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POLITICS AND CULTURE IN GREECE

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PREFACE

Politics and Culture in Greece is the fourth monograph in the series on the analysis of culture and politics in a variety of national settings. The series is designed to further understanding of how culture helps shape political systems and behavior in selected countries. The monographs should be useful to analysts, diplomats, and others with extensive knowledge of the particular country as well as to those seeking an introduction.

The Department of State selected the countries to be included in the series. As series editor, I chose the authors of individual monographs and prepared a set of guidelines developed in two conferences organized by the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at State and attended by government and academic specialists. The guidelines reflect my perspective on "Culture and Politics" as presented in a monograph with that title prepared as part of the project. That general work is available to those seeking more background on the topic.

Each country monograph was revised following a review session attended by academic and government specialists on the country. However, the country author bears final responsibility for the contents of the volume; it should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the Department of State.

The country author also prepared the references and the annotated bibliography of the most important interpretations of culture and politics in the country. For statistical and other basic information on the country, readers should consult the latest issue of *Background Notes*, issued by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State.

I am indebted to many people for the success of this series. Dr. E. Raymond Platig, Director of the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at the Department, heads the list. This collaboration between government and the academy has been facilitated and enriched by his understanding of both cultures. He joins me in expressing appreciation to the many participants in our conferences on the conceptual monograph and on individual countries. Their collective experience is formidable. Their insights, criticisms, and advice have been invaluable.

Samuel H. Barnes
Ann Arbor, Michigan

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POLITICS AND CULTURE IN GREECE

HIGHLIGHTS

The Greeks possess a long continuous history broken down into distinct periods characterized by at times conflicting "world views." Early Greek nationalists tried to accommodate the variant traditions of Classical and Byzantine Greece and the disruptive interlude of Ottoman Turkish domination. It was the latter two periods which contributed to the development of an "eastern" (i.e. non-western) identity for the Greek world. The selective approach to defining the Greek past contributed to the perpetuation of myths, a highly defined sense of nationalism, and insufficient preparation to deal with the challenges of a modern era.

A chronically poor economy, dominated until recently by its rural sector, and limited political security, provided the Greek with a harsh world of struggle and uncertainty that he viewed in Hobbesian terms. To cope with it, the Greek relied on an ingroup composed primarily of the extended family, friends, friends of friends, and those people concerned with his welfare, for security and advancement. Complementing the predisposition to rely on the ingroup for protection against the outgroup was a patronage-clientage system which up until recently dominated Greek politics while sacrificing ideology. A clientelistic approach also characterized the relationship of Greece to the great powers dominant in the Mediterranean.

Greeks tend to evaluate in political terms virtually all dimensions of life in their insecure, hostile world. Consequently, Greek society has tended to be politically volatile and fractious and not inclined to rely on consensus and compromise for solving outstanding problems. Having suffered through foreign domination, manipulation, and external threats, and having experienced the frustration of defeat in pursuit of national expansion earlier this century, Greeks are highly sensitive to threats, real and imagined, from abroad. With differing motivations, the Church, education, and politicians have reinforced a heightened sense of nationalism in the Greek population.

Social, demographic and economic shifts in post-World War II Greece have created the conditions of a traditional society in rapid transition. The pace of change has accelerated since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974 and Greece's entry into the European Community in 1981. The rural sector no longer dominates the majority of the Greek population now lives in urban centers. Greek political processes to be conducted in a rough-and-tumble style, at least by Western European standards, but since the trauma of the military dictatorship, the political process is confined to acceptable parliamentary limits and the military is concentrating on its professional mission.

Andreas Papandreou's PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) appears to have identified the direction of national attitudes quite skillfully and to have captured widespread support among disaffected elements in Greek society. Moreover, with his strident nationalistic stance on foreign policy issues, Papandreou has demonstrated to the general population and to the military officer corps that a political party of the left will not sacrifice national interests. His policies and methods have given a populist cast to PASOK, which has departed from the long prevalent clientelistic structure of Greek political parties by constructing a mass organizational base. The party rather than individual politicians has now assumed the traditional patron role in the dispensation of positions and benefits. Papandreou has also sought to divest Greece of its role as a deferential client to American policy by developing a more independent foreign policy. Such tactics are welcomed by Greeks who express bitterness over the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus and who share an ongoing concern over Turkish challenges to Greek islands and oil exploration rights in the Aegean.

The overall impact of modernizing forces on Greece's culture remains to be seen. Political leaders, however, cannot overlook the fact that no matter how much Greeks might be outwardly attracted to political change, culture can be approached for change only with the greatest skill and care.

POLITICS AND CULTURE IN GREECE

INTRODUCTION

Along with Chinese and Jews among modern peoples, Greeks possess a long continuous history and written language. The extremes of gloried heights and tortured depths in the path to the present have left their impressions on Greek culture. Historical references to a historically-oriented peoples are therefore necessary in a study such as this one.

For generations educated Europeans and Americans have been inspired by and have learned about the achievements of Greece's Classical period that spawned so much of what we recognize as Western civilization. But they have learned little about the exotic 1000-year Byzantine Empire and even less about the period of alien Ottoman Turkish domination, both of which affected Greek culture. Because of these latter developments, the Greek world assumed more of an "eastern" (i.e. non-western) identity that separated it from areas to its west in Europe. As a result, many Europeans and Americans, with their preconceived ideas about what constitutes Greece, have for decades experienced "culture shock" upon exposure to the "real" Greece.

The Greeks also have their own ideas about who they are, and these images do not wholly conform with reality. As with other peoples, the modern Greeks have idealized their own history. The process of simplifying their past for nationalistic purposes is more complex because it is difficult to reconcile the unlike spirit and achievements of the pagan Classical era with the Christian-Orthodox, Byzantine period.¹ Moreover, subjugation to Ottoman Turkish rule separated the Greeks even more from their Classical heritage. By the time the Greeks began to assert themselves against their Turkish overlords in the early 19th century, Greek writers began a crusade to emphasize the continuity and not the complex diversity of their historical experiences during the Classical, Byzantine and Ottoman periods.² They did this deliberately to present an impregnable image of Hellenism for the purposes of developing and maintaining national consciousness and pride. They succeeded.

Politicians, the Church, the educational system, and newspapers, among other sections of the Greek world, have perpetuated—and often exploited—these nationalistic feelings. Consequently, Greeks have nurtured a pervasively ethnocentric vision of themselves and their nation (*ethnos*), whether they are in Greece or in the diaspora. Despite the increased sophistication of today's Greek, he latently would like to accept the image of modern Hellenism created in the nineteenth century. An ethnic myth, widely accepted in earlier decades, had the modern Greek at once as the spiritual heir of all the splendid intellectual endowments of the Classical Age and the political heir of the vast pretensions, both religious and imperial, of the Byzantine Empire. Earlier aspirations to imperial

grandeur crumbled with the demise of Greece's expansionist program, the *Megale Idea*, in 1922.

An associated myth portrayed the Greeks as "a chosen people," ready to rise up from misfortune resulting from the hatred and conspiracies of the strong. An offshoot of these sentiments was the classification of all foreigners as *philhellenes* or *mishellenes*, Greek-lovers or Greek-haters. Anyone working against or critical of Greece fell into the latter category. There is still a tendency to use the term *mishellenes* when referring to foreign leaders, countries, and scholars who appear to be working against Greek national interests.³

Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis stated in 1975 that Greeks mistakenly imagine that Greece is the center of the world's political interest, "the navel of the earth," which leads to the delusion that "we can dictate our own policy to others, both friends and enemies, great and small." He also claimed that when archaeologists working at Delphi reported to him that they had found the original stone known as the "navel of the earth," he begged them to throw it into the sea (Woodhouse, 1982:222). Such manifestations of nationalism—a dominant dimension of Greek society—will be one of the important themes discussed here.

Chronically poor economically for three millenia, Greece was long unable to provide economic security for its population. Consequently, Greeks through the centuries have gone elsewhere, earlier as conquerors or colonizers, and later as merchants or immigrants. Economic uncertainty in the homeland combined with political struggles for survival created a troublesome environment for the Greek. Within the impoverished rural society that dominated the diminutive Greece emerging from the Greek War of Independence in 1830, security, as had been the case for centuries, was to be found in family and friends. They formed the "ingroup" as protection against the "outgroup." Linked with this cultural outlook was a patronage-clientage system which came to dominate the political process.

An extension of this predisposition towards clientelism was reflected in Greece's relationships with the great powers. The main political factions that emerged during the Greek War of Independence were identified by the patron power with which they were associated, either English, French, or Russian. These labels remained until the Crimean War era (1854-1856). Subsequently, the British, who dominated the Mediterranean, came to play the role of controversial patron, and after World War II the United States assumed this function. Beginning with Truman Doctrine support to crush the communists in the civil war and with subsequent large amounts of economic aid, Washington involved itself heavily in Greece's domestic affairs. Moreover, as problems in Cyprus increased from the mid-1950s, first with Britain and then with Turkey, many Greeks came to question the value of this client role with an America that did not come to Greece's aid. More recently, the large majority of Greeks came to share negative perceptions of America because of Washington's support for the military dictatorship and because of its seeming indifference to the Turkish occupation of the northern section of Cyprus in 1974. There was a general call for ending the longstanding role of

abused client but no unanimity on how it should be done, hence the particularly rocky state of U.S.-Greek relations since that summer.

No matter what their content, politics in Greece has tended to be conducted in a very contentious fashion, frequently leading to polarization. Consensus politics and compromise, basic to the American system, have not been Greek ideals. Economic and political insecurity in Greek society appear to have perpetuated these patterns. Moreover, it is not an exaggeration to state that a concern for politics is characteristic of Greek culture. The "average" Greek is far more ready to express himself politically than the "average" American or Englishman. In the past such proclivities, taken to the extreme, led to instability and contributed to the creation of political nightmares such as the 7-year military dictatorship which collapsed in July 1974. Greek political habits seem to have changed positively in its aftermath.

Demographic and economic forces have transformed Greece in numerous ways and at an ever-accelerating pace since the end of the civil war in 1949. More recently, Greece entered the European Community as its tenth member-state in 1981. These changes have had an impact on traditional culture and vice versa, an understanding of which is crucial for studying this society in transition.

THE STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP ON GREEK CULTURE

Modern Greece's culture and people have been appealing subject matter to many authors, yet many of these writers have come from non-academic backgrounds. In the 18th and 19th centuries many English travelers and classicists recorded their impressions for a literary market, a pattern maintained by others during this century. A controversial example of a popular yet superficial portrayal of Greeks is Henry Miller's *The Colossus of Maroussi* (1941).⁴

No less a personage than Arnold Toynbee devoted a part of his career to writing about the Greeks during their different epochs. One usually associates Toynbee's name with his monumental study of world civilization, but his last book, posthumously published, bore the title, *The Greeks and Their Heritages* (1981). His prime focus was on discovering why the Greek people's reactions to their heritages differed so much at distinct stages in their history. The other name that comes to mind when one considers studies of the broad sweep of world history is William H. McNeill from the University of Chicago. He, too, has written intermittently yet prolifically on modern Greece. That such distinguished historians continued to concern themselves with Greece confirms the existence of an intriguing, challenging subject. However, their conclusions, often provocative, and their methodology are not readily accepted by many social scientists.⁵

Only recently have serious social science studies provided scholarly substantiation to judgments about the special or universal dimensions of Greek culture and society. Because of political and nationalist sensitivities, Greek scholars have lagged behind the efforts of Europeans and Americans up until the last decade or so in studying Greece. Anthropological investigations, in particular, have contributed much to our knowledge of traditional culture and modernization.

