as local Republican Party official. Yet the facts which made her situation atypical also trapped her at the center of those cross-currents which lent the 1960 presidential election prime interest. That she was unusually active in politics, that she was unusually devout in religion, merely gave her plight dramatic heightening. But it was in essence the same simple conflict of group loyalties felt, at a lower pitch, by millions of other Americans in 1960.

In this paper we propose to record the basic characteristics of this conflict of loyalties as it emerged in 1960, and to examine a few of the phenomena attendant upon it. The data are based on national sample

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surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan. The fall, 1960, surveys were part of a long-term panel study. In the fall of 1956 a sample of 1,929 adults, chosen by strict probability methods from all the adults living in private households in the United States, had been questioned just before the presidential election. This initial sample was constituted as a panel and was reinterviewed after the 1956 election, in 1958, and twice in connection with the 1960 presidential election.^{1/} Such materials provide an unusually reliable backdrop against which to assess 1960 voting patterns.^{2/}

^{1/} This sequence of interviews was carried out under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation. The 1960 sample design provided not only contact with the 1956 panel which, due to aging, no longer gave an adequate representation of the 1960 electorate, but also a set of additional interviews filling out an up-to-date cross-section sample of all adult citizens living in private households in 1960. Analysis of the additional interview material is being carried out under a grant from the Social Science Research Council. Both the panel and cross-section bodies of data contribute, where appropriate, to materials in this paper. As regards the panel, it is of course difficult to retain contact with a national cross-section sample over a four-year period, especially given the high geographic mobility of the current American population. Of the original 1,929 respondents interviewed in the first pre-election wave in 1956, over 100 had died before the 1960 interview. Others had been effectively removed from citizen status by advanced senility or institutionalization. Of the remaining possible interviews, numbering about 1,800, some 1,217 were successfully taken prior to the 1960 election, and 1,169 again after the election. The 1956 social, economic and political characteristics of the 1960 survivors show almost no sign of deviation from the characteristics of the larger pool of original 1956 respondents. Across a dozen key characteristics, differences in relative size of even fine partitions never exceed 2% save in the case of political involvement. 1960 survivors showed over 4% more people who represented themselves in 1956 as "regular voters" than had been true of the initial parent sample. It is not surprising that individuals without interest in politics should be slightly less likely to tolerate repeated interviewing on political matters. Although the bias here is modest, we have taken steps to increase slightly the weighting of less involved respondents to correct it. The survivors thus weighted show no remaining deviations from the parent sample which exceed 1.8%, and the vast bulk of the partitions compared show deviations of less than 1%.

^{2/} Most analysts have justifiably felt uncomfortable with the recall materials which are the only means of lending time depth to successive independent surveys. A corollary of low public involvement in politics is the rapid decline in the accuracy of a vote report as time passes. In both 1958 and 1960, we asked our respondents to recall their 1956 vote. The results, as compared with reports just after the 1956 election, document the systematic inaccuracies which accumulate with time.

Some Basic Estimates of the "Religious Effect" in 1960

An insulation between political and religious orders has been fervently valued by most elites in the United States for a long period of time. No few sophisticated observers were torn between the desire to see free access to the Presidency regardless of creed, and an apprehension that the candidacy of John F. Kennedy would induce again currents of religious intolerance. Although motives varied, there was a remarkable show of consensus in an attempt to stifle religion as an issue in the campaign. The two candidates, as well as the vast majority of top leaders of the dominant political and religious groupings, pled as one with the American public to maintain a reasonable compartmentalization between the two orders. Indeed, few matters which could have come even to incipient question would have enrolled so many prominent people of divergent viewpoints on the same side of an opinion.

Nevertheless, no sociologist was surprised to learn that religious differences had played a rather unusual role in shaping the 1960 voting patterns. Estimates have gained wide currency that four out of five Catholics cast votes for Kennedy, as opposed to less than two out of five of the nation's Protestants. We are interested here not simply in the fact of influence itself, but in assessing its magnitude, its social distribution, and the implications of both, given the rather singular conditions.

We may first address the problem of the magnitude of the impact of Kennedy's candidacy on the primary religious groups.^{3/} Despite excellent data, the magnitude is somewhat more difficult to communicate than might be supposed, for the simple reason that there are no entirely suitable yardsticks which social science has established in these affairs. However, we can spin some web of conceptual and historical meaning around the bare figures which have emerged from the contest. Our sample estimates, very similar to those of others, showed that 81% of Catholics, as opposed to only 37% of Protestants, cast their votes for John F. Kennedy. Yet the figures alone are crude and deceptive.

They are deceptive in the first instance when we attempt to give them meaning by relating them to the 1956 vote cast by the same religious groups. Sample estimates showed that Catholics in 1956 split their votes very nearly equally between the two major parties, while Stevenson received 36% of the Protestant vote, or almost exactly the same figure achieved by Kennedy. In other words, it would appear superficially that the Kennedy candidacy drew an additional 30% of the Catholic vote, while the Protestant vote remained unaffected. Moreover, such a reading would fit some of the estimates current in Democratic Party circles before the election as to the probable impact of a Catholic candidate.

Our data lead us to an entirely different interpretation, however. Of those citizens considering themselves to be Democrats and thereby voting Democratic unless they perceived compelling reasons to do otherwise, over

^{3/} We have assessed elsewhere the effect of the 1960 religious patterns on the political outcome of the election, Kennedy's narrow popular vote margin. See "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election," by Converse, Campbell, Miller and Stokes; The American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 2 (June, 1961). Although our interests are somewhat different in this paper, we recapitulate briefly some of the more relevant details here.

one-quarter had defected to vote for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956. Two facts stand out about this massive defection. First, it was a defection and in no sense a conversion. Democrats voting for Eisenhower continued to think of themselves as Democrats, and continued to vote Democratic at other levels of office, particularly when Eisenhower was not on the ticket. Our subsequent data since 1956 have made it clear that Eisenhower's appeal was rather completely dissociated from the Republican Party: even among Democrats most attracted to him, it is hard to find evidence of any change induced in partisan loyalties.^{4/}

Second, and most important for our purposes here, the Democratic defections of the Eisenhower interlude seem to have occurred quite independent of religious background. That is, rates of defection to Eisenhower were essentially the same for Protestant and Catholic Democrats alike. By sample estimates, Catholic defections were slightly less frequent than Protestant defections in 1952, and slightly more frequent in 1956. However, neither difference exceeds sampling error. More generally, it may be shown that the Democratic rates of defection to Eisenhower were remarkably similar across all the commonly studied social groupings: he enjoyed an "across-the-board" appeal which paid no visible respect to the major social boundaries.

With these facts in hand, then, attempts to assess 1960 voting patterns by comparison with 1956 take on a rather different meaning. All other things equal, one might have expected Eisenhower defectors to return

^{4/} It should be understood that "Eisenhower's personal attraction" is in some small measure a convenient shorthand which simplifies the case considerably. In 1952, enthusiasm about Eisenhower was somewhat more tempered than in 1956, but was abetted by a variety of short-term grievances at evidence of corruption, the Korean war and the like. See Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1960, Chapters 3-4.

to the Democratic fold in 1960, with a consequent substantial increase in the Democratic proportion of both the Catholic and Protestant vote. Indeed, it is possible to estimate roughly that the Catholic vote for president should normally have returned to about 62-64% Democratic, while the Protestant vote, if the South be taken into account, should have climbed most of the way back to 50% Democratic. "Normally" here means the empirical expectation in the absence of any new short-term forces favoring one or the other party.^{5/} As a matter of fact, we know that the candidacy of a Catholic in 1960 did indeed create such new short-term forces, and the distortions wrought by these forces on expected patterns were in their turn quite predictable. Catholics not only returned to their normal voting habits, but were drawn well beyond their normal vote toward the Democratic side. Protestants, on the other hand, repelled by the Kennedy candidacy, failed to return to their normal vote.

In this view, then, the 30% increase in the Democratic proportion of the Catholic vote and the "stability" of the Protestant vote in the 1956-1960 period gives a very false impression of the relative impact of the Kennedy candidacy on the two religious groupings. The impact registered among Catholics is, in such figures, artificially doubled, while the impact among Protestants is hidden completely.

There is a large mass of empirical detail which supports this interpretation, and which is rather incomprehensible in any other terms. For the sake of brevity, let us introduce but one of the more conclusive items. If it is true that the short-term attraction of Eisenhower in 1956 was empirically independent of any religious background term such as creed or strength or devotion to a particular creed, and if it is true that the

^{5/} The basis for such "normal" estimates will be introduced below.

new short-term forces associated with the Kennedy candidacy in 1960 were to the contrary certain to have differential impact along lines defined by religious attitudes, it follows necessarily that the net stability in the 1956-1960 Protestant vote must conceal a certain gross vote turnover, and that this turnover must be strongly correlated with strength of religious involvement, however the latter term may be operationally defined.