But these have tended to focus on the rural experience, and much remains to be done on the impact of urbanization on Greek culture. There are few sociological and anthropological studies of the urban setting. The writings of political scientists tended to concentrate on the phenomenon of clientelism until the mid-1970s, but with the advent of ideological politics, more diverse, sophisticated, and detailed analyses have appeared.

For a truly accurate profile of Greek culture, considerable work remains to be done in the several disciplines already mentioned, plus fields such as demography, human geography, and social psychology. The return to Greece of European- and American-trained Greeks with advanced degrees will contribute much to this effort. In addition, these academics can now conduct research in a freer intellectual climate.

SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF GREEK CULTURE

In the harsh struggle for existence that characterized Greek rural society for centuries, cultural patterns emerged that still hold true for much of Greek life. Heavy reliance on the ingroup for security and advancement has given direction to Greek life. This ingroup has the extended family at its core but also includes friends, friends of friends, guests, and others who are concerned with a person's welfare. The outgroup consists of all others. There is a tendency to categorize people quite quickly in one or the other group. The extended family provides the primary reference group for Greeks and also determines their values, norms and behavior (Triandis, 1972:110; Pollis, 1977:3).

There is general agreement that *philotimo* long served as the dominant Greek value, but that its current function has diminished. Literally translated, *philotimo* means "love of honor," but the term implies more because of its emotional tone and behavioral requirements. The concept is not to be found in the Anglo-Saxon value system (Pollis, 1965:34). In the West individuals are judged as to whether they possess integrity, whereas in Greece they have been evaluated as to whether they possess *philotimo*. It measures "a man's worth in terms of his success in fulfilling kinship obligations and in protecting the extended family from real or imaginary threats emanating from a hostile physical and human environment" (Pollis, 1977:3). Expressed in another way, the person embodying *philotimo* will behave toward members of his ingroup in the way they expect him to behave (Triandis, 1972:309). Nevertheless, this rigid standard does not exclude distrust and latent hostility within the extended family.

The Greek view of the social order is essentially a Hobbesian one; however, the arena for struggle is at the group, not the individual, level. In the hostile world the Greek is ever on guard to protect his *philotimo* and the interests of his ingroup (Pollis, 1965:35). Human relations, in general, are defined in terms of struggle and competition; one man's gain will be seen as someone else's loss. It is difficult for a Greek to accept that a deal might be mutually beneficial (McNeill, 1978:12).

Trust can be hard to come by in Greece. It exists mainly within one's ingroup and is a prerequisite for effective cooperation. Trust emerges from personal relationships as a consequence of the other person's good behavior and character (Triandis, 1972:333). Unlike the openness of intragroup relations, Greeks in intergroup relations tend to be secretive about their own affairs and regularly on the lookout for information about others in their competitive orbit. Such a setting naturally breeds distrust, suspicion, and rumors. And because the sense of struggle prevails, Greeks in interpersonal relations can be highly assertive in their behavior, reinforcing a commonly held perception of Greek individualism (Campbell, 1983:186; Pollis, 1965:43). A recent European Community survey covering the twelve members confirms such tendencies: the Greeks rank quite low (ahead of only the Italians) on the level of trust among their own people (*Eurobarometer*, June 1986:46).

The Greek attitude towards authority also has ingroup-outgroup parameters. Within the ingroup, authority may be viewed as benevolent and concerned. This is particularly true in the family where child rearing encourages the acceptance of authority. Traditionally, this reached the extreme of complete submissiveness in a hierarchical structure that has the father at the top. This acceptance of authority in the family has not generally carried over similarly to outgroup figures, who are viewed in competitive terms (Triandis, 1972:311). "Reciprocal duties and obligations determined inter-personally accord the authoritative figure . . . deference on the part of those of inferior status" (Pollis, 1965:41). Thus, Greeks will display deference and submission towards the authority figures on whom they are dependent. If an authority figure is rejected, the characteristic response can be one of resentment, defiance, and undermining. Overt defiance of authority is not the standard reaction (Triandis, 1972:304; Pollis, 1977:5-6).

Individuals with status and power are, however, also viewed as potential sources for furthering individual or family interests. From their position of influence they can dispense benefits to clients who, in turn, will provide support, often political or bureaucratic, to the patrons. In a society dominated by limited economic resources, the development of clientelistic networks came to be regarded as vital for survival, both for the patron and the client. Particularly in rural areas which provided the breeding ground for its development, patron-client relations were face to face relations and engendered a host of psychological bonds (Pollis, 1977:9). The greater impersonality of the urban setting as well as changing social and economic patterns have been altering the character of this old system. However, it is still firmly placed in the mindset of Greeks that the road to advancement cannot be based on individual merit but instead comes through *mesa*, or means. That is, someone in a position of influence is there to help against the competition. Since a Greek has difficulty conceding failure, he regularly attributes the success of others to their greater access to *mesa*.

If a Greek does not perceive the boss as an "ingroup" protector, he will not readily accept his leadership in a work situation, often undermining and sabotaging him. The boss, aware of these tendencies, responds with severe controls and close supervision (Triandis, 1969:34). Such attitudes work against the development of

loyalty towards the employment unit, and Greeks accept with difficulty the maxim that by working effectively together all may benefit from a better institution (such as a school, bank, business). If an outgroup member holds little power, the characteristic Greek response is indifference. The greater the power of the outgroup authority, the greater the perceived threat; if somebody has power it automatically makes him a competitor. Group leaders, in turn, instinctively would rather see "stagnation or even deterioration of the existing situation than see their competitors acquire more power. It further means that the sympathies of the Greeks are with the underdog in any kind of intergroup struggle" (Triandis, 1972:311)—that is, until the underdog acquires power.

"Deference is not necessarily accorded to traditional authorities but to whomever possesses status and power, who in turn is 'legitimately' entitled to privileges not accessible to the many" (Pollis, 1977:5). An egalitarian spirit with the Western connotation of equality of opportunity, equality of human rights, or equality as a natural endowment has not characterized Greek society. Equality has been defined by measuring a man's worth, and the criterion of his worth is that of his virtue—that is, if he behaves with *philotimo*. With such a value base, rich and poor, powerful and weak could be equal (Pollis, 1977:5).⁶

Greeks tend to be oversensitive to criticism; the slightest critical remark is likely to be reacted to as a major threat. Moreover, Greeks rarely acknowledge personal responsibility for failure, errors, or negative developments. To do so would be psychologically devastating to the self and the ingroup. Blame is placed upon others. The explanation for failure is also linked to fatalism: the Greek will contend that he has no control over his destiny or environment. Others have betrayed him, fate has relegated him to poverty, and he cannot escape his destiny (Pollis, 1977:4; Triandis, 1972:308).

Words characteristically speak louder than actions in the Greek setting. For a society which seems to be dominated by outspoken individuals who assert their opinions aggressively in loud exchanges, there are few extreme initiatives or instances of violence that follow. A verbal tirade will not usually lead to direct action. Instead, "venting the spleen" serves as a psychological outlet for pent-up frustrations in dealing with one's fate. Open challenges to authority can be psychologically traumatic and imperil one's prospects for gain.⁷

Shame plays a distinctive role in Greek society. Greek culture tends to be shame-oriented; the term "guilt" is generally used within a legal context. The West views guilt as the punishment meted out to an individual for the transgressions of internalized values. "In Greek culture, shame is the psychological device employed to ensure conformity, and shame is the emotion a person's transgressions engender in him" (Pollis, 1965:33). A Greek is not solely responsible to himself, but also to the group of which he is an integral part. Shame is the psychological penalty for behaviour inappropriate vis-à-vis the group (Pollis, 1965:33). As Greek society becomes increasingly exposed to Western patterns, the weight added to guilt might increase.

GENERAL CULTURAL PATTERNS

"Reality in Greece is impregnated with social considerations . . ." (Triandis, 1972:299). In the hostile world, successes, failures, conflicts, and relationships with people and authorities are viewed in ingroup-outgroup terms. The incapacity to admit responsibility for failure and the habit of attributing it to the maliciousness of others alert Greeks to real and fabricated conspiracies.

Religion for the Greeks today has more of an identity than a spiritual function.⁸ The Orthodox Church played an important role in maintaining Greek identity during the period of Ottoman Turkish and Moslem domination. Indeed, Greeks will even now acknowledge what was an axiom during the Turkish occupation: Church and nation have a great unity and interdependence, and they cannot be separated from one another (Ware, 1983:208). The Orthodox Church has traditionally distinguished between the life of the soul and that of the state and society. It is by its very nature a bastion of conservative principles and is resistant to change. However, it does not preoccupy itself with social and political issues. The church's role today as a strong spiritual guide for or direct influence upon Greeks has diminished. Its Byzantine legacy to Greek culture has been to support submission to traditional authority, to contribute to anti-Western attitudes,⁹ and to add to the fatalistic belief that individuals cannot control forces working against them. Although few Greeks attend church regularly today, they still overwhelmingly participate in the religious rites of baptism, marriage (even after the recent legalization of the civil wedding ceremony), and funerals. The sentimental link to the church has not been broken.

Observers of the Greek scene have sarcastically or condescendingly asserted that reason is absent.¹⁰ There may not be a reliance on accepted Western norms of logic, it is to defend or advance one's own status or that of one's ingroup. The hostile world requires all sorts of tactics to assure protection from the forces of adversity. In the same vein, though honesty and truth are respected, telling a lie outside the ingroup is not necessarily seen as a crime. "Greeks believe that face-saving lies are highly desirable and at any rate most acceptable" (Triandis, 1972:224). Greeks can also for the same reason be quite obstinate and unyielding in their positions and opinions. Operating in a highly verbal society compared with the United States, Greeks often exaggerate to add emphasis, to establish debating points, or simply to outsmart the opponent. "Exaggeration is not only an ethnic weakness. It is a way of life" (Dimou, 1983:22). Needless to say, these proclivities contribute to a general atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. On the other hand, argumentativeness is a mechanism of social control which can restrain the potential violence inherent in a world of man against man (Pollis, 1977:6).

Tolerance of others is directly linked to the ingroup-outgroup perception of society and can be seen as an outgrowth of the Ottoman experience. Coldness and suspicion, even hostility, can characterize contacts between outgroups.

Improvement comes only when mutual trust or mutual usefulness, or both, become certain.