The 1956-1960 panel data, which permit these hypotheses to be evaluated with unusual reliability, confirm them beyond any doubt. Of those Protestants who voted for President in both years, close to 20% shifted parties, moving either from Eisenhower to Kennedy or from Stevenson to

Table 1

1956-1960 Vote Changers among Protestants,
by Regularity of Church Attendance

		<u>PROTESTANT CHURCH ATTENDANCE</u>		
		<u>Regular</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Seldom, Never</u>
<u>1956</u>	<u>1960</u>			
Eisenhower	→ Kennedy	38%	44%	77%
Stevenson	→ Nixon	<u>62</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>23</u>
		100%	100%	100%
	Number of Cases	(45)	(18)	(51)

Nixon. As Table 1 suggests, the direction of movement was highly correlated with measures of religious involvement. If we percentage the table in the other direction, we see that less than 40% of the Protestant voters who moved back to the Democrats after the Eisenhower interlude reported attending church regularly or often; over three-quarters of the Protestants moving "against the tide" from Stevenson to Nixon attended regularly or often.

We can lend some historic meaning to the magnitude of the impact of Kennedy's candidacy upon Protestants of differing "strength" by examining the defection rates among Protestant Democrats in 1956 and 1960. In both years, about 30% of the Protestants defected, although as we have seen, they were far from the same subset of Protestants in the two years. In 1956, there was a slight and ragged correlation between regularity of Protestant Democratic church attendance and defection to Eisenhower, with variation at the extremes from 31% to 25% defection rate. In 1960, a very sharp correlation appears in both North and South (Table 2). For the most

Table 2

1960 Defections to Nixon among Protestant Democrats and Independents,
by Regularity of Church Attendance

		CHURCH ATTENDANCE			
		Regular	Often	Seldom	Never
<u>Among Protestant Democrats..</u>					
<u>Non-South:</u>	Voting Democratic	64%	72%	89%	94%
	Defecting to Republicans	<u>36</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>
		100%	100%	100%	100%
	Number of Cases	(69)	(61)	(128)	(18)
<u>South:</u>	Voting Democratic	60%	64%	82%	--
	Defecting to Republicans	<u>40</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>--</u>
		100%	100%	100%	
	Number of Cases	(131)	(44)	(97)	(6)
<u>Among Protestant Independents..</u>					
<u>Total Sample:</u>	Voting Democratic	17%	28%	39%	--
	Voting Republican	<u>83</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>--</u>
		100%	100%	100%	
	Number of Cases	(36)	(18)	(36)	(6)

faithful Protestants, we may venture, the negative reaction to Kennedy's candidacy did more to force a crossing of party lines than had the attractions surrounding Eisenhower in 1956. Among less faithful Protestants, however, the impact was weaker than that which had been associated with Eisenhower. Indeed, among the most nominal Protestants there is no sign of impact at all, as a 6% defection rate is about what we have come to expect empirically as a result of idiosyncratic factors when there is no systematic force operating on a group to defect from its normal party.

The picture among the small group of Protestant Independents is fundamentally the same. After an absence of correlation between church attendance and vote for these people in 1956, a very lively correlation emerges in 1960. Even the vote gradient as a function of church attendance in 1960 has about the same slope for Protestant Independents as for Protestant Democrats, although of course the implicit minimum here is a 50-50 vote division, rather than a 6% Democratic vote.

Among other things, then, the 1960 election provides a classic illustration of pitfalls in the most superficial voting statistics. Instead of concluding that political choices of Catholics were profoundly affected by the candidacy of a Catholic while Protestants were left entirely unaffected, we must conclude that the impact on the two religious groupings was rather more equal, although opposite in direction. However, we have introduced a number of assumptions to arrive at this conclusion. Since these assumptions pervade the more analytic portion of this paper, let us make both the conception and its empirical base explicit.

Voting Changes as Short-Term Fluctuations
around Stable Levels of Partisanship

Over and above the events of 1960, we have found it fruitful more generally to conceive of the two-party vote division of any partition of the population as made up of a long-term and a short-term component.^{6/} Since systematic research has begun to supply more extended time series on voting within different groupings, it has become increasingly apparent that the partisan division of votes cast by any specified partition tends to fluctuate within a relatively narrow range over considerable periods of time, although the actual range in absolute terms may be quite peculiar to the given partition. The central tendency within this range may be taken as the long-term component of the vote cast by partition members. It specifies a durable equilibrium level or "normal vote" characteristic of the grouping.

Any particular vote in such a time series then becomes treated as a temporary but meaningful deviation from this normal level. The partisan direction and magnitude of the deviation express the short-term component of the vote. This component is taken to represent the reactions of individuals in the grouping to immediate and transient circumstances of the election in question. By definition, these short-term forces induce vote change without affecting the long-range voting patterns of the group. In other words, the most probable vote to be predicted for any given partition (assuming no further information) remains its "normal vote," no matter what deviation from this level may have occurred in the election just preceding.^{7/}

^{6/} The conceptualization employed here, while stated in a form prompted by more recent data and the general objective of this paper, derives many theoretical underpinnings from more elaborate discussion in Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter, *op. cit.*

^{7/} There is of course the trivial exception in which short-term forces are preserved intact over two successive elections. The two Stevenson-Eisenhower elections approached this type of situation.

In sum, then, we presume a ponderously stable partisan division characterizing any population grouping, with actual votes recorded over time fluctuating around this level in response to short-term forces.

This view is of course more or less useful in the degree to which the assumption of a stable partisan division corresponds to some reality in the population, and in the degree to which this reality can be empirically ascertained, so that the long-term and short-term components of a given vote may be disentangled. Actually, given a sufficiently long time series of votes cast by a particular group, the central tendency is usually quite apparent. Or, with somewhat more abbreviated series, the patterning of partisan divisions of the vote cast at the same time for different levels of office can, with some additional theory taken into account, be translated into a very similar estimate. However, it remains desirable to have some means of deciding, on the basis of a single election, the direction and the degree to which a particular group may be deviating from its normal vote.

The questions which we employ to measure "party identification" have shown empirical characteristics which have become increasingly gratifying in these regards. As in most social science, this measure is adequate rather than perfect. There is always a tiny fringe of people in any cross-section of the American population whose professions of general party loyalty largely reflect their current vote intention or most recent vote. Such responses, when they occur, serve to make the measurement less stable over time than it would otherwise be. However, such people are so few in the electorate that they can create little more than minor undulations in the division of party loyalties over time. While these undulations move in phase with the wider oscillations of the partisan vote division itself, they are so faint as to be statistically insignificant even in relatively large samples, and do little to cloud the picture of fundamental stability.

This picture of stability is rather astonishing. If we take into account biennial votes at both presidential and congressional levels, the two-party division of the national vote has fluctuated as wildly in the past decade as at any time in the hundred years since the two-party system was firmly established. Yet annual measurements of the underlying division of party loyalties in the nation during this period have shown the most serene stability.

Furthermore, this is not the sort of net stability which conceals gross turnover of individual partisanship over time.^{8/} Even in this period of extravagant vote change, the 1956-1960 panel data reveal great individual stability in party identification. Indeed, if we find unstable analytic categories unsettling, we would have cause to feel fully as uncomfortable in subdividing blue-collar workers into union members and nonmembers: actually, the four-year turnover between Republicans and Democrats is if anything less than that for union membership, even setting aside those workers whose change in status reflects retirement from the labor force.

The party identification measure orders 95% of the American population on a seven-step ranging from "strong Democrat" through Independent to "strong Republican." Over the five elections we have studied, it has turned out empirically that the rates of vote turnout and party fidelity associated with each step of the continuum show very inviting empirical regularities. We have established enough norms for the measure that if we were told that members of one of these categories defected to the opposing party in certain


^{8/} There are certain secular trends in the social distribution of partisan loyalties which have been going on in the 1950's, which happen to have been compensating one another. However, these trends appear to be extremely few in number and to date have proceeded at such a glacial pace that it tends to require a decade before they can be reliably distinguished from sampling error. The political change being discussed in this paper is of another order of magnitude entirely.

rates for a particular election, we could deduce with reasonable accuracy what the defection rates for this election must have been in the other six categories. Knowledge of defection rates for weak Democrats, for example, communicates rapidly the net partisan direction and strength of short-term forces operative in the election. The nature of the distortions in behavior which will be produced by such forces along the rest of the party continuum have been codified. Since we have now observed elections in which the net balance of short-term forces has been both Republican and Democratic, one can arrive by interpolation at the rates of turnout and defection to be expected in the null case, where short-term forces are either absent or in perfect balance. From this point it is merely a mechanical step to compute the partisan vote division to be expected "normally" from any group, given its own peculiar distribution across the seven party identification categories.^{9/} This hypothetical vote division, which we shall call the "normal vote" or the "expected vote yield" of the group, turns out to match well with the central tendency of votes cast by the group when sufficiently long time series are available to give a fair sampling of Republican and Democratic short-term forces.

In Figure 1a, we review the recent history of presidential and congressional votes cast by Catholics and non-Southern white Protestants, against the backdrop provided by biennial estimates of the expected vote yield for each group. Two cautions must be strongly urged with regard to

^{9/} Let x be a seven-component row vector representing the turnout norms for each category of party identifier as established for the null case. Let y be a column vector whose components are the proportions of any specified population falling in each category of the scale. The vector product (xy) gives the expected group turnout. Computation of the expected partisan division of the group's vote simply involves a repetition of the same procedure.