Another dimension of this cultural pattern is associated with localism and parochialism. For centuries, rugged geography limited contact between regions. Greeks in their relations with individuals from other regions (outgroup) naturally responded suspiciously and expanded their ingroup to include fellow villagers. The size of the ingroup can be seen to increase in direct relation to the type of threat or challenge. If the threat appears relevant to a widely shared characteristic such as nationality or religion, the ingroup expands to include all members having this characteristic. Thus, effective cooperation characterizes Greek behavior in wartime, whereas internal competitiveness tends to prevail during peace (Triandis, 1972:304).¹¹

The foreigner in Athens witnessing the pushing and shoving in crowds and loud shouting between disputatious Greeks can falsely assume that Greece is a potentially violent society. Greeks possess no inhibitions about expressing emotional and antagonistic feelings, but rarely does violence follow the verbal barrages. Greece continues to have one of the lowest crime and murder rates in Europe. However, a significant percentage of homicides fall into the category of "crimes of honor." Depending on the circumstances, many Greeks will not consider it a crime to kill for family honor, and courts do not always convict. Even the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941) and the more recent military junta (1967-1974) did not qualify as bloody regimes in the style of Argentina or Chile. The one notable exception was the brutal suppression by the army of the demonstration by students and their supporters at the Athens Polytechnic in November 1973.

CULTURE AND POLITICS

Structural Aspects

The inculcated value system of the United States emphasizes that an individual can succeed on hard work, abilities, and merit. Few Greeks believe solely in such a strategy for personal success. Individual Greeks do work hard and make it on their own, but Greeks characteristically rely on the extensive support of their kin and aspire to the right "connections." Patron-client relationships that emerged during the rougher times of Ottoman domination have persisted to the present, despite demographic and other developments associated with urbanization and socio-economic changes that are altering their form and diminishing their universality.

Considering foreign wars, civil wars, economic hardships, and shaky political stability, one can understand that the impact of the political process on the individual's life in this small country is far greater than in the United States. Greeks are highly political and they view much of everyday life in political terms. In earlier decades the heated political discussions of the *kafeneion* (coffeehouse) dominated much of leisure time. Foreigners observed that politics should be

designated as Greece's "national sport." Today, it is hard to find another European country which drums up so much enthusiasm for elections, including those at the municipal level. While the other 9-member states of the European Community conducted the June 1984 European Parliament elections in a generally staid and mechanical fashion, Greece displayed partisan fervor at the highest level.

Notwithstanding the intensity of political involvement in Greece, there is not necessarily a commensurate degree of sophistication. But there is a basic awareness of political realities, the immediate consequences of victory or defeat in a fiercely competitive society. At the turn of the century, an English official observed: "No difference of principle divides one party from the other . . . the difference is of men, not measures—the sweets of office versus the cold shades of opposition" (Papacosma, 1977:16-17). Since that era Greek politics has become more ideological, but the lure of personal gain and the fear of loss still persist. Additionally, Greeks tend to be wholeheartedly for or against something. There is no leeway allowed for an understanding of the possible merits of an opponent's position. No "gray area" is tolerated. Loyalties may shift from one party to another, but at a given moment loyalties are absolute and indivisible to a particular party. An individual espousing an independent position is a rare commodity: one cannot stand alone.

In expressing total commitment to a political faction, Greeks are prone to oversimplify positions while casting aspersions at opponents. History's main forces are too frequently reduced to conspiracy, intrigue, and behind-the-scenes manipulation. According to one critic, it is hard to explain to Greeks that responsibility for "whatever happens is not attributable only to the superpowers, to foreign 'fingers' [i.e. influences], to monopolies, to multinationals and to secret services but that—sometimes—they themselves are" (Dimou, 1984:47). In the same vein it can be hard to convince Greeks, "That all rightists are not junta supporters, all leftists guerrillas, all merchants thieves, all artists sodomites, all politicians liars" (Dimou, 1984:47). Thus, despite the fact that after the junta's fall the rightist New Democracy party embraced quite different politics from its predecessors, an effective slogan of Andreas Papandreu's victorious Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the 1985 election was: "Greeks cannot forget what it means to be Right." Of course, the conservative right prior to the dictatorship and the junta itself had earlier milked anti-communism and anti-leftism dry with equivalent simplistic phrases.

Traditionally, because of the dominant role played by clientelistic networks, parties had no extensive organizations at the local level and no mass basis. With such a fragile foundation, parties rarely outlived their leaders. Organized vertically, these networks linked political loyalties from the local to provincial to national levels. Voters in the countryside perceived political concerns in personal and local terms and rarely in national terms, except when foreign policy issues threatened Greece's security or national expansion. Because of the dominant role played by patron-client relationships and polarized feuding and because of the energy consumed in pursuit of the *Megale Idea* until 1922, the Greeks were slow in developing strong ideological parties. For example, unlike the pattern in

neighboring Balkan states, no agrarian party of consequence has ever existed in Greece, and prior to World War I no significant socialist movement had emerged.¹²

The dominant role of kinship-ingroup loyalties for providing security found a natural extension in patron-client relationships. With the emphasis placed on personal interests and contacts, Greek society remained politically fragmented. Except in nationalist issues associated mostly with foreign policy, the needs of the Greek state and the objective of national development as a unifying process hardly attracted the voter. Few organized interest groups existed prior to World War II, and the emergence of the Greek communist party (KKE) after World War I provided the only class-oriented party, albeit a weak one. The Venizelist-Constantinist division of World War I evolved during the interwar period into a republican-royalist division of political allegiances. Class and societal concerns started appearing in political debates, but the old clientelistic patterns prevailed. Traditional political families and regional elites perpetuated themselves in influence within the framework of this divisive power struggle. Attention concentrated on maintaining or overthrowing republican institutions rather than on working within the existing system for the improvement of social and economic conditions. A rightist dictatorship, backed by the monarchy and an army purged of republicans, emerged from the political disarray in August 1936. However, unlike other fascist and fascist-style regimes in Europe, Ioannis Metaxas came to power without a mass party following.

The Greek Communist party (KKE) increased in strength and popularity during the Axis occupation, when the resistance organization it controlled proved effective in exploiting anti-royalist sentiments in the population. The restoration of the monarchy and defeat of the KKE in the civil war consolidated the right's hold on power. Despite the ideological confrontations of the 1940s, the right came to dominate politics with repressive measures and the revival of old clientelistic patterns. The right's ideology consisted basically of anti-communism and little else. Apart from the United Democratic Left (EDA), which represented the positions of the banned communists, the other parties, too, indulged in clientelistic politics. Basically, these traditional patterns were an accepted way of life and had confronted too few formidable challenges to precipitate change. Although Greeks have often condemned *rousfefti* (i.e. the reciprocal dispensation of favors), they have all pursued it. Not to do so places one at a distinct competitive disadvantage.

Early in his political career Constantine Karamanlis wrote to a friend that Greeks have an incapacity for political consistency: "It is an incapacity which runs through the whole of our age-long history. Hellenism . . . has always lived in a state of improvisation and extremism. It can perform momentary miracles, but it cannot make a continuous effort. And politics is above all a continuous effort" (Woodhouse, 1982:24). Perhaps too sweeping a declamation, his statement nonetheless is true of much of modern Greek politics. Everyday Greek life is characterized by maneuver and manipulation to protect and advance one's interests. Resourcefulness prevails and the rules of the game are not set in concrete. Consequently, politics has reflected similar attitudes.

Defending and advancing national interests are goals shared universally by Greeks, but there have been different schools of thought as to how these goals should be attained. These objectives must not be threatened by politicians, and, as might be expected, nationalist sentiments in the populace are, in turn, often exploited. Thus, despite grave social and economic problems in interwar Greece that might have led to increased support for its programs, the communist party made little headway largely because of its adherence to the Comintern line on an autonomous Macedonia, a policy which implied that Greece would have to give up its section of Macedonia. In the national struggle against the Axis occupiers, the KKE increased in popularity, but the governments and rightists during and after the civil war harped incessantly on the theme that one could not be a true Greek and a communist (or leftist sympathizer) at the same time, because of the latter's allegiance to a non-national center and ideology—Moscow and communism.

The policies of the military dictatorship between 1967 to 1974 stretched conservative nationalism and anti-communism to absurd lengths. Yet one of the several significant changes that Andreas Papandreou has introduced to the Greek political scene since 1974 has been his success in proving that one can be associated with the political left and be a staunch nationalist, even more nationalist than the right. He has done this by emphasizing the development of a more independent foreign policy and by maintaining a stiff stance towards Turkish diplomatic and military posturing. Such positions brought important returns by converting wary voters to his cause and easing the concerns of military officers. In turn, the KKE, though loyal to Moscow, has packaged a program which stresses that Greece's national interests are constantly being violated by the United States, Western Europe, and NATO. Because of continuing problems with Turkey, no matter which government is in power, Greece continues to spend about one-quarter of its national budget and 6 to 7 percent of its gross national product on defense, amounts which are consistently at the highest levels among the NATO states.

The Orthodox Church supports politically and socially conservative principles and was closely associated with the military dictatorship. As an institution, however, the church has not been prepared to die at the barricades for these principles. Nor has it been severely threatened by parties or governments. Anti-clericalism as a mass movement has never developed. "The church, even if a conservative force in many parts of the country, never became a separate political culture" (Macridis, 1981:6). The recent controversy and furor over the state takeover of Church lands and attempts to control Church affairs with the inclusion of laymen on local church councils highlight the sensitivity of the relationship. Generally, however, the Church hierarchy has experienced more serious pressures from within its own ranks than from outside.¹³

Having conceived the word in the Classical era, the Greeks are indeed quite "cynical" today. The political system is an extension of the generally contentious Greek world. Politicians promise much but deliver on little. No matter what type of regime is in power—dictatorial, conservative, socialist—the bureaucracy is a minefield to be maneuvered through with the greatest difficulty. Notwithstanding professed claims to the contrary, corruption has never been eliminated. It helps to

have relatives, friends, and political contacts in the bureaucracy. And it certainly is not a liability if you are identified with the political party controlling the government. One cannot expect to advance within the system on the basis of merit; considerations of loyalty generally overshadow effective performance.

Substantive Aspects

Not that everything is, but virtually anything can be or can become political in Greece.¹⁴ Society has become polarized within and beyond constitutional restraints on several occasions. The most extreme example of the latter is, of course, the civil war period. Social relationships can hinge on political allegiances, as can coffeehouse clientele, and even beer preference. Politicized Greeks are constantly on the alert to take the offensive and to place the opposition on the defensive. Newspapers justify a good part of their existence on this type of role. Extremism has bred extremism. Since the fall of the junta, however, there have been serious attempts by all parties to conduct this sparring within mutually acceptable limits. A notable example is the "proper" tactics used by the KKE since it became a legal party again in 1974.

Originally regional notables, Greece's elites came to include many representatives from socially prominent and wealthier classes. An identifiable political class has existed since independence. Some families have had politically prominent members for 3, 4, even 5 generations. Despite the entrance of some ideology into politics during this century, clientelism prevailed within a frequently polarized setting, combining to snuff out the development of mass parties. After the fall of the Republic in 1935, the right—parliamentary or authoritarian—consolidated its position and dominated Greek affairs, with the exception of the Axis occupation, until the 1970s. Only since the fall of the dictatorship have political party programs come to reflect more appropriately the social and class breakdown of the general population.