Figure 1a. Vote Trends among Catholics and Non-Southern White Protestants




the figure. First, it goes without saying that each data point is a sample estimate and subject to sampling error. Given the size of the groups and the character of the sample design, the confidence interval (.05 level) which must be imagined around each estimate is on the order of 6%.^{10/} Secondly, it must be remembered that the data points for any given year and group are not statistically independent. That is, the actual vote estimates come from the same people whose distribution of party identification generates the normal vote estimate.^{11/}

Beyond these cautions, the message of Figure 1a is a simple one. While the normal votes to be expected of the two groupings differ strongly, the motion of actual votes cast by each group relative to their respective normal votes is remarkably similar. To underscore this fact, Figure 1b reproduces the data in Figure 1a with the basic and long-term Protestant-

^{10/} In other words, it would be fortuitous indeed if with this sampling error the expected vote yields computed on five successive samples were to give the impression of a straight line even though the underlying parameters were in fact perfectly constant. A fair portion of the movement portrayed--and conceivably all of it, although this we doubt--must be attributed to sampling variation. Even in this graph the vote movements are much stronger than differences in estimates of the vote yield; where larger groupings are employed and sampling error is reduced, the vote yield movements tend to damp out progressively.

^{11/} As a result, sampling variation can contribute in part to the impression that the hypothetical vote yield is undulating mildly with the oscillation of the actual vote itself. At the same time, what is most important about Figure 1a is the gap which emerges between any actual vote and the underlying normal vote for the group. The fact that the personnel remain the same assures us that this discrepancy is subject to only a single source of sampling error. A certain proportion of people were at the same time expressing a loyalty to one party and voting for its opposite.

Figure 1b. Vote Trends among Catholics and Non-Southern White Protestants, with Expected Vote Differences Removed



Catholic difference in normal vote artificially removed. Both groups appear to have cast a 1948 presidential vote close to normal. Both were drawn sharply to the Republican side of normal in both 1952 and 1956. In 1960, the only major divergence in their short-term motion occurs, and it is a strong divergence. We should keep in mind that were we to subdivide the 1960 Protestants by strength of religious involvement, the most nominal Protestants would be seen to return to their normal vote, while the most devout Protestants would shift even more violently away from normal than they had in the Eisenhower years.

Now the similarity in short-term fluctuations for Catholics and Protestants between 1948 and 1958 is no surprising occurrence. To the contrary, such motion in tandem seems to be the rule for most politically relevant groupings in all of the elections we have studied. With the sole dramatic exception of Catholics and Protestants in 1960, short-term forces appear not to have had differential impact along lines of the more commonly studied social cleavages in this period. With monotonous regularity, we find time series such as the following sequences of the Democratic portion of the two-party vote:

	<u>Election</u>				
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Group A	78%	70%	72%	82%	74%
Group B	48%	40%	42%	52%	44%
Group C	58%	50%	52%	62%	54%

This is, to be sure, an idealized illustration. Yet in the measure that a large mass of empirical data tends to approximate this pattern, it is easy to understand why the distinction between long-term and short-term components of the vote seem imperative. Naturally, the long-term, short-term distinction does not itself logically require that vote changes due to short-

term forces occur in tandem across the notable social groupings in this fashion. The latter is rather an empirical observation of great interest in its own right. But the prevalence of such patterns calls attention quite bluntly to the fact that two radically different explanatory chores are wrapped up in such vote trends. The first has to do with how the partisanship of Group B came to be established in the 40% range rather than in the 70% range frequented by Group A. The second has to do with the dynamics of the short-term variation shared across all three groupings. The roots of the first phenomenon lie so deeply in time past that it is doubtful that the data gathered can comment incisively upon them. The second phenomenon is notable primarily for its lack of continuity with the past; the temporal location of the explanatory terms is clearly in time present. Other differences between Groups A, B and C are likely to have some bearing on the first phenomenon; they are likely to be entirely irrelevant in understanding the second.

The illustration is idealized to set the matter in black-and-white terms. We do this in part to make a recalcitrant point clearly, and in part because we encounter empirically many fewer shades of grey than most observers find easy to comprehend. But of course greys exist. For one important instance, forces which induce short-term oscillation in the vote must have some conceptual continuity with the circumstances which actually succeed in changing the abiding voting pattern of the group. However, we shall expend more effort codifying the differences between short-term forces and those which have more lasting imprint once we have had a chance to witness some clear examples of the latter. For the moment, we are satisfied to define short-term forces as those which exert pressure toward a shift in vote

partisanship, without disturbing the underlying distribution of party loyalties. Such negative forces as those set up by signs of Democratic corruption in 1952, or such positive forces as the Eisenhower attraction, have been as an empirical matter of this order. The party identification measure permits a proper assessment of these situations. It lays bare deviations from "normal" voting, and the deviation concept is the more felicitous as it is shown to be not merely the investigator's analytic construct: it is demonstrably a perception of deviation (more or less explicit) on the part of the actor himself.

Where such patterns as those presented in idealized form above emerge and persist over considerable periods of time, one is drawn to conclude that whatever sociopolitical mechanisms first sorted Group A toward the Democrats and Group B toward the Republicans, group members are currently reacting to politics primarily (though not exclusively) as Republicans or Democrats. They remain, of course, members of the non-party group. If the non-party membership becomes politically salient in any particular election, then these loyalties will provide some competition for party loyalties where the two are in conflict. Given the notorious lack of attention paid by group members to public debate even on the more complex issues that directly affect the group, however, most members most of the time will not have a strong sense of the political relevance of the non-party group. In such periods, traces of differential response to the changing political scene by members of the non-party group will be weak indeed. The overriding phenomenon will be, for example, that Catholic Democrats will evaluate politics in a manner which is almost indistinguishable from that of Protestant Democrats, and which differs very notably in all the common ways from the evaluations of Catholic and Protestant Republicans.

When, however, circumstances arise lending political relevance to the non-party group which are so crude and obvious that no member can fail to see them or to assign them portent, then loyalties to the non-party group are going to compete with the party loyalties with some visible effectiveness. This is the 1960 case. But it remains a competition, and a competition which, when strengths of loyalty are equated, will fall more often than not to the party loyalty simply because it remains, where political choices are concerned, the more relevant loyalty.

The important conceptual point is not, however, the manner in which loyalties are weighted to arrive at a given decision, but rather the fact that over time party loyalties develop a functional autonomy. They become coordinate for the actor with loyalties held toward non-party groups, even groups that any student of history knows to have been causally prior to the adoption of the party in an earlier generation.^{12/} The respondent whose remarks introduced this paper reflects this conflict of coordinate loyalties admirably, and in this regard is typical of our respondents who commented on the religious question in 1960 (..."(Politics) is just like religion...it is something wide and deep--no end to it--you get it in your system so deep...").

In sum, then, any analysis of the relation between non-party social groupings and politics in general, or the 1960 Catholic-Protestant case in particular, should not confuse the following components:

(1) The long-term partisan component. The distinctive division of party loyalties which characterizes the non-party group over periods of time even though the political relevance of the non-party group is faint or passes unperceived dates from points more or less deep in time past. It is likely to be either

^{12/} We say "coordinate" and not "equal in weight." The weighting depends on the instance. by "coordinate" we mean simply that the party is not conceptually set off in a "means-realm" while the non-party group monopolizes some "goal-realm."

a direct consequence of group membership, or at least a consequence of other life situations once correlated with group membership. In the Catholic-Protestant case, the literature abounds in historical surmises which are well known. As this basic difference stretches back into what is, for us, pre-history, we cannot hope to improve upon these surmises with our data.

(2) Certain maintaining mechanisms. A variety of phenomena may be classed here. The functional autonomy of party loyalties, which maintains political differences even in periods when the perceived political relevance of the originating group is low, obviously falls in this category. It is true as well that turnover in personnel between generations creates maintaining problems, in the degree that the basic level of partisanship of the group departs from a fifty-fifty division. If the group is relatively homogeneous in partisan terms, and if the transmission of the dominant party loyalty from parent to child ever fails, then some other mechanisms such as a differential birth rate giving more offspring to families of the dominant party, or a differential recruitment of the ensuing generation such that the occasional intergenerational partisan changes favor the dominant party very disproportionately, are required to keep the partisan level of the group from drifting slowly toward a 50-50 division.^{13/}

(3) Short-term partisan forces. The response to transient election circumstances which do not materially affect the abiding division of party loyalties in the group.

Despite our great interest in all of these phenomena, this paper is, by intention, restricted to the third. That is, we are interested momentarily in the impact of the Kennedy candidacy in drawing partisans of differing religious beliefs to deviate from their normal political responses. Provisionally, we locate the Kennedy candidacy as a short-term force, for the vote shifts entailed have not as yet registered in any reliable way on

^{13/} Evidence that such differential recruiting phenomena occur in the current era for Catholics and Protestants has been remarked upon by Lenski in The Religious Factor (New York: Doubleday, 1961) pp. 126-128 and by Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 61-69. These phenomena are clear in national data as well. It is easy to forget, however, that these recruiting differences must be extremely strong in a case like the Catholic one, or the group will "lose ground" nonetheless. In national data or in the Lenski data, while the differential seems intuitively to be remarkable strong, it remains insufficient to maintain the Catholic group at its current level of distinctiveness, if the total story is actually told by the simple fourfold father-child, party-party, table.

party loyalties. It is always entirely possible, of course, that the 1960 shifts will turn out to have more durable consequences. There is a slight undulation in the more stable vote yield measure toward and away from the Democrats on the part of Catholics and Protestants respectively in 1960 (Figure 1a or 1b) that might herald such change. However, we have watched such undulations before, even dwarfed as they have been by the actual vote swings, expecting them to be the seeds of more permanent change. They have never developed into any permanent change strong enough to be disentangled from sampling error, and hence we have come to be more cynical about them than at first. Nevertheless, we know such permanent change must occur, and 1960 might provide a first instance. It would be exciting indeed if short-term forces which follow lines of the more obvious social cleavages were to be found in time to leave a more lasting imprint than those which do not. Such a finding would illuminate a variety of annoying theoretical problems.

Whether the impact of the Kennedy candidacy turns out to be permanent or transient, however, the strategy of analysis is the same. We still wish to dissociate the current impact from more ancient differences. Therefore as we push our investigations within the primary religious groupings we shall continue to take into account deviations in 1960 from prior

partisanship.^{14/} To avoid any possible contamination from the 1960 undulations in basic party loyalties, we shall employ 1958 measures of party identification for our panel people as the indicator of such prior partisanship.

For those who like to visualize these matters of force and impact, Figure 2a summarizes the effects of Kennedy's candidacy in creating a conflict of coordinate political and religious loyalties, while Figure 2b provides the comparable picture for the same people categorized by the same measures (1958 party identification, a 1960 measure of religious identification) for the 1956 election. As we see, there is no reliable slope

^{14/} The analysis of the 1960 materials is rife with examples of misconstructions which would occur if the more primitive analysis format ignoring the party term had been employed. We insert one of these by way of illustration. In 1956 we had asked our respondents to choose from a long list of non-political social groupings (e.g., "veterans' groups," "college groups," etc.) any whose political recommendations they would particularly trust or distrust. Since "Protestant groups" and "Catholic groups" were included on the list, one can order respondents on a simple a priori basis with regard to the Catholic-Protestant difference, placing individuals who distrusted Catholics and trusted Protestants at one extreme, and those who trusted Catholics and distrusted Protestants at the other end. The analytic question was whether these 1956 attitudes were stable enough to predict the strength of anti-Catholic reaction which would register in the presidential vote of Protestants four years later. If we predict from this scale to the crude 1960 vote, we get no results at all. From anti-Catholic to neutral or slightly pro-Catholic (the range of variation is truncated for Protestants, there being none who both trusted Catholics and distrusted Protestants) the percent Democratic of the 1960 presidential vote reads:

25% 40% 34% 36% 25%

If, however, we compute a normal vote for each category and then a 1960 deviation from this normal vote, we find a perfectly monotonic and rather sharp relationship:

-23% -18% -12% -11% + 3%

A negative deviation means that the group voted more Republican than its normal vote; a positive deviation means more Democratic.

Figure 2a. 1960 Presidential Vote by Party Identification (1958) and by Religious Identification (1960)





Figure 2b. 1956 Presidential Vote by Party Identification (1958) and by Religious Identification (1960)



associated with religion in the 1956 vote, once party is considered; in 1960, the religious measure exerts a very systematic distortion on the original slope.^{15/}

Inside the Catholic Vote

Differential lines of impact of the Kennedy candidacy within the Catholic community are somewhat hard to trace because the size of the group does not permit very elegant subdivision. And, since normally less than 20% of Catholics consider themselves unconditional Republicans, the biting edge of any analysis is further dulled. However, we can draw a few brief observations about the way that different types of Catholics responded to the 1960 situation.

The Ethnic Subcommunities. Kennedy was not only a Catholic candidate, but an Irish Catholic candidate. Since it has often been observed that lines of the old ethnic communities have been dissolving in favor of broader religious communities, it is of interest to consider the interplay of the ethnic factor with the religious factor among Catholics in 1960. We can examine not only the contrasts between Irish and non-Irish Catholics, but have enough cases to get at least a rough idea as well of the 1960 response in a third logical subset, that of the Irish non-Catholics (Protestants).

The degree of socio-economic assimilation of the Irish Catholic community in the mainstream of American life is well recognized. Almost three-quarters of the Irish Catholics in our 1960 sample were of third

^{15/} It should be remarked that two points on each surface (1956 and 1960) suffering from inadequate numbers of cases (less than 10) have been artificially smoothed in a manner which seems dictated by the character of the surface around them. This smoothing does not involve any of the four critical corner points, however.

generation or more, as opposed to one-third of the non-Irish Catholics.^{16/} Combining samples from the 1950's to maximize cases, the Irish Catholics appeared to have an educational background and occupation level which (1) compared quite well with that of non-Southern, non-Irish white Protestants; (2) exceeded that of Irish Protestants, even with the South set aside; and (3) exceeded very notably that of non-Irish Catholics.

At the same time, on all measures which were employed, the Irish Catholics in the 1960 sample showed stronger religious involvement than did non-Irish Catholics. These measures include both reports of church attendance and professions of strength of religious identification. Lenski has noted a pattern of lower church attendance among the less "Americanized" citizens, Protestant or Catholic, whose families have arrived in this country more recently.^{17/} While these patterns are present in our data as well, Irish Catholics remain visible higher in church attendance even with controls on status or on generations in the United States. While none of the differences between Irish and non-Irish were extremely large across these measures of religious involvement, they would certainly render it difficult to argue that relative socio-economic assimilation has made inroads on Irish Catholic religious faith.

So much for background. The Irish Protestant political reaction in 1960 was totally indistinguishable, both North and South, from the reactions of other kinds of white Protestants. The same negativism toward Kennedy appears reflected, and in the same degree, whether we look at vote shifts recorded between 1956 and 1960, or at their 1960 deviations from normal vote

^{16/} The Protestant Irish contingent is almost without exception of very ancient vintage.

^{17/} Lenski, op. cit., pp. 41 ff.

patterns. While it might be maintained that an ethnic attraction was counterbalanced by a particularly intense intracommunity religious cleavage, it is as easy to presume that the now-remote ethnic factor had no weight, and the religious factor operated at what was, for Protestants in 1960, normal strength.

On the other hand, there is some mild sign that Irish Catholics were more affected by the Kennedy candidacy than were non-Irish Catholics. The differences are not great, and case numbers are too small for firm conclusions. However, Irish Catholics who had voted for Eisenhower in 1956 were more likely to join the movement to Kennedy in 1960 (Table 3). The deviation toward the Democrats of the 1960 Irish Catholic vote (N of 49) from levels which would have been expected in the light of their 1958 expression of party identification is in absolute terms larger than that for non-Irish Catholics, though not statistically significant by usual standards (a Democratic increment of 19%, as opposed to 14% among non-Irish Catholics). Some, but not all, of this absolute difference is removed if it strikes one as conceptually useful to take into account the fact that Irish Catholics before the Kennedy candidacy were more strongly involved as Catholics. It

Table 3

Vote Change among 1956-1960 Presidential Voters
for Irish and Non-Irish Catholics

	<u>Irish Catholics</u>		<u>Non-Irish Catholics</u>		
	<u>Stevenson</u>	<u>Eisenhower</u>	<u>Stevenson</u>	<u>Eisenhower</u>	
Kennedy	52%	37%	Kennedy	42%	39%
Nixon	0%	11%	Nixon	1%	18%
		100%			100%
Number of Cases		(37)			(178)

Each fourfold table is percentaged to its corner, rather than along rows or columns.

appears that among strongly identified Catholics, the Irish, non-Irish difference in reaction disappears; it is rather among people weakly identified with the religion that the ethnic difference seems to have its life. Irish people weakly identified with Catholicism were nonetheless more likely to deviate to a vote for Kennedy, while the non-Irish weakly-identified show no reliable impact whatever (N of 45). While insufficient case numbers leave these observations on the thinnest of empirical bases, the pattern of absolute differences which show have the same flavor as many others observed in comparable situations, and may be worth some credence.

Perhaps the most intriguing difference, however, is the fact that Irish Catholics contributed disproportionately to the minor shift toward the Democrats in party loyalties between 1958 and 1960 (see the Catholic vote yield, Figure 1a). If there is to be any lasting impact of the Kennedy candidacy on the Catholic community, it may well be that it will register primarily among Irish Catholics.

While it is plausible to suppose from these data, then, that the ethnic factor contributed some extra "push" to Catholics in 1960, there is of course no question but that its role was entirely eclipsed, like an eddy in a torrent, by movements along broader religious lines.