The Greek political arena has been a highly cluttered one for most of this century. That is, not only the freely elected representatives of the people have provided political direction to the country. Clientelism reached into other areas. Kings did not assume a role over and above the political melee but had direct associations with political parties that represented their interests. The officer corps of the armed forces played a major political role, making and unmaking governments and institutions. In the interwar period political control of the military could mean control of the country. Foreign powers also involved themselves in Greek affairs by supporting specific factions and parties. Such extraparliamentary forces contributed to the development of a number of political crises. The Greek left's popularity since 1974 increased partly due to the right's association with such patterns in the years following the restoration of the monarchy in 1935.

The acquisition of power characteristically involved struggle, manipulation, opportunism, and extreme methods. Once in power, political parties tried to assure perpetuation of control, hence the concern over the political identification of the officer corps and public administration. Cashierings and politically motivated

promotions in the armed forces and appointments in the state bureaucracy were commonplace. Rightist control of the state apparatus and the armed forces characterized Greek politics in the four decades from 1935. After the junta's fall, the conservative government of Constantine Karamanlis, divesting the parliamentary right of its old repressive image, became the first to open up significantly in a pluralistic sense the state bureaucracy and civil service positions.

The victory of Papandreou's PASOK in the October 1981 elections and the smooth transition of power were certainly significant enough for Greece. Even more important, however, was that normal elections were held in June 1985: it was the first time since before World War I that there was a major turnover of power from one type of regime to a very different one that did not result within the span of several years in a serious extraparliamentary shock to Greece's institutions. This does not mean that old patterns have totally faded away. Papandreou has rewarded many of his party members, disparagingly referred to as the "Green Guards", with governmental and civil service positions.¹⁵ Despite advocating a reformist social program to redistribute wealth, Papandreou's policies also reflect an extension of old clientelistic patterns, with "rewards" this time distributed horizontally among a mass party base.

The enforcement of both the letter and spirit of the law can be difficult in Greece. Traditionally, Greeks have been suspicious of power and authority, an evident outgrowth of their experiences under Ottoman rule. This attitude in conjunction with the dominant role of elites and patrons and their ability to "bend" the law for themselves and their clients extended these patterns into the 20th century. When indeed there are attempts to enforce certain laws uniformly, the Greeks prove ingenious in seeking legal and illegal ways to beat the system or, as they phrase it, "finding the open window." In countering such maneuvers, lawmakers have amassed a ponderous mish-mash of laws and litigation that complicates, if not confuses, enforcement. Impartiality of the courts, moreover, is not a firmly-based tradition. The sanctity of law is not inviolable.¹⁶

Political Symbols

Several symbols have played and continue to play a role in Greek society. Perhaps the most significant is the *ethnos*, or nation, embodying all that is rich and positive for Hellenism through the millenia. Similarly, and as referred to elsewhere, the Greek Orthodox Church is closely linked with the identity and survival of the *ethnos*, even if on a historical and not spiritual level today.

Others have tried to coopt the *ethnos* symbol, but with no permanent success. The monarchy, from its restoration in 1935 until its demise during the the early stages of the junta, tried to serve itself up as the savior of the *ethnos* but within the context of a politically divided populace. Greek monarchs, associated directly with conservative political factions, failed in their mission to appear as a unifying focus.

The military dictators after their takeover in April 1967 utilized the image of the phoenix behind a soldier with bayonet as the symbol for their new regime and

for their purported regeneration of the *ethnos*. With the dictatorship's fall and its accompanying humiliation over the Cyprus fiasco, the symbolic role of the armed forces as a savior of all that was traditional in Greece—and therefore as an opponent of liberalized social and political conditions—has been downgraded to fill the customary defensive mission of the military in other Western European countries.

The term *aghnas* (struggle) is used so frequently in the Greek political process that it has assumed symbolic proportions. It has been employed by virtually all factions with a positive connotation of working towards an improved condition. Thus, it had been used earlier for the *ethnos* in its struggle to achieve independence against the Turks and then to extend the borders to include the Greek-speaking Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire. The so-called nationalistic Greeks (*ethnikofrones*) spoke of the struggle to suppress the communist rebellion in the late 1940s; the communists continue to refer to the *aghnas* for overthrowing oppressive capitalist domination; the anti-junta groups hailed the resistance struggle against the military rulers; and PASOK has called for the national struggle to assert Greek national sovereignty against foreign exploitation and manipulation. George Papandreou, as leader of the Center Union party in the 1960s, referred to the "unyielding struggle" in his attempt to unseat the right and to challenge King Constantine's overinvolvement in political affairs.

Up until recently the two versions of Greek used by the population carried significant symbolic weight. *Katharevousa*, a purist form constructed to combine ancient Greek with more modern forms at the end of the eighteenth century, came to be the official language of the state, of the educated and professional classes, and of newspapers. *Demotiki*, a natural descendant of the popular Greek spoken in the Byzantine period, was widely used by the general population. Since independence, insistence on the use of *katharevousa* in schools and public administration came to be associated with the privileged classes and political conservatives. First radical left elements and then even moderate groups came to support the adoption of demotic Greek. The version of Greek used (dependent on the situation) came to identify a person politically and socially. Finally, after the fall of the junta, which was an arch-supporter of *katharevousa* because of the Church's pressure, the Karamanlis government oversaw the drafting of the new constitution with no provision for *katharevousa* as the official form of the Greek language. This omission promoted the acceptance of *demotiki* at all levels of Greek society, officialdom, and education—and its usage has prevailed. Arch-conservatives and the Church remain the last bastions of *katharevousa*.

Gender in Politics

Greece has been a traditional, male-dominated society for centuries. Historically, Greek women received appropriate recognition for their contributions only in times of national struggle such as during the Greek War of Independence and in the resistance to the Axis occupation. More controversial was their role in the ranks of the communist forces during the civil war. Individual Greek women from the social elites have periodically acquired prominence for outstanding

achievements. But culture, tradition, and laws combined to place obstacles in the path to greater equality. The collective impact of important demographic, social, and economic changes since the 1960s, however, highlighted more than ever the incongruous relation between the important role of women in Greek society and the traditional laws and habits of the nation. The efforts of the New Democracy governments after the junta's fall marginally improved the situation.

Real change followed the victory of Andreas Papandreou in October 1981. Greece became increasingly prominent in the formulation of progressive public policy for women. Despite the significant attempts by the mid-1980s to change the legal and civil status of women, "equality was still nowhere near to being achieved, and the old patriarchal assumptions were still firmly rooted in Greek society" (Stamiris, 1986:110). Nonetheless, the legal advances for women will be among the lasting achievements of PASOK.

Since 1974, Greek women have become increasingly involved in politics, and 11 women out of a total of 300 members of parliament were chosen in the 1985 elections. Two of the 24 members of Greece's contingent to the European Parliament are women. They have also held ministerial positions. As might be expected, women have been more visible in leftist political parties, which also sponsor most of the women's organizations.

Political Evaluations

In Greece the political system is part of a hostile politicized world. The effectiveness of the system for the individual is measured in terms of how one's interests are protected or advanced. If the system is not producing positive results, it should be challenged, perhaps even changed. Importantly, the forms such challenges assume have moderated since the horrors of the military dictatorship. A system protective of pluralistic interests is more universally appealing now than it was in 1967, when a noticeable percentage of the population accepted the imposition of rightist dictatorship (despite claims to the contrary today);¹⁷ or earlier during the civil war when the far left sought the violent overthrow of bourgeois institutions. The military, after its embarrassments during the Cyprus debacle in the summer of 1974, has assumed a quiescent role. The monarchy, moreover, is a dead letter for Greece. The legalization of the KKE found it quite willing to operate within the pluralistic setting of parliament. With some of the former threats to a democratic order pushed firmly to the side and with no public support for extremist methods, Karamanlis strove for Greece's membership into the European Community earlier than originally scheduled as a way to provide even more girding to the newly installed democratic system.

The political system survived the critical transition from conservative to socialist leadership in October 1981. The conservatives played the political game very fairly after 1974 until the 1981 elections, and they felt, in turn, that the country's new socialist leadership had not played fair as it tried to place its imprint on all levers of political control. Repentant conservatives had to concede with regret that they were paying for past sins, that they were now on the other side of

the fence. PASOK's ranks, swollen with those deprived of opportunities within the rightist-dominated system which had been in place for decades, gloated in their newly acquired power.

PASOK's tenure in power has been, if anything, controversial. It has had a mix of successes and failures, by whatever standards one might measure them. It has lost earlier supporters and acquired new ones, according to how the losses and gains are evaluated by individual voters. In the face of a badly suffering economy, committed PASOK supporters, when confronted with the reality, will characteristically respond: "They [i.e. PASOK] are better than the others [i.e. the right]." Dichard attitudes still prevail: to them, the right has never been good. To exaggerate their separateness from the conservatives and their earlier illiberal practices (pre-1967), supporters of PASOK and the two communist parties often refer to themselves collectively as democrats. There are still only rare examples of consensus politics (primarily on defense issues), but it, in any case, has little appeal for party supporters and few precedents.

Constantly suspicious of power and its uses, Greeks are generally wary of the political community, but specifically that section of it that does not represent effectively their individual interests. There are few fair, gentlemanly politicians; they are not highly regarded because their tactics do not bring victories. Traditionally, Greeks have divided the world into "haves" and "have-nots" and politicians have flourished by articulating and feeding these sentiments. Papandreou successfully consolidated his position by emphasizing the ongoing struggle of the non-privileged against the small, privileged oligarchy, just as in earlier decades the right harped on the threat from the left to Greek security, national identity, and culture.

As was generally the case earlier in continental Europe, constitutions in Greece have been seen as representing specific political interests to the detriment of other groups. The interwar clash between royalists and republicans intensified this pattern, and the junta's balleyhooed constitutions, structured for "controlled democracy," reemphasized the repressive potential of such documents. The 1975 Constitution, modeled somewhat on the constitution of the Fifth French Republic, aroused the opposition of PASOK and KKE. Although the system worked well and neither Constantine Tsatsos, president from 1975 to 1980, nor Constantine Karamanlis, who served from 1980 to 1985, used any of the strong presidential powers provided in the Constitution, the document had, for the left, a rightist imprint. In a move that surprised Greeks and which was apparently designed to appease the left within and outside his party, Papandreou in March 1985 said that he could not support the reelection of Karamanlis to the presidency—something that he had publicly backed until then—and that he would institute proceedings for constitutional revision of presidential powers. Karamanlis resigned and the controversial election of Christos Sarzetakis followed. The partisan identification of institutions continues to extend to the highest level.

From its origins as an independent state Greece has had a highly centralized state apparatus, generally dominated by the political party in power. Bureaucratic

institutions have rarely worked smoothly and efficiently, nor have they ever achieved the reputation for being corruption-free or fair. Dealing with the bureaucracy has never been pleasant, even if one has appropriate contacts within it.

Ironically, though, being part of the bureaucracy has been viewed by many Greeks, particularly recently, as an occupational goal. The deliberate expansion of the public sector, begun by the right after the civil war, increased significantly under the junta. This statist pattern grew under Karamanlis's government and has continued under PASOK. Civil service status can offer relative job security and an advantageous benefits system. The uncertainty of the Greek economy has affected the thinking of many younger Greeks to the point that "around 70% of the young (the 18-to-24 year-olds) want to work in the public sector; only 10% want to be employed in the private sector, or to become businessmen" (Loulis, 1986:72). On more ideological grounds, it is argued that the public sector should be expanded because state enterprises serve "the social whole." Greek attitudes, therefore, seem to have shifted markedly from earlier bourgeois proclivities such as owning a business or being involved in commerce. The state is now seen as accommodating individual needs. Moreover, the heavy statist involvement in the economy seems to be bringing about a politicization process there, too.