Types of Religious Involvement. It is of at least anecdotal interest that the two Catholics who swam against the Catholic tide in the 1956-1960 period, voting first for Stevenson and then switching to Nixon, were rather peculiar Catholics. Neither was a regular church attender (as opposed to 70% of all Catholics), and neither was Irish Catholic. One showed signs of positive psychological identification with the Catholic community despite irregular church attendance, and her defection clearly sprang from her multiple

memberships. She was a Negro woman of unusual education, reared in a Baptist home, who had married a Catholic and had accepted the faith. She expressed positive interest in "seeing what a Catholic would do" as president, but she voted for Nixon out of sharp racial reaction to Lyndon Johnson. The second case, a skilled worker in New York City, was not only a rare churchgoer, but indicated complete disinterest in the Catholic community on every measure. The candidacy of a Catholic was simply irrelevant to him: he reported picking up an immediate distrust of both Kennedy and Nixon, and before the election was thinking of voting "no" for president. After the election he reported a Nixon vote, as Kennedy had finally impressed him as the less sincere of the two men.

It has been apparent throughout this paper that the differential impact of the Kennedy candidacy formed along lines of religious involvement. The more devout of the Protestant Democrats were more likely to cross party lines to vote Republican than were less faithful Protestant Democrats; the more involved Catholics were more likely to shift their vote to the Democratic column in 1960 than were more peripheral Catholics. If we view the election as a conflict of loyalties, it is not surprising of course that ultimate decisions rested upon a balancing of the relative intensity of these loyalties.

However, it is interesting to dissect the involvement phenomenon into components which give some better understanding of the processes underlying the influence relationship. For example, in his study of religious subcommunities in Detroit, Lenski maintained empirical contrasts between "associational involvement" in the religious group--frequency of attendance at formal worship services of the creed--and "communal involvement," measured by the degree to which the individual's primary relations (close friends and

relatives) are limited to persons of his own religious group.^{18/} Such a procedure gives obvious entree to bodies of theory concerning the interplay of primary and secondary group relations.

Over the course of the panel study since 1956 we have carried two measures which reflect religious involvement in somewhat the same differential manner. The first measure, report of church attendance, is perfectly equivalent to the Lenski gauge of associational involvement. The second measure is quite different operationally from Lenski's communal measure, although it bears some conceptual similarities.^{19/} It attempts to measure the sense of proximity and common interest which individual members feel vis-a-vis the group.^{20/}

^{18/} Lenski, The Religious Factor, op. cit., p. 21 ff.

^{19/} While we collected data in 1960 on the religious homogeneity of the immediate family, which formed part of the Lenski measure of communal involvement, these data are not employed in this paper. It might be observed that Lenski's measure is somewhat more useful in a polyglot metropolis than it is in a national sample, where ecological distance rather outstrips social distance as a factor where cross-group primary contacts are concerned. We are currently working with estimates of relative density of various groupings drawn from our repeated samplings in the same areas over time, and it will be interesting to see how this ecological variable interacts with other measures discussed here.

^{20/} The two questions employed were: "Would you say you feel pretty close to (Catholics) in general or that you don't feel much closer to them than you do to other people?" and "How much interest would you say you have in how (Catholic) people as a whole are getting along in this country? Do you have a good deal of interest in it, some interest, or not much interest at all?" In the Protestant case, the group object referred to was the denomination, unless the respondent labelled himself simply a "Protestant." For large areas of the country the broader referent would make little sense. Naturally, however, this changes the focus of the questions and reduces comparability with the Lenski procedure for Protestants.

The parallels in empirical results generated by this measure and the communal involvement measure employed by Lenski are very striking. Thus Lenski finds, for example, that Jews in Detroit rank lowest of the major religious categories in church attendance, and the highest in communal involvement; at a national level, Jews in our samples similarly show the lowest church attendance and by far the highest community identification. Similarly, church attendance is very high among Catholics relative to white Protestants, as is true nationally. But, as Lenski remarks, these two groups match closely on the communal measure, and nationally they are indistinguishable in terms of our identification measure. Indeed, we have been unable as yet to find instances of any basic assessments in which the differential patterns found by Lenski in employing his two measures are not reproduced within the pair which we have used.^{21/} If it helps in locating our measure conceptually, then, it is likely that there is some degree of functional equivalence between our community identification measure and the results of the Lenski procedure.^{22/}

Table 4a permits us to examine the differential impact of the Kennedy candidacy as a function of these two measures of religious involvement. The dependent variable here once again is not the vote itself, but the

^{21/} It is true, however, that the intercorrelations generally between our two involvement measures on different groupings run higher than those which Lenski reports, although the patterning of these intercorrelations across groupings once again seems similar. This simply means that it should be harder to get differential results between our two measures.

^{22/} A third simple measure of identification was included in the 1960 study, to parallel the party identification measure by asking the respondent whether he considered himself a "strong or not very strong (Catholic)." This measure seems to go more directly to an underlying central dimension of involvement, in the sense that the associational measure and the community identification measure each correlate more strongly with it than they do between themselves. We have used it in this text where we have wished a simple and summary discrimination, as in Figure 2a.

deviation of the actual 1960 vote from the vote division which might have been expected short-term forces aside, given the distribution of party loyalties expressed in 1958 by individuals within each cell. As we see, both variables make some independent contribution to differences in impact. At the same time, while there are several means of drawing the comparison, they all suggest that the impact tends to run more strongly along lines defined by community identification than those of church attendance. This difference conforms with comparisons drawn by Lenski for Detroit.

Table 4a

Political Preferences of the Catholic Community,
by Two Types of Religious Involvement

The 1960 Presidential Vote Deviation

<u>Identification With the Catholic Community</u>	<u>CHURCH ATTENDANCE</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Seldom, Never</u>	
High	22% (83)	14% (12)	(6)	23% (101)
Medium-High	21% (82)	12% (17)	(10)	20% (109)
Medium-Low	14% (69)	11% (14)	6% (19)	12% (102)
Low	9% (37)	(4)	4% (24)	3% (65)
Total:	16% (271)	7% (47)	10% (59)	

The cell entry in each case is the increment in the Democratic proportion of the two-party 1960 presidential vote over the expected vote for each cell computed in Figure 4b. Each deviation is positive, indicating that the vote generated by each cell was more Democratic than expected in 1960. Only cells with more than ten cases have been entered. Bizarre distributions and votes in these small cells account for some of the apparent anomalies which arise if one compares internal entries for various rows or columns with the summaries for the rows or columns. Case numbers are indicated in parentheses under each entry.

Table 4b

Political Preferences of the Catholic Community,
by Two Types of Religious Involvement

The 1958 Base:

<u>Identification With the Catholic Community</u>	<u>CHURCH ATTENDANCE</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Often</u>	<u>Seldom, Never</u>	
High	71%	53%		67%
Medium-High	64%	68%		65%
Medium-Low	70%	73%	67%	70%
Low	47%		75%	59%
	—	—	—	
Total:	67%	63%	66%	

The cell entry in each case is the proportion of the two-party Democratic which could be expected in the respective cross-partitions on the basis of the distribution of party identifications professed in 1958. This entry is what we have called the normal vote or the vote yield for the group. Only cells with more than ten cases have been entered, although the missing entries are of course included in the summary totals for the marginals.

In Table 4b we have reproduced the 1958 base from which the 1960 deviations were extracted, since a comparison of the two tables is illuminating. We note immediately that in 1958 the gradients of party preference as a function of both involvement measures were entirely degenerate: either there was no relationship at all or a non-monotonic progression which summed to a weak positive relationship. On the basis of 1956 data we had once surmised that such seedy patterns as were present at that time in the Catholic instance must reflect the late stages of a decline in group political relevance.^{23/} This impression is now lent considerable weight by an abbreviated

^{23/} Converse, Group Influence in Voting Behavior, unpublished doctoral dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1958. See Chapter III.

time series which we can erect for Catholics during the 1950's, representing a rank-order correlation between these measures of religious involvement and basic partisan loyalties:^{24/}

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1958</u>
Church Attendance x Party Identification	.05	.02	.00
Community Identification x Party Identification	???	.09	.03

As Table 4a indicates, the events of 1960 dramatically resuscitated the correlation between involvement terms and at least momentary partisan choice.

Yet it is noteworthy that the apparent erosion of these intragroup correlations prior to 1960 had occurred while the basic partisanship of Catholics as a whole seemed to be remaining at its high Democratic level. Let us suggest that when a social grouping is in its early stages of political relevance, there is a structure of intragroup correlations which betray the lines of impact of whatever forces are leading the group to political distinctiveness. The most generic correlation in the structure, and from point of view the least illuminating, is the inevitable association between member involvement and susceptibility to the political norms which the group is advocating. If in a later phase the political relevance of the group has declined, this structure of intragroup correlations begins to lose its clarity. It is worn away by all the forms of turnover which characterize the terms of the relationship. There is, for example, slow turnover in the personnel of the group, occasionally by conversion, more often by simple vital processes; turnover as well in the political opinions of some members of the group, shifting now for non-group reasons; and turnover in the involvement of some members in the group itself, once again for reasons uncorrelated with matters political.

^{24/} The Kendall tau-beta was used. See Blalock, Herbert M., Social Statistics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 321 ff.

If we were to use what is known of certain political maintaining mechanisms which are irrelevant to group peculiarities, and certain probabilities of social interaction which are quite independent of political controversies per se, it would be possible to model a total process in which intragroup correlations erode much faster than the partisan distinctiveness of group members relative to other population groupings.

A new relevance for the group will give life to such patterns again, as in the 1960 case for Catholics. Whether correlations form more directly along lines of associational involvement or communal involvement may depend on the character of the stimulating political term, or upon structural peculiarities of the group in question, or both. For 1960 Catholics, the restoration seems to be picked up more clearly by the community identification variable.^{25/} Whether the restoration in this case will be entirely transient or will endure for some further period depends, as we have argued, on the degree to which underlying party loyalties turn out to be affected.

Catholic Values concerning Barriers between Church and State. One of the most curious tables to come out of the panel analysis is worth a brief report. In 1956 we had attempted to secure, from members of various non-political groupings, a measure of the degree to which they felt it was

^{25/} It should be called to the reader's attention that the stronger discrimination of the community identification variable in Table 4a is a phenomenon quite independent of the fact that some residual correlation between the community term and partisanship remained in 1958, while there was none for church attendance. Since the deviations are extracted from precisely these 1958 patterns, the fact of independence should be immediately clear.

legitimate for their group to engage in direct political activity.^{26/} This "legitimacy" variable tended to correlate with group identification and with the tendency to accept group political norms. At the time, however, we expressed reservations as to the causal status of such relationships, since the values expressed could be quite superficial relative to the underlying behavior dynamics. One of the sole characteristics which suggested utility was the fact that members of religious groups, like Catholics, were less likely to consider group intervention in politics legitimate than were union members and Negroes.^{27/}

We repeated this measure on our 1960 panel of Catholics to see what would happen at a moment when many Catholics were deeply influenced by the unusual presidential candidacy of a group member. The turnover in the table and the shift in the marginals were as sharp and yet as systematic as any we have seen to date in panel analysis (Table 5). Of the original set of Catholics who had defended the propriety of Catholic intervention in both legislative lobbying and candidate support, a majority had moved in 1960 to outright repudiation of both types of intervention!

^{26/} The two questions posed were:

"How do you feel about (Catholic) organizations trying to get Congress to pass laws that Catholics are interested in? Do you think it's all right for them to do that, or do you think they ought to stay out of that?" and "How do you feel about (Catholic) organizations trying to help certain candidates get elected? Do you think it's all right for them to do that, or do you think they ought to stay out of that?"

Respondents answering that such intervention was all right on both counts were considered "high legitimates," while those against both were "low legitimates."

^{27/} Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 321-22.

Table 5

Change in Beliefs as to the Legitimacy of Catholic Political Activity among Catholics, 1956-1960

	<u>1956</u>			1960 <u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>High Legitimacy</u>	<u>Mixed Reaction</u>	<u>Low Legitimacy</u>	
High Legitimacy	38%	16%	9%	20%
Mixed Reaction	10	17	14	14
Low Legitimacy	<u>52</u> 100%	<u>67</u> 100%	<u>77</u> 100%	<u>66</u> 100%
1956 TOTAL	32%	25%	43%	100%
Number of Cases	(82)	(64)	(112)	(258)

This sudden expression of a desire for high barriers between church and state gives an interesting reflection of the apprehension brought to the Catholic community by the 1960 religious controversy. In 1956, the proportion of Catholics denying the propriety of both forms of intervention (66%) actually cannot be distinguished from the proportion of non-Southern white Protestants (64%) who make the same double rejection for Catholic organizations. On the other hand, of course, there is little sign that such apprehension served to diminish the volume of political shifting to Kennedy among Catholics.

THE ANTI-CATHOLIC REACTION AMONG PROTESTANTS

Whatever the entreaties of the most reputable political and religious elites, it is clear that American Protestants in 1960 were remarkably preoccupied by the fact that Kennedy was a Catholic. In our pre-election questionnaire during the campaign, we avoided introducing the matter directly on a number of grounds. Despite our reticence, however, nearly half of the white Protestant respondents themselves introduced "the Catholic question." Given the normal dispersion of content interest displayed by the American public in the face of non-directive questioning in past elections, this focus on Catholicism amounts to an obsession. The "silent" religious issue showed a salience which put it in the class of the most central and widely-debated issues of past elections, such as Korea or corruption in 1952. When one reflects that some Protestants must have felt sufficient inhibition to avoid the subject, these comparisons take on even greater significance.

Not all Protestants introducing the subject were unequivocally negative. About 1% of the white Protestants making comments did so to defend the right of a Catholic to be president, or to deny indignantly the relevance of the issue. Another rather large group made remarks with some edge of ambiguity, such as "I know the fact he's a Catholic shouldn't bother us." While comments of this order probably reflect no more than a superficial bow to social values on the part of a person deeply influenced in spite of himself, they were coded as intermediate reactions. Despite this leniency in classification, over three-quarters of white Protestants who introduced the subject were coded as unequivocally negative.

These hostile reactions can be divided into the elaborated and the unelaborated. The latter were numerous: "I just don't like Catholics;

"I just can't see a Catholic for President." Where elaborations were given, they were sufficiently diverse to give support to most of the current theories of prejudice. A Kentucky man had disliked Catholics since the day when, at a Cincinnati hiring hall, the Catholic doling out the jobs had asked Catholics in the hall to raise their hands first. Another man reported having heard Kennedy charge in a campaign speech that Catholics heretofore had been excluded from high government jobs, and that if elected, he would personally remedy that in a hurry. The modal elaborations involved expression of alarm at papal control of American policy. These comments varied widely in sophistication from moderate discussions of a Catholic's primary commitment to his faith, to dark beliefs that Catholicism lay somewhere on the road to Communism.

If we consider a priori the social distribution which this anti-Catholicism should take, we can develop some delightfully conflicting expectations. On the one hand, we now have a large literature which indicates that verbal expressions of intolerance -- political, religious, racial -- show a strong inverse correlation with education. It is worth remembering, of course, that these data rarely involve discriminatory acts, and we are always subject to the possibility that education, in communicating certain social values concerning intolerance, builds in inhibitions in verbal responses which may be more or less disengaged from underlying evaluations and actions. However, this may be, the education correlate would lead us in two directions in looking for any sharp anti-Catholic reaction: downward to the more anomic, alienated strata of the urban status hierarchy, and outward toward the provincial hinterland.

On the other hand, it was no great trick to predict that the anti-Catholic reaction would follow lines of church attendance, as we have

seen to be the case. More generally, it could be argued that Kennedy's Catholicism would be more repugnant to those members of the society most vitally bound up in the dominant values of the dominant Protestant community. The local Protestant minister is of course the prototype here, but one may think more generally of the "pillars of the community," particularly where the effective community is exclusively Protestant. Here we are talking not of people socially adrift, as before, but of the social activists who are themselves the anchors. We are at the opposite end of the status continuum. These are the people who are most aware of, and have the greatest stake in, the ascendance of Protestant values, for they, far more than the great masses, are the keepers of the flame.

The more elite anti-Catholicism could find justification, if not initial motivation, in concerns over the separation of church and state and the anomalous position of an American Catholic in these regards. The low-status anti-Catholicism would occur despite rather than because of these highly-valued barriers, since there is a great deal of evidence to make us believe that such abstract considerations go largely unappreciated where education is weak. That is, for the poorly-educated, anti-Catholicism would be a free-floating animus toward a dimly-perceived outgroup, an animus which could receive free political expression simply because of a failure to compartmentalize between religion and politics.

Since differential reactions seemed plausible along both of the dimensions which we have broadly painted, it was plausible as well to suppose that the anti-Catholic response would be most severe at their intersection. That is, in the sparsely populated cells representing the low-status, poorly-educated people who are nonetheless faithful or active

in the Protestant community, we anticipated the sharpest anti-Catholicism. By the same token, we expected such signs to be weakest or non-existent among well-educated people least involved in Protestantism, as community or association. The cells on the more populated diagonal -- high-activist and high-education, or low-activist and low-education -- would then be expected to fall in intermediate positions.

Across the grossest subdivisions of the white Protestant population, voluntary anti-Catholic references showed a distribution which seemed indeed to follow education lines (Table 6). That is, hostility was expressed more freely among blue-collar Protestants than among white-collar; among farmers than among non-farm people; and at all levels, more frequently among white Protestants in the provincial and poorly-educated South.