Traditionally, Greeks have responded to charismatic leaders who have exuded the image of power, leadership, control, and eloquence, among other strong qualities distinguishing them from their fellow-politicians. Most recently, Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou have easily claimed this distinction. Not to be charismatic can lead to the loss of votes, as was the case with George Mavros, who headed the old Center Union after the death of George Papandreou, and also with George Rallis, who led the New Democracy party in the 1981 elections. In earlier periods, the death of a charismatic leader generally meant the demise of the party. Today, however, the Greek electorate seems to be increasingly issue oriented and less drawn to charisma, if only because a non-charismatic leader, such as New Democracy's Evangelos Averoff, was able to improve on his party's 1981 performance in the 1984 European Parliament elections. But that particular vote can also be interpreted in negative terms, as a statement against PASOK and not for New Democracy.

Greeks want the leaders whom they support to advance their specific interests and to defend them against the opposition. The expectation of rewards, material or other, is always present. Although many might hope that a political promise for greater efficiency might come about, few voters actually respond to such claims. A judgment on what constitutes good political rule is hard to render because it is usually done on subjective, partisan grounds. Since 1974 voters drawn to the left have responded to the promises of its leaders for a relentless struggle against the advantaged classes. Universally, Greek voters expect their elected leaders to defend the nation against all foreign threats and particularly, of late, against the Turks. A leader can expect to experience serious impediments to his career if he is perceived to be lax in defending Greek national interests. This includes Greece's relations with the United States. Consequently, governments and political opposition parties vie with each other to establish nationalist credentials.

Greeks are most certainly emotionally attached to the idea of *ethnos* and to the unifying role of the Greek Orthodox Church, attachments which survive strongly even when they live in the diaspora. However, loyalty to existing political institutions has historically never been universal, as evidenced by the number of constitutional changes in this century. Karamanlis reportedly concluded that the only constant factor in Greek politics was the desire for change, preferably through the ballot box, but, if necessary, by revolution (Woodhouse, 1982:288). This is hardly a testimony for the legitimization of institutions. Although he performed with mixed success in a number of categories, Karamanlis did try to lead by example, particularly as a model president, something which even his political adversaries had to concede.¹⁸

Whereas some societies tremble at the prospect of dramatic political and social change, in Greece part of the political world always seems to be calling for it. Most recently, Andreas Papandreu proclaimed *allaghi* (change) as the prime slogan for his successful 1981 campaign, and PASOK still uses it as a justification for its policies. The KKE stresses that supporting it will bring "real change" and not just words. The New Democracy has called for *apallaghi* (deliverance, release) from PASOK's change. It is a positive development if Greeks might now be agreeing that change and tactics to implement it should be restricted to existing constitutional parameters.

MAJOR SUBCULTURES

A discussion of subcultures can begin by referring to the state in Greece. The connection between state and society has been one of "imperfect integration, in the form of [a] tense and sterile symbiosis" (Diamandouros, 1983:54). Ever conscious of their political affiliations and the partisan identity of the state, Greeks have come to view it as something to be controlled, manipulated, or contested.

Distinct rural and urban subcultures have existed since Greece's first days as an independent state. The former has continued to represent the traditional characteristics of Greek culture, while the latter has come to identify itself increasingly with the more sophisticated patterns of Western Europe. The acceptance of this urban model has been scorned by those advocating the perpetuation of Greek ways, a cultural-political schism that has significantly affected modern Greek history.

Traditional patterns emanating from the rural areas have had their lasting impact on current Greek culture, hence the space devoted to them here. Recent demographic shifts in Greece have been dramatic. From a nation with a predominantly rural population prior to World War II, Greece now has a distinct majority of its population living in urban areas (towns of more than 10,000). In 1951 only 38 percent of the population lived in urban areas. The 1981 census indicates this percentage rising to 58, with 30 percent in rural areas and the remaining 12 percent is semi-urban. The Athens-Piraeus metropolitan area, which now is home for almost 35 percent of Greece's total population, has absorbed the

greatest number of these migrants from rural regions seeking a better livelihood. As might be expected, residents of Athens who can be referred to as third or fourth generation (or older) Athenians are in the minority. Thessaloniki, Greece's second largest city, has experienced a similar growth.

The two subcultures have had a significant awareness of each other's ways and mores, and they have not been totally separate worlds for several decades. The urbane city-dweller and the urbanized villager have not cut themselves off from the rural areas. The number of second, even third, homes in rural coastal and mountain areas owned by affluent Greeks for vacations and the frequent visits to relatives in villages, particularly at the time of holidays, reaffirm this linkage. Upward social mobility "[has] not come at the expense of kinship ties" (Friedl, 1959:29). A great divide, therefore, does not separate the two subcultures. Moreover, Greece's many emigrants, who have settled in faroff places such as the United States, Australia, Canada, and, more recently, West Germany, have brought news, stories, and material possessions to formerly isolated areas. Television is accessible, if only in the village *kafencion*. The economic situation in most villages is far better than it was two decades ago, and many material conveniences, formerly available only in cities, are accessible everywhere.

These population shifts have contributed to a partial blurring but not elimination of regional loyalties in politics. Consequently, differences such as those between "old Greece" and "new lands" (i.e. territories added in this century) are no longer highlighted in the political process. The same can be said of the "refugees," the Greeks who arrived from Turkey after the fall of Smyrna and the exchange of populations in 1922-1923.

Vertical

The Greek Orthodox Church can claim 97 percent of the nation's population. The 1975 Constitution, as its predecessors had done, registers this supremacy in article 3: "The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ . . ." ¹⁹ Serving itself up as a symbol of the nation, the Orthodox Church continues to provide a conservative restraint to be dealt with by the state whenever issues concerning it are raised, for example, when more liberal legislation for divorce procedures was proposed. Outright confrontation was generally avoided by both sides, but the recent controversy over the disposition of church lands might prove to be the exception. The traditional role of the Church in education has been maintained, and all students take courses in religion in all grades of primary and secondary education. The attitude that religion and education should be considered together is perpetuated by placing the direction of the two areas in the same government Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. The impact of all those hours of religious training on today's young students is undetermined. Indeed, in the crowded urban settings of Athens and Thessaloniki where the forces of modernization and secularization are formidable, the spiritual hold of the Church has generally weakened.²⁰

Article 13 of the 1975 Constitution states: "All known religions shall be free and their rites of worship shall be performed unhindered and under the protection of law . . . Proselytism is prohibited." The latter restriction ensures that inroads will not be made at the expense of the Orthodox Church. Consequently, activist sects that seek converts, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, though small in number, are singled out as enemies to the Church and nation. The Evangelical Church is probably the largest Protestant contingent in Greece, numbering about 15,000 and composed mostly of Greeks who are descendants of those who had been converted earlier by missionaries while living under Ottoman rule in Asia Minor. Other Protestant communities include Pentecostals and Seventh Day Adventists. Latin Catholics number about 40,000 and are concentrated primarily in Athens and on several Aegean islands. Most can claim descent from the Crusaders and Greeks associated with them, going back to the 13th century when the Venetians and French dominated large sections of Greece.

Greece is ethnically homogeneous, with around 97 percent of its population identified as Greek. Although other ethnic groups are few, two have a significance which overshadows their actual numbers. The first is the Slavic-speaking population in Macedonia, and the second is the Moslem community in Western Thrace. Greece, like other Balkan states, is highly sensitive to the potential use of local populations for the furtherance of rival claims to territory. Under Ottoman rule the region was a hodge-podge of ethnic groups. The creation of the new Balkan national states during the nineteenth century transferred hostility and claims to territory from the Turks to neighboring rivals. Mutual suspicion still prevails and, as with all successor states, the Greeks are ever sensitive to real and imagined threats from abroad and within their borders.

The Slavic-speaking element in Macedonia is a controversial group. Because of their affinity with the Bulgarians prior to World War II, the Greeks feared that their presence on Greek soil would be used by Sofia as the basis for ethnic claims to Greek Macedonia. Consequently, Athens refused to grant these Macedonian Slavs official minority status and referred to them as Slavophone Greeks, Slavic-speakers with a Greek national conscience. (In the same vein, the Serbs classified them as Southern Serbs.) During World War II Macedonian Slavs benefited from the Bulgarian occupation of northern Greece, and in the civil war many of them fought with the Greek communists.

After Tito's recognition of the Macedonian Slavs as one of the major nations with its own republic in postwar Yugoslavia, the patron of these people became Yugoslavia. As a result, by the 1960s Bulgaria said there were no Macedonians in Bulgaria (claiming them now to be Bulgarians), whereas previous censuses had always included them as a separate group. In Greece the published official census statistics do not list these Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Macedonia at all. In fact, Greece has not published a population breakdown according to language or religion since the 1951 census. These Slavic speakers constitute perhaps a little more than 1 percent of the total population, but they are concentrated in the sensitive northern border areas. If there is any potential for Greek-Yugoslav relations to deteriorate, it will probably be because of this issue. There are at least a couple of incidents a

year which highlight Greek sensitivity to Skopje's propaganda campaigns. The great fear is that the Macedonian Slav population in Greece, considerably Hellenized by now in any case, might be used as a base for Yugoslav inroads in Greek Macedonia. The Bulgarians also share similar apprehensions about Yugoslav intentions in their territory. Although one might have expected differently, Papandreou's government has tended to be more rigid on this issue towards Yugoslavia than his predecessors. Undoubtedly, this position is associated with PASOK's determination to be viewed as a staunch defender of Greek national interests. It is imbedded in the Greek national consciousness that these Slavic speakers are upstart peoples with a confused identity who have falsely laid claims to the ancient Greek patrimony of Macedonia.

The status of the Moslem minority in Western Thrace has become another bone of contention between the Turkish and Greek governments amid their other disputes. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne provided for the mandatory exchange of the "Greek Orthodox" and "Moslem" populations then living in Turkey and Greece, respectively. The only exceptions were to be the Moslems (Turks, Pomaks, and Gypsies) living in Western Thrace and the Greeks residing in Constantinople and on the islands of Imbros (Gokceada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada). Whereas the Moslem minority has increased in size since then from roughly 90,000 to more than 120,000, the Greek population in Istanbul and the two islands has shrunk from close to 300,000 to around 5,000. Ankara has generally ignored Athens' complaints about the Greek minority and, of late, has increased its own statements about alleged oppression of the Moslems in Western Thrace. Here, too, Greeks in general and not just their governments are overly sensitive to a people whose loyalty to the Greek state is not absolute and who live in sensitive border areas.

Other smaller groups worth noting include the Koutsovlachs, who speak a language related to Romanian; Jews, who now number less than 6,000 after the Nazi extermination and postwar emigration; and Arvanites, who are Albanian speakers but who are quite Hellenized in their national consciousness, having lived in the Attica area and nearby islands for several centuries.