Although we should not lose sight of these broad facts in the more detailed probing which follows, they tell a story which is mildly misleading. In the first place, the volunteering of anti-Catholic remarks turns out to be much less tightly correlated with education itself than Table 6 would lead one to deduce. In the South, there is a fair relationship, with 30% of the college respondents, 43% of the high-school respondents, and 48% of the grade-school white Protestants proffering anti-Catholic comment. But outside the South, the correlation is sparse indeed, the comparable gradient running 22%, 29% and 28%. If we focus on the urban status hierarchy outside the South (Table 7), we find a remarkable picture, one which indicates rapidly why the non-Southern correlation with education is so slight. The incidence of such commentary is very markedly curvilinear, with anti-Catholicism being expressed most frequently at the high and low extremes of the status continuum. There is

Anti-Catholic Commentary Volunteered by White Protestants
 During the Pre-Election, 1960, Interviewing,
 by Region and Occupation

	<u>OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD</u>		
	<u>White Collar</u>	<u>Blue Collar</u>	<u>Farm Operator</u>
<u>Non-South:</u>			
Made unequivocally negative references	22%	32%	32%
Made references, direction ambiguous	12	10	23
Made no references	$\frac{66}{100\%}$	$\frac{58}{100\%}$	$\frac{45}{100\%}$
Number of Cases	(231)	(284)	(60)
 <u>South:</u>			
Made unequivocally negative references	35%	46%	57%
Made references, direction ambiguous	17	6	8
Made no reference	$\frac{48}{100\%}$	$\frac{48}{100\%}$	$\frac{35}{100\%}$
Number of Cases	(185)	(158)	(49)

perhaps the shadow of such a pattern in the South, with professional people slightly more likely to register anti-Catholicism than the business and managerial stratum. From this point, however, the incidence of Southern comment increases rapidly as status decreases, so that the global impression is one of linearity.

Table 7

Anti-Catholic Commentary Volunteered by Non-Southern
White Protestants During the Pre-Election, 1960,
Interviewing, by Head's Occupation

	<u>OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD</u>				
	<u>Prof. & Semi-Prof.</u>	<u>Business & M.O.P.</u>	<u>Clerical & Sales</u>	<u>Skilled & Semi-Sk.</u>	<u>Unskilled</u>
Clear negative references	28%	28%	16%	28%	47%
Ambiguous references	7	18	10	9	14
No references	$\frac{65}{100\%}$	$\frac{61}{100\%}$	$\frac{74}{100\%}$	$\frac{63}{100\%}$	$\frac{39}{100\%}$
Number of Cases	(78)	(85)	(68)	(202)	(51)

Table 7 appeared to argue even more eloquently than expected, of course, for a distinction into two types of anti-Catholic reaction. By this account, the clerical stratum in the middle would be too well educated on the one hand to indulge in the more ignorant forms of the reaction, yet too little bound into the active leadership of the Protestant community to resist strongly the advent of a Catholic president. We knew,

for example, that professional people outside the South in extreme disproportion among regular Protestant church attenders, with business and managerial people also disproportionately represented, and the remainder of the occupation hierarchy showing fairly weak status differentials in attendance. Therefore it seemed a simple matter to forge the empirical links between church attendance and the anti-Catholic response among business and professional people to complete the picture.

We were chagrined, therefore, to discover that outside the South there was not correlation between church attendance and the anti-Catholic responses within the business and professional strata. Below these strata, from clerical workers downward, the correlation is strong, but at the top it simply does not exist. This is true whether we measure involvement in the Protestant community by the associational criterion (church attendance) or by the community identification terms, or by a reasonable combination of the two. Indeed, in absolute terms (differences not statistically significant), we tend to find that the anti-Catholic reaction is actually stronger among the less religiously involved, even though these less involved people turn out to be the more high-educated.

We have dealt up to this point with volunteered reactions to Kennedy's Catholicism during the pre-election interviewing. We may also bring to bear the behavioral criterion, as measured by the deviation of a partition's 1960 presidential vote from the expectation created by its 1958 distribution of partisanship. The verbal criterion suffers a weakness in the possibility of inhibition of comments along systematic social lines. The behavioral criterion suffers a weakness in the possibility that some deviations in 1960 voting in one or another social grouping might have

been touched off by concerns other than the Catholicism of the candidate. It is gratifying, therefore, that across all the comparisons we have drawn, these two criteria give the same results. That is, where partitions of the population show significant differences in incidence of anti-Catholic responses, they show comparable differences in the magnitude of deviations away from a Democratic vote in 1960.^{28/} Thus, for example, the curvilinear distribution of anti-Catholic responses along the status continuum outside the South is duplicated by a curve of 1960 vote deviations (a negative deviation means motion away from the Democrats):

	<u>Deviation</u>	<u>N</u>
Professional and Semi-Professional	-16%	88
Business and Managerial	-10%	80
Clerical	0	79
Skilled and Semi-Skilled	-12%	227
Unskilled	-10%	65

Similarly, it is true that for clerical people and below, church attendance correlates handsomely with a strong deviation away from the Democrats. For the business and professional community outside the South, however, there is no such correlation.

Table 8 summarizes these data for both regions and both types of religious involvement. If we start at the bottom of the table, we find a pattern of deviations within the South which fit our original predictions. That is, the impact of anti-Catholicism is indeed sharpest where low status combines with high religious feeling, and is mildest where status is high and religious involvement is low. Outside the South, however, the pattern is different, as most clearly exemplified by the church attendance quarter of the table. Here status differences account for little or nothing even within the set of regular church attenders, although there is a trend in the predicted direction. And there is a clear reversal among Protestants

attending church only irregularly: low-status people registered little or no anti-Catholic impact, but that impact remains high in the business and professional community.

The reader is warned that the division of the status hierarchy in Table 8 tends more toward the post hoc than we like. Normally, on both conceptual and empirical grounds the division into blue-collar and white-collar is indicated. In this case, however, the step change between business-professional people on one hand and clerical people on the other is large, in terms of the capacity of measures of religious involvement to explain differences in anti-Catholic impact. At the same time, it goes without saying that this division of the occupation hierarchy isolates much more incisively the "pillars of the community" which we originally had had in mind. It is a distinction which seems to reflect local prominence and local power.

²⁸We have encountered only one exception, which is neither surprising to the observer nor disturbing to the current analysis. Examination of aggregate vote statistics from the rural midwest leads to the strong impression that a farm revolt toward the Democrats in 1960 on economic grounds was largely stifled at the presidential level by rural anti-Catholics. And indeed, we do find that the deviation away from the Democrats in 1960 was much less strong than the incidence of anti-Catholic references would have suggested given the norms set for the comparison by the other groupings studied to date. Although case numbers are once again limited, it may be noteworthy in this connection that the only major positive deviation we have encountered among Protestants -- a vote more Democratic than normal -- occurs among farmers who seldom or never attend church (a positive deviation of 11%, as opposed to a negative deviation of 8% among more regular church attenders).

Table 8

1960 Deviations of Presidential Vote Partisanship
from 1958 Expectations of White Protestants by Region,
Head's Occupation and Two Types of Religious Involvement

<u>Head's Occupation</u>	<u>CHURCH ATTENDANCE</u>	
	<u>Regular, . Often</u>	<u>Seldom, Never</u>
<u>Non-South:</u>		
Professional or Business	-11% (107)	-13% (58)
Clerical or Blue Collar	-15% (171)	- 2% (183)
<u>South:</u>		
Professional or Business	-25% (70)	-16% (34)
Clerical or Blue Collar	-36% (110)	-13% (68)

	<u>IDENTIFICATION WITH PROTESTANT COMMUNITY</u>	
	<u>High</u>	<u>Low</u>
<u>Non-South:</u>		
Professional or Business	-13% (63)	-12% (97)
Clerical or Blue Collar	-17% (130)	- 5% (217)
<u>South:</u>		
Professional or Business	-24% (68)	-15% (38)
Clerical or Blue Collar	-32% (111)	-20% (68)

The cell entry in each case is the decrement in the Democratic proportion of the two-party 1960 presidential vote relative to the two-party vote proportion which could have been expected on the basis of the distribution of party identifications shown by individuals in the cell in 1958. Case numbers for each cell are indicated in parentheses under each entry.

This being so, we are naturally interested to see whether differences in the type of community have some bearing on the observed patterns. As always, we encounter limitations in case numbers here which make any elegant subdivisions precarious. However, we can draw some impressions from a crude trichotomy of the non-Southern sample into large urban concentrations (over 100,000 in population), towns and small cities (2,500 to 100,000), and villages and rural areas. Such a division suggests strongly that the non-Southern pattern which surprised us tends to be confined to the metropolis. As we move outward to smaller towns and rural areas, the patterns seem to shift from the deviant case toward the Southern, or originally expected pattern. It never becomes the case outside the South that business and professional people who are religiously uninvolved show less anti-Catholic impact than lower-status people peripheral to religious activity. This part of the expected pattern emerges only in the South. Nonetheless, it does seem to be true that the incidence of anti-Catholicism in the professional and business community comes to depend more and more reliably upon religious involvement once out of the non-Southern metropolis. For such higher-status people in the metropolis, the less involved were actually more likely to deviate away from the Democrats than were the high church attenders. If we express this reversal as a negative difference in deviations, we find the following progression moving out of the metropolis:

	<u>D²⁹</u>	<u>N</u>
Non-Southern metropolis	-9%	59
Non-Southern small cities, towns	+3%	56
Non-Southern villages and rural areas	+7%	52
The South	+9%	104

29/ D here represents the subtraction of the 1960 vote deviations for high church attenders from the same statistic for the low church attenders, all within the white Protestant business and professional strata. Thus Table 8 shows high church attenders from these strata deviating 25% away from the Democrats in 1960, with low church attenders deviating only 16%. The difference of 9% is entered above.