Texts in Greek primary and secondary schools are practically silent on all the non-Greek peoples and non-Orthodox religions. "The virtual identification of Hellenicity with Orthodoxy . . . has made it very difficult for such religious minorities as the Roman Catholics, the Protestants, the Jews and the Muslims to become fully integrated into the dominant Greek culture" (Diamandouros, 1983:55). The consequent result is that Greeks can personally display ignorance on these subjects and intolerance if the solidity of Hellenism appears to be threatened by "alien" elements within Greece's borders. Serious incidents, it should be noted, have been few.

As mentioned earlier, until the fall of the military dictatorship, the authoritarian and parliamentary right had long stressed that the Marxist left represented something very non-Greek and hostile to the very basis of Hellenism. The junta amplified this position. The KKE and other political groupings of the far left thus did serve the role of a subculture. Despite the banning of the KKE in 1947

and the subsequent defeat of the communist forces during the civil war, sentiment for its mission remained among certain Greeks, particularly the working classes. But, because of the repressive measures of the rightist governments, these feelings remained muted and could be legally expressed only in support for the United Democratic Left (EDA), a moderated version of the KKE. The rightist regimes refused to define the conflicts from the time of liberation in 1944 until 1949 as a civil war, classifying them instead as a guerrilla campaign. This dogmatic position was maintained to emphasize in simplistic terms that foreign communists and Macedonian Slavs directed these leftist forces, and that true Greeks could not fight against their *ethnos*. In a similar vein, until PASOK assumed power, Greek governments refused to give legal recognition to the leftist resistance organizations of the occupation, thereby denying pension benefits to its fighting members.

The long-term persecution of the KKE somehow added to its mystique and, since its rehabilitation after the fall of the junta, its influence has been greater than its relatively small numbers and its old-style, pro-Soviet brand of communism might warrant. The Communist party of the interior with its Eurocommunist orientation (recently renamed the Hellenic Left), dominated by intellectuals, has a much smaller base of support. Because it has considerable influence in the ranks of the working classes and because it is highly disciplined, the KKE makes its presence felt particularly on the economic front. The PASOK leadership has tended to pay far more attention to the challenge from its left than from its right, despite the latter's far greater numbers in parliament and the electorate. Much of Papandreou's policy making and leftist rhetoric has been geared to limiting KKE's popular support and to appeasing its demands. Concurrently, Papandreou has had to cater to a number of the demands of the restless left wing of his own party.

Horizontal

Although the rhetoric of Greek politics has been increasingly dominated by references to classes and longstanding inequities, empirical studies on stratification are few. In any case, the population can be broken down into several general groups. There is the rural peasantry, whose numbers have decreased markedly over the past four decades and who now make up about 30 percent of those employed. The urban working class (factory and construction workers) constitutes a slightly smaller percentage. The single largest group in the urban population (also present but less numerous in rural areas) is the lower middle class, a petty bourgeoisie composed of small merchants and shopkeepers, clerks, lower ranking civil servants, and skilled workers. A significantly smaller but growing group is a category of professional people, senior officials and executives, and lesser

But essentially wealth or influence, widely interpreted, are the criteria of acceptance" (Campbell and Sherrard, 1968:300). Therefore, this class can include leading politicians, though they may not be personally wealthy, leaders of the professions, doctors, lawyers, and some academics and artists. More recently, the numbers of the "new rich" have swelled, while the economic standing of many members of the "old wealth" ranks has declined.²¹

Whereas prior to the dictatorship members of this old societal elite were directly involved in politics or else indirectly exerted influence—many had close ties with the Palace—their representation in parliament and impact on national politics has steadily decreased since the restoration of civilian government and the rise to power of PASOK. In turn, one can discern shifts away from the older ranks of the political elite. In 1964—the last election prior to the junta—161 members out of 300 had been elected for a fourth term while 41 were returned for a third time. Only 37 were elected for the first time. Forty percent of the parliamentary representation came from established political families. The 1974 election brought 184 new faces to parliament and sixteen for a second term; only 27 percent were from political families. This changing of the guard and modernizing trend continued in 1977 when 221 were elected to serve for a first or second term. The number of parliament's members from established political families dipped again to just under 20 percent. Although PASOK provided most of the new faces, even the conservative New Democracy welcomed new candidates to its ranks (Ioakimidis, 1984:50-53). In that same election PASOK became the main opposition party with 93 seats. Most of its votes came from skilled workers and peasants. PASOK's parliamentary representatives came largely from the professional middle classes: there were 45 lawyers, 10 doctors, 7 engineers, and 7 school teachers (Clive, 1985:49). This pattern appears to have continued in the 1981 and 1985 elections.

With the combined votes of the three leftist parties (PASOK, KKE, and KKE of the Interior) totaling 60 percent and 58 percent in the 1981 and 1985 elections, respectively, it is obvious that there has been a change in the composition of the ruling elites. Papandreou has skillfully drawn many younger technocrats educated in Western Europe and the United States into his ranks (ministerial and civil service positions, advisers, etc.). Children of wealthy and comfortable middle class families have also associated themselves with PASOK and, particularly, the KKE of the Interior. Moreover, since the fall of the junta the university student generation has been dominated by leftist affiliations, with the KKE playing a particularly strong role in its ranks. Later, however, a mild advance in influence seems to have been made by the conservative politicians of the New Democracy party.

Institutional

Only recently have Greek political parties been organized in a fashion that departs from the previously dominant clientelistic networks. Ideology increasingly distinguishes parties from each other. New Democracy, which is clearly right-of-center within the West European context, has suffered from failing to articulate effectively a party ideology. KKE was the first to succeed, despite repression, to

develop a tightknit party organization for spreading its program and attracting support. PASOK has about 200,000 members in the party and a system of party organization and cadres at various levels of the population, extending into all corners of Greece. New Democracy, though the second largest party in voting, has not been able to match this success at the grassroots level as it struggles to work its way out of the old clientelistic syndrome. All of the main parties have active youth organizations, and Greek universities are chronically plagued by political factionalism. These types of divisions are apparent even among high schoolers, who do not have the vote. The KKE youth organization (KNE) is especially active and well-organized.

As has been noted elsewhere, the upper levels of the public administration are usually dominated by loyalists to the party in power. Although there was an easing up on this pattern under New Democracy's rule after 1974, PASOK aggressively moved non-loyalists out of strategic positions upon assuming office. The one ministry whose strains have become public is foreign affairs. Many career diplomats had entered the ministry before or during the dictatorship and possessed more conservative backgrounds. Consequently, pressure has been placed on diplomats to conform to a foreign policy that has in some areas departed significantly from longstanding patterns.

The radio and television media have to be considered as an important institutional subculture. Radio and television in Greece both began during periods of authoritarian rule, the former under the Metaxas dictatorship in the late 1930s and the latter under the recent junta. By not allowing private stations, the state has controlled radio and television from their inception and, whether dictatorial or freely elected, the government in power has tended to manipulate the airwaves for its own purposes. Such control can affect all forms of programming but is particularly important in the presentation of news, whose contents can be arranged to present the government in a constantly positive light (Katsoudas, 1985). Balanced objectivity is more the exception than the rule.²²

The problem for the Greek who desires objective reporting is compounded by the presence of many daily newspapers (16 in Athens), all characterized by varying gradations of party affiliations, ranging from fanatical partisanship to moderate independence. Bias and yellow journalism distort information, and the sensational newspapers have the largest circulation. Such newspapers "tend to augment/reinforce public opinion preconceptions of their respective clientele rather than shifting or shaping public attitudes" (Coulombis, 1983a:114). Although most Greeks read the interpretation they wish to accept as true, they suffer too from a lack of faith on crucial issues. Thus, the government's unfortunate delay in revealing the impact of Chernobyl's radiation on Greece until the 1986 Easter weekend passed made disbelievers of many Greeks whenever the government presented any subsequent information or guidelines. Greeks are great devotees of rumors, a situation due partly to their inclination not to view the sources of public information as totally dependable.²³

The influence of the military as an institutional subculture has diminished, at least in outward appearances, since the fall of the junta. Earlier, the rightist and royalist composition of the armed forces had hardened in the aftermath of the civil war. Training for conscripts included extensive indoctrination in nationalist, anti-communist and conservative principles. Starting with the civil war the armed forces even had its own radio station and later a television channel.

An extreme rightist coterie of officers carried out the military takeover on April 21, 1967, ostensibly to save the nation from a communist takeover. The reactionary leadership tried to restore what it termed traditional Greek culture, free of communist and liberal influences, with a renewed emphasis on the Orthodox Church. The military's authoritarian attempt to govern the country with outdated principles and harsh methods had manifold consequences for the nation that can not all be dealt with here. The junta helped spawn a generation of Greeks, particularly younger people, who instinctively looked to the left because of alienation from the right, even the democratic right. Interestingly, however, Greeks remain as nationalistic as ever, but the inspiration for expressions of nationalism comes not from the military or the right now, but from Papandreou's PASOK. Apart from those supportive of the junta's authoritarian approach, which attracted less than 1 percent of the total vote in the 1985 elections, Greek political allegiances have taken noticeable steps leftward. The New Democracy party, a rehabilitated version of its predecessor, the National Radical Union (ERE), has assumed a right-of-center identity and divested itself of "old ways." The center, infrequently a viable political sector (whether for ideological or polarized political reasons), has had many of its voters move leftward into the Papandreou camp.

Both Karamanlis and Papandreou have been very careful in their dealings with the officer corps. The upper echelons of the dictatorial vanguard were arrested or dismissed by Karamanlis' government but a large number of officers with authoritarian proclivities remained because of the ongoing crisis with Turkey and out of concern not to stimulate their backers into extraparliamentary action. Papandreou has gingerly moved to place officers sympathetic to his policies in strategic posts. He has also worked to assure the officers that he shares with them their nationalistic concerns. Defense budgets have been maintained at high levels. From a formerly visible role in everyday Greek life, the officer corps has retreated into the background and appears to be concentrating on its professional mission.

CULTURAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Greece's geographical positioning at a veritable crossroads of the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa has long made it a cultural and political borderland between what is arbitrarily referred to as "East" and "West." Allegiance to Eastern Orthodoxy committed the Greeks to the East even before the arrival of the Ottoman Turks. This distinctiveness of identity persisted because the Greek world under Turkish rule did not experience a Renaissance and sensed only the marginal trappings of the Enlightenment. Far more than with the other Balkan

peoples, however, the Greeks, initially through their commercial activities, had regular contact with the West from the 18th century onward. The influence of Western ways on developments in Greece has been noticeable.²⁴ The great challenge for social scientists, and it has not yet been met, is to determine how much and in what areas. One fairly obvious judgment is that there is significant cultural continuity in this transitional society as it has accommodated to very rapid change associated with the general patterns of modernization and Westernization in the last 30 years.

Greeks have long sensed this divide between themselves and Europeans to their west, and it is still evident today when they refer, for example, to a trip to London or Paris with the words: "I am going to Europe." They exhibit a "split personality" dimension when the Greece-Europe question comes up, and Nikos Dimou has succinctly summarized it: "Whenever a Greek speaks about 'Europe', he excludes Greece automatically. Whenever a foreigner speaks about Europe, we cannot even conceive that he will not also include Greece" (Dimou, 1983:32-33). In his campaign to gain earlier entry into the European Community for Greece, Karamanlis regularly told the nation: "Greece belongs to the West." He brought attention to the distinctiveness of the two worlds at the signing of the Treaty of Accession on May 28, 1979, when he declared: "As of today, Greece irrevocably accepts this historical challenge and her European destiny while conserving her historical identity. We have confidence both in Europe and in Greece" (Papacosma, 1983:41).

The tug between home-grown and imported styles and attitudes, long evident, continues. At a superficial level one has only to note the cosmopolitan demeanor and chic dress of Greeks and the shops with the latest luxury and convenience items in Kolonaki and Syntagma Square and then to contrast this setting with the one just a few blocks away towards Omonia Square and the covered market area where the street vendors, crowded food stalls, hanging cuts of meat, and loud noise sound, look, and smell more like the Eastern Greece of centuries past. The materialistic and consumer side of Western life are very much evident at all levels of Greek society, and to "show off" what one has is quite common and fashionable.

Distinctive aspects of Greek culture remain amidst all the many changes. *Philotimo* no longer serves as the absolute guide for personal and social relationships in the urbanized settings of Athens and Thessaloniki but one still senses its presence (Vassiliou and Vassiliou, 1973:338-340). The family remains strong and is the main source of security and support against hostile elements in a competitive society. Individuals are still capable of making heavy sacrifices to help a family member in a manner and degree not customarily seen in America. For all its rapid and ugly growth, Athens is a large city with no shanty towns; it provides livable housing with basic comforts for its old and new residents. This phenomenon is partly due to the tendency of Greeks, even from the countryside, to invest available funds in property for personal use or rental purposes (and earlier for a dowry). One does not see homeless people. The crime rate is still quite low, even by European standards, as is the suicide rate. The probable explanation is that the Greek family has effectively served the function of a built-in welfare system for its

members requiring help. Not to do so would bring shame to the family. These are carryover attitudes from the rural setting, along with the propensity for emphasizing "getting ahead." Moreover, education is encouraged as a way of improving the social standing or economic status, or both, of a family member. The achievement of one can reflect on all.

The above does not mean that city life and improved economic conditions have not taken their toll on old patterns. The family can no longer be as thoroughly authoritarian in its structure, and with so many working mothers it is no longer possible to hold the previously tight rein on children. Many middle class children have been indulged and cannot relate to the harsher conditions of earlier generations. Unlike their American equivalents of the 1980s, however, they do become involved in political issues; many of them have drifted leftward in their ideological positions. Overall, the previously tight-knit family is experiencing strains. The improved legal status of women, liberalized grounds for divorce, and elimination of the dowry, among other recent developments, have struck at the underpinnings of this traditionally male-dominated society. While these and related changes are welcomed by many, others express concern that their pace is too quick and that the fabric of Greek society is threatened.

In a general way education is encouraged and seen as a stepping stone to social mobility. Statistics have shown that the percentage of university students from mainly agricultural families and working class backgrounds are 21 percent and 19 percent, respectively—an extremely high level when compared to general norms in Western Europe (Nassiakou, 1981:63). Because the state-controlled Greek universities are not large enough to meet the demand for entry, approximately 25 percent of all Greek university students collectively pay large sums of money for study abroad at great sacrifice to their families. In 1971 Greek students represented over 19 percent of the entire number of foreign students enrolled in all European universities (Tsoucalas, 1981:109).

The cumulative effect of encouraging education has not been totally positive because one can refer to a phenomenon of "over-education" (Tsoucalas, 1981). There are too many university graduates for too few positions; consequently, a large number hold lesser positions for which their education is too advanced. In turn, many have not acquired the necessary technological skills for leading Greece in transforming its economy to cope with the competition of its European Community partners. Others with skills but no available jobs in the Greek market subject Greece to a brain drain as they head for other countries. Having acquired or maintained social status with a university degree has not assured economic security for the degree holder. These disgruntled individuals are ready to express their resentment in the political arena. More recently, PASOK has done little for them, and many now seek solace in the ranks of the other parties.

Educational policies have long been the subject of heated political debate and widespread journalistic coverage. Yet despite the obvious need for reform,²⁵ international experts who have been called upon to propose blueprints for reorganizing the Greek educational system have emphasized the extreme reluctance

of the majority of Greeks to abandon traditional orientations (Tsoucalas, 1981:121). There have been some important reforms, most notably the 1976 laws for primary and secondary education and the 1982 law for higher education, but significant problems persist.²⁶ The Greek system today is, as it was in the 19th century, firmly oriented towards the provision of "general knowledge." It still offers limited opportunities for alternatives to institutions of general education, and it maintains an approach whereby knowledge is "given" rather than being "discovered" (Dimaras, 1983:234).²⁷

The maintenance of a strong sense of Greek national identity is perpetuated by traditional Greek education. Constantine Tsoucalas, a noted Greek sociologist, has written: "In few modern nations has the national conception of historical continuity been so operational in shaping the collective destiny as in Greece. And it is no accident that deep-rooted idealistic and even 'racist' national images, completely detached from concrete social and economic realities, still survive to an amazing degree in large segments of the Greek population" (Tsoucalas, 1981:114). School textbooks have been undergoing extensive revision since PASOK came to power and although socialist and at times Marxist precepts have undercut earlier conservative emphases, the thrust of nationalism appears not to have been significantly modified.

Greek culture is by no means impermeable, but it is a strong shield, resistant to outside patterns and attitudes in a number of categories. For example, many European- and American-educated academics and professionals returned to Greece after the junta's fall with idealistic intentions to bring about reform and change along Western lines and to place greater emphasis on merit, fairness, ability, and non-political criteria for positions and advancement. These attitudes had some impact in the years following 1974, and Andreas Papandreou, in particular, capitalized initially on such sentiments. Generally, though, many of these returnees are now disillusioned idealists or active participants, or both, in the politicized climate of universities and public administration.

Despite improved social and economic conditions, many Greeks continue to perceive their society as characterized by struggle, manipulation, and political identifications, albeit within a setting at the national level that discourages old-style extraparliamentary initiatives. It is indeed ironic that the Greeks have been very successful as immigrants in other countries. The willingness to operate within the system in a receptive foreign setting and to adhere to successful role models, in combination with their high aspirations and achievement orientation, plus hard work, have fostered this success. These same propensities are not enough to guarantee success in the contentious climate of Greece with its less beneficent rules. Stated differently, Greeks can be seen to progress as individuals more readily in an alien environment where the general population does not share Greek cultural traits.

When compared with most West European countries, Greece has experienced a form of time lag in the evolution of its politics during this century. Part of the explanation lies in the distractive disruptions associated with the Venizelist-Constantinist *dichasmos* (division) of World War I that evolved into the

Republican-Royalist feud of the interwar period. The Metaxas dictatorship, Axis occupation, civil war, and, most recently, the military dictatorship perpetuated this situation.

The cultural predilections of Greeks with their emphasis on clientelistic politics also contributed to the staying power of old patterns. In the aftermath of the junta's fall it was the democratic right which set into motion processes which helped diminish the military's involvement in politics, ensured with a fair plebiscite that monarchy would not return, limited American involvement in national affairs, and, in general, opened up the political arena to all domestic factions. Greeks had responded cautiously to their reacquired freedom by electing Constantine Karamanlis' New Democracy to office in 1974 and 1977. Concurrently, the cumulative effect of the extensive postwar social and economic changes began to find political expression in this post-junta period.

Andreas Papandreou skillfully captured the energy of many of these forces and gave direction to them. Casting itself as something new and vital, Papandreou's PASOK systematically developed its popular base, receiving 14 percent of the vote in 1974, 25 percent in 1977 and then a parliamentary majority with 48 percent in 1981. It began its existence by offering a program of national independence, popular sovereignty and social liberation. Railing against multinationals and imperialism, PASOK offered a "Greek road to socialism" distinct from both the European social democratic and communist models. After the 1977 elections Papandreou began to downplay the Marxist dimensions of his party and subsequently attracted many traditionally centrist voters who no longer had a strong party to represent their interests (Mavrogordatos, 1984; Lyrintzis, 1984).

Analysts of the post-1974 political scene have characterized PASOK as a movement of populist proportions, a brand of politics hitherto not present in Greece. PASOK claimed not to represent a specific social class but in a general way promised "change and hope" to all underprivileged Greeks, the broad social bloc encompassing, according to Papandreou, "farmers, workers, employees, craftsmen and artisans, the youth and all the people who are subject to odious exploitation by modern monopoly capital, local as well as foreign" (Lyrintzis, 1984:111). In appealing to the people, generally, Papandreou also offered his strongly nationalistic program to prove that one could be progressive and socialist without bearing the stigma of communism. Unlike the clientelistically-oriented pattern of party organization that dominated Greek politics for decades, Papandreou built up a mass organization with numerous local branches in all the Greek provinces with a rank and file far exceeding the membership of any other non-communist party. Apart from the communists, no other major party in modern Greek history managed so decisively to break out of the clientelistic pattern or to construct such an extensive organizational base (Mouzelis, 1978b:65).

PASOK provided a populist forum whereby groups formerly excluded from or admitted marginally to the political arena could now become an active part of it. Papandreou also became "the champion of a new nationalism, skillfully blending

the traditional loyalties of many Greeks with the Western and modernizing outlook of others. . . he seemed to transcend the old dichotomy between Westerners and traditionalists, to straddle the right and left, and to appeal to both in the name of national independence" (Macridis, 1984:31). Although individual PASOK politicians did not assume traditional patron roles for their supporters, the party in control of the state apparatus now assumed an equivalent function. On coming to power PASOK engineered dismissals and appointments. One analyst has defined this policy as "a transition from clientelism to machine politics" (Mavrogordatos, 1983a:50) while another refers to it as "bureaucratic clientelism" (Lyrintzis, 1984). An additional blow to the traditional style of the patron-client system came with the passage of a law prior to the June 1985 elections which stipulated that, for the first time in Greek politics, voters cast their ballots for parties and not for individual candidates. This measure allowed the party leadership to exercise greater discipline on party members and to destroy the old system of local notables.

Papandreou successfully combined much that was traditional in Greek society with quite a bit that is new. This amalgam in combination with the call for *allaghi* (change) brought victories in two elections. New Democracy has been trapped because of its association with the old politics and its inability to develop an appealing, alternative ideology to counter PASOK's aggressive tactics. Nowhere is the decline of conservative influence more apparent than in rural areas, formerly its stronghold and now the domain of PASOK. Despite PASOK's original opposition to entry into the European Community, it has benefited from its political identification with the added funds from Brussels directed toward the modernization of the countryside.