We do not feel that we are rigging a case here in locating the South as a whole at the bottom of the ordering. In part this is so because of the profoundly small-town and rural character of the South. More to the point, however, the ordering is a true one if we consider it less a ranking of population concentrations by brute size alone, than an ordering reflecting the proportion of Catholics in the given population. For it is primarily in the non-Southern metropolis that Catholics have moved into positions of political power and have made progress toward greater economic equality with members of the Protestant community. In some smaller cities in certain sub-regions outside the South this evolution has occurred as well, although it has been spotty. In rural areas outside the South, or in the South as a whole (New Orleans excepted), Catholics have been sparsely represented indeed.

The broad picture suggested, then, is this. By and large across the nation where Catholics are either absent or reside in dispersed minorities, the patterning of the anti-Catholic impact was more or less as originally predicted. However, the contribution of education was somewhat mild, and was generally eclipsed in these areas by differences linked to religious involvement: the reaction was to Catholics as a religious outgroup, and anti-Catholicism strongly reflected prior religious involvement. Where Catholics were remote and the individual was lukewarm about his Protestantism, the impact tended to be less.

On the other hand, where Catholics reside in large numbers and have come to compete for some of the forms of secular power, the anti-Catholic reaction fell much less clearly along lines of religious involvement in a narrow sense. This was particularly true of the upper middle class in the non-Southern metropolis, where the Catholic encroachment has been most notable.

Here, despite the highest education level, the Protestant business and professional community responded in a manner which suggests a threat along a broad front; not simply a challenge to religious orthodoxy. Of course, as soon as the perceived world is split into Catholics and Protestants, the upper strata do not stand alone in the metropolis as suffering some broad secular threat from Catholics; the lower strata have experienced economic competition of this order for a long time. It is therefore noteworthy perhaps when we discover that while outside the South generally the anti-Catholic deviation in 1960 among lower-status irregular church attenders was slight indeed (Table 8, entry of -2%), this figure breaks into a significantly negative deviation in the non-Southern metropolis (-11%) and slightly positive, statistically insignificant deviations for the same types of low-status, religiously indifferent people in cities, towns and villages.^{30/} As is the case for the upper strata, the lines of religious involvement predict the anti-Catholic deviation least effectively for the lower strata in the non-Southern metropolis as well. The fact remains, however, that the most striking departure occurs in the business and professional community here, a departure the more striking in a sense because it is forced to work "uphill" against an advanced education.

^{30/} As these signs of anti-Catholic reaction in the non-Southern metropolis accumulate, the reader is cautioned against concluding that there was a "Republican swing" in these urban areas. Such a conclusion would directly contradict what we know to be true, whether we look at aggregate voting statistics or the total structure or our own data. We must remember that these heightened deviations away from the Democrats in 1960 in the metropolis are small, and are confined to white Protestants. They ignore the strong Catholic movement to the Democrats in precisely these areas, as well as a general Democratic trend among Negroes and Jews. Furthermore, they are deviations from an expected vote, and not shifts from 1956 voting patterns. Actually, some of the smaller deviations away from the Democrats represented here would look like actual gains in Democratic strength relative to 1956. Suffice it to say that we are looking now at small underlying wrinkles in the texturing of the 1960 vote, and not at the whole cloth.

These findings have an odd ring when touched against theories of the urban metropolis as a melting pot, the focus of secularism and cosmopolitanism. In general, of course, there remains some mild progression of increasing religious involvement as we move from the metropolis to the rural, and with it, some progression of religious intolerance as well. The broad pattern of findings does little to repudiate the view that religion per se is a more focal area of life in the provinces than in the largest urban centers.

But the wrinkles in the pattern serve to remind us of the proposition that intergroup contact does not, in and of itself, reduce intergroup tension: under many common circumstances, it can lead to broadened competition. Lenski and others have recently challenged the older view of the city on grounds that the religious subcommunities remain more distinct and vital in metropolitan life than has been commonly supposed. By and large, the data we have presented support this challenge. Subcultural boundaries based on religion do appear to have maintained considerable tone in the metropolis where the groups involved have lived for some time in contact. But the data suggest as well that the mainsprings of antagonism in the contact situation are themselves secularized in a sense. They come to pivot less uniquely upon religious feeling, and broaden out across other areas where, of course, competition is occurring. Whatever its original source, the friction becomes less directly religious than subcultural in the broadest sense of the word.

CONCLUSIONS

It is worth some effort to keep the 1960 presidential election in perspective. However fascinated we may be by the X-ray of socio-political cleavage it provides, it is unlikely that the society is as a result about to fall asunder along religious lines. Even the 1960 data themselves would contest this most strongly: despite our interest in the exceptions, the fact remains that on balance, Protestant Democrats were more likely to behave as Democrats than as Protestants, and Catholic Republicans were more likely to behave as Republicans than as Catholics.

It mattered, of course, that Kennedy was not running on a "Catholic platform," nor was Nixon running as a Protestant. While there were attempts from the sidelines to inject issues which would underscore the religious difference -- the birth control question, for example -- such efforts were artificial and had little popular repercussion. The 1960 contest did not take shape because religious tensions in the society were coming to a head at this particular moment. Rather, the fact that Kennedy emerged when he did was, from a religious point of view, purely accidental. Whatever bitter religious struggles have been moved to the political arena to plague pluralistic democracies, the 1960 election in the United States was of another order. In a sense, it was at most a flash of lightning which illuminated, but only momentarily, a darkened landscape below.

To have supposed that "this time" the dark landscape would not "show" represented in part wishful thinking and in part a basic misunderstanding of the sorts of discriminanda seized upon by a relatively ill-informed electorate. Generally, these discriminanda strike the intellectual as superficial. It happens that some are socially divisive, and some

socially integrative. One which is most obviously divisive is the bare fact of the contrasting group memberships of the candidates. This fact in all its simplicity and primitive meaning, was among the first to be disseminated broadly about Kennedy.

Even in the heat of the campaign, however, integrative mechanisms could be witnessed. The oft-disparaged mass media must be accorded a prime role here, in their communication of otherdiscriminanda, some equally superficial but less divisive in cast. There is strong reason to believe, for example, that most of the public had no idea who Kennedy was until the spring of 1960, and that a very large portion first learned of his existence when he was nominated for the presidency. The initial reactions of Protestant Democrats were particularly interesting, as best we can piece them together from our early interview materials. One subset of Protestant Democrats learned that Kennedy was a nominee without learning that he was a Catholic. These respondents were often well along in the time-honored processes of taking the unknown candidate of one's own party to the bosom before word of the Catholic background reached them; the reaction was one of betrayal. Other Protestant Democrats learned at the outset that their party had nominated a Catholic, and were in high dudgeon at the fact. Word of Kennedy's Catholicism traveled fast enough that by mid-September, Protestant Democrats almost without exception "knew" and were in considerable torment. One can suppose that had no further information been conveyed to the public, either through a truncation of the campaign or an absence of powerful mass media, the anti-Catholic reaction registered in the 1960 Protestant vote would have been more impressive.

But gradually the mass media -- and the television debates in particular -- filled in more fully an image of Kennedy. They did not

modify cleavages by convincing Protestants that Catholicism per se was not black. But they did serve up a host of other items of information about this man. He was not only a Catholic, but was as well (in the public eye, from interview material) quick-witted, energetic, and poised. These are traits valued across religious lines, and act at the same time to call into question some of the more garish anti-Catholic stereotypes. While in the grand scheme of things such perceptions may seem superficial, they are real to the actors, and the fact that such perceptions compete with some success against the initial cognition of the candidate's group membership gives some sense, in turn, of the superficiality of the latter as a cue for many people. Bit by bit, as religiously innocuous information filled in, the Protestant Democrat could come to accept Kennedy primarily as a Democrat, his unfortunate religion notwithstanding. Vote intentions angled away from group lines toward party lines.

We must therefore keep perspective on the significance of the voting act itself. Even though we may try to estimate with some precision the impact of the Kennedy candidacy on the two religious groupings, there is no conversion formula translating these statistics to the terms of day-to-day local intergroup antagonism. To the degree that the voter has minimal information, so that beyond basic party loyalties the question devolves to "other things, equal, who do you choose -- a member of your own group or a member of some other?", the impact registered in the vote is perhaps unduly large.

On the other hand, to the degree that the stark group differentium becomes imbedded in a broader process of political choice, a process laden with components irrelevant to the religious cleavage, the primitive power of the group term is muffled. That it is thus imbedded, not only in this

election situation but in other situations characteristic of the American scene as well, is a fact of the first water where the overall stability of the system is concerned. Yet the spontaneous burst of hostility which greeted the simple fact of other-group membership is, at the same time, a warning that in the mass electorate the potential for social friction on these bases is far from dead.

For the elites worried by the problem -- and now we address not the local elites who have some numerical weight in a cross-section sample, but those national elites, who do not -- it is likely that election-eve entreaties to ignore the matter are rather bootless. But in the year-to-year structuring of public controversy, elites who remain sensitive to the explosive potential in some of these issues are, at this reading, scarcely misguided.