The Greek economy is currently suffering in far too many ways. The heavily statist system has too many people and too many economic units dependent on it, a situation which in the short run has helped consolidate PASOK's influence. Some economists claim that the state now controls more than 60 percent of the gross national product. This statist pattern is not a recent phenomenon, but the higher degree of involvement is new. Centralized and interventionist policies go back to the authoritarian regime of King Othon, Greece's first ruler (1833-1862). The recent dictatorship, however, accelerated the process. In reaction to its rightist oppression, Greeks responded favorably to various shades of socialist-style policies. Conservative theoreticians, subjecting their policies to self-criticism, now maintain that the democratic right reacted inappropriately during its seven-year tenure after the fall of the junta. Succumbing to a policy of "unlimited pragmatism" to maintain power, John Loulis argues, conservatives tried to ride the crest of the leftist wave by claiming that they too did not hesitate to take socialist measures. "Instead of damning nationalisation and offering 'privatisation', they expanded the state sector, and indeed prided themselves that they could nationalise even more than their socialist rivals" (Loulis, 1986:70). Loulis adds that despite state expansion the predominant values in Greek society until 1967 remained individualistic. Instead of values encouraging dynamic and constructive social traits, one increasingly sees "the values of the public employee. Greek society as a whole is assuming, more and more, the dismal mirror-image of Greece's bureaucratic, lumbering, inefficient, unimaginative and unproductive state sector" (Loulis, 1986:73).

Greece in a development sense has entered into the 20th century rather abruptly. Its changing society and economy—and accompanying adjustment problems—are forcing Greeks to deal increasingly with ideas and ideologies. Nonetheless, cultural patterns are experiencing change at a relatively slower pace and, in the political scene, have been in a number of cases cleverly presented as something new. The overall impact of modernizing forces on the traditional culture remains to be seen. In any case, political leaders cannot overlook the fact that no matter how much Greeks might be outwardly attracted to political change, traditional culture often can be courted or challenged only with the greatest skill and care.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Following the twists and turns of Greek domestic politics can provide a more than normal challenge for analysts. Trying to determine the course of Greek foreign policy can be more predictable, particularly if one bears in mind the strong sense of Greek nationalism. The pride Greeks nurture for their *ethnos* is evident in a number of ways and has been reflected in opinion polls which place Greeks by a considerable margin as the European Community peoples who are most proud to be the nationality that they are (*Eurobarometer*, December 1985:21). Greeks also rank highest in the EC in their willingness to fight for their country in a future war (*Eurobarometer*, December 1985:26).

From 1821, Greek national aspirations developed, advanced, and failed with a succession of campaigns against foreign enemies, ending with a defeat at the hands of Turkey in 1922. Since then Greek national security has been threatened and violated on several occasions. In the eyes of most Greeks the country has enjoyed few moments of truly secure peace. Consequently, foreign policy issues continue to dominate Greek politics to a degree hard to match elsewhere in Europe.

Greeks bemoan their military and demographic weakness and smallness in relation to neighboring states such as Turkey and particularly to the larger powers with interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek leaders during and after the War of Independence participated in the extension of the prevailing practice of clientelism to international relations, only in this instance politicians and nation were the dependent clients. Yet despite longstanding loyalty to Britain and France, and since the late 1940s to the United States, the Greeks perceive themselves as having been too often exploited for the sake of bigger interests, especially when the powers have cultivated Turkey's friendship.

Dismay increased during the recent military dictatorship and heightened with the junta-inspired ouster of Cyprus' Archbishop Makarios in July 1974, quickly followed by the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island. Anti-junta Greeks, who had earlier condemned the United States and NATO for their toleration of and extension of military aid to the dictatorship, now found their ranks swelling with those who considered Washington as a prime conspirator behind the coup on Cyprus and as a supporter of Turkish actions. Greeks well recognize the

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greater potential strength of Turkey and fear once again for the security of their territory, hence their great anxiety over challenges to Greece's perceived sovereign rights in the Aegean. Despite strong historical, ethnic and legal claims, Greeks sense that these are not enough in light of Turkish maneuvering in the region—which they view with great apprehension—along with America's seeming aloofness to Turkish posturing.

Once one cuts through journalistic hyperbole and the tendency to concoct ingenious conspiracy theories to explain the plight of Greece, it is clear that Greeks now universally seek to eliminate the client role of past decades. Whereas before the Colonels established their dictatorship, the left had consistently opposed Greece's close ties with the United States and NATO, and the Center had become increasingly critical of them, since 1974 the right also has joined the ranks of those questioning the value of these affiliations.²⁸ What distinguishes the various parties (apart from KKE) is tactics and tone. Andreas Papandreou has extended, albeit with sharper language, policies launched by the putatively pro-West and more moderate Constantine Karamanlis.²⁹ Another indicator of a critical Greek perception of the United States is that in the European Community the Greeks and Spaniards (many of whom also see themselves as victims of an American-backed dictatorship) are the only people to express a negative trustworthiness rating for the Americans (*Eurobarometer*, June 1986:41).

The sensitivity of the Greeks to foreign threats and to slights from allies, real or potential, is chronic and acute. No government or party can appear to be "soft" on such matters without suffering politically. Examples are legion. In 1977, William E. Schaufele, the Carter administration's appointee for the ambassadorship to Athens, made a statement during his Senate confirmation hearings that the proximity of Greek islands to the Turkish coast was "unusual." Athens interpreted this judgment as questioning the legitimacy of treaties that had fixed the national status of these islands. The Karamanlis government requested—and received—the withdrawal of the nominee. More recently, in February 1987, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Turkish occupation troops of northern Cyprus were not of an aggressive nature and that the troops could be armed with American weapons. Relations between Athens and Washington which had been gradually warming quickly chilled.

The pejorative implications of Greece's client role were amplified during the summer 1985 Senate confirmation hearings for Robert Keeley, the current ambassador to Athens. He suggested that the United States had now to deal with Greece on a level different from that which had characterized relations after World War II. The Papandreou government hailed this enlightened understanding of what it was trying to accomplish. The conservative right, in power during those earlier years, took this as an affront, criticized the nominee for his bad judgment, and cited examples of resistance to American policy. In an interview with an Athenian newspaper the following summer, Keeley included comments trying to clarify his use of the terms patron-client. Instead of calming the political waters, he stirred them up. Once again the political parties and their journalistic organs heatedly debated the ambassador's judgments.

Andreas Papandreou's provocative maneuvers in foreign policy, particularly his rhetorical jabs at America, in many ways appease the frustrations of the Greeks whose national pride has been bruised severely by the Turkish occupation in Cyprus, by an omnipresent fear of Turkish advances in the Aegean, and by America's seemingly unsympathetic policy in resolving these crises. Rhetoric aside, however, Greece's foreign policy options appear limited. Economically and culturally, Greece is too tightly linked with Western Europe within the institutions of the European Community. Diplomatically, Greece finds itself in a longstanding predicament because, since independence, it has had to deal with and been forced to consider as "friends" those powers that are dominant in the Mediterranean.

Papandreou has traversed an erratic route in trying to develop a "national, independent, and multidimensional foreign policy." The sum total of Papandreou's initiatives within the Western alliance appears to outline a role for Greece similar to that of Romania in the Warsaw Pact. The reasons and circumstances for such roles are obviously different, but, just as there are realistic limits within which Romania has maneuvered independently of Soviet policy since the 1960s, there also seem to be restrictive forces on the PASOK government which keep it from drifting into more adventurous diplomacy. In the meantime, Papandreou's socialist regime will doubtlessly create uncomfortable moments for Greece's traditional friends. Moreover, bearing in mind post-1974 trends, there is little reason to doubt that if the conservatives win the next election, they too, with less stridency, will probably promote similar policies, particularly in a situation where the Turkish challenge persists.

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After cutting through the theoretical sections, the reader can benefit from Mouzelis's insightful observations on the social and economic underpinnings of Greek society. Mouzelis, a neo-Marxist, is a sociologist who skillfully incorporates history in his chapters on: "The Development of Greek Capitalism"; "The Relevance of the Concept of Class to the Study of Modern Greek Society"; "Class Structure and the Role of the Military in Greece: An Interpretation"; "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece."
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This article's value lies in its interesting observations on the impact of Greek culture on politics prior to the imposition of military dictatorship in 1967. Prophetically, Pollis wrote: "Post-World War II developments in Greece do not augur well for democratic development" (p. 42). Much has changed in Greece since the article was written, including the conditions which set the stage for a rightist dictatorship, but a number of the author's observations are still quite relevant for current conditions.
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Primarily the work of academic psychologists, this volume presents "subjective culture" as a "cultural group's characteristic way of perceiving the man-made part of its environment" (p. 4). Although Greece is only one of several societies investigated, chapter 9, "A Comparative Analysis of Subjective Culture," focuses on Greece and the United States and is particularly informative. The findings, however, must be used with care since, as is the case with several other works cited in this bibliography, social conditions and some values have experienced changes since the original research was conducted.
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Despite its overly laudatory approach, this biography has valuable references to Karamanlis's political philosophy and judgments. Unlike most Greek leaders Karamanlis has had a definitive view of what Greece and Greeks are and what they should be—it goes without saying that many of his positions have not been well received by political critics.

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Notes

1. The Byzantines referred to themselves as *Romaioi* to emphasize their membership in the Eastern Roman Empire and to distinguish themselves from the Classical Hellenes. It has been commented that a "Helleno-Romaic" dilemma confronts contemporary Greeks and that within them lie two figures in opposition. Patrick Leigh Fermor has compiled two parallel lists of 64 characteristics, allegiances, and symbols for "the Romios" and "the Hellene" (Fermor, 1966:106-115).
2. The extent of the Classical period's impact on modern Greek society and culture is the subject of considerable debate. Toynbee has offered one authoritative opinion: "The Modern Greeks' heritage from the Hellenic Greeks is not on a par with their heritage from the Byzantines. Their Byzantine heritage is direct and has been inescapable...In casting back to their Hellenic past, the Modern Greeks have not been preserving a heritage; they have been raising a ghost..." (Toynbee, 1981:154).
3. One contemporary Greek writer, critical of the importance that the Greeks attribute to themselves, has stated: "From what I know, no other nation has created special words—and special cognitive categories—for its friends and enemies" (Dimou, 1984:39).
4. Miller bubbled over in his enthusiasm for the Greek people. The text of *The Colossus of Maroussi* is full of exaggerated impressions, some of which follow. "The Greek knows how to live with his rags: they don't utterly degrade and befoul him as in other countries I have visited" (1941:12). "The Englishman in Greece is a farce and an eye-sore: he isn't worth the dirt between a Greek's toes" (1941:36). "A Greek is alive to the finger-tips; he oozes vitality, he's effervescent, he's ubiquitous in spirit" (1941:108). "Today as of old Greece is of the utmost importance to every man who is seeking to find himself" (1941:211). A more sophisticated account is David Holden's *Greece without Columns: The Making of the Modern Greeks*. Holden, an English journalist, sought to explain the existence of the military dictatorship as a natural antidote to unfortunate pitfalls in Greek character. His basic unfamiliarity with the Greek language did not stop him from making grandiose generalizations about Greek culture, politics, and history. Amid his judgments there are many distorted appraisals and historical errors of fact. His book must be read with great caution.
5. For example, in *The Metamorphosis of Greece since World War II* McNeill too casually crosses the methodological boundaries of the several social sciences, provides few footnotes in his broad, sweeping commentary, and draws too many conclusions from his study of only six small villages. Anthropologists, in particular, have reacted negatively to this book.
6. One can then understand how an English diplomat in Athens in 1929, with his inbred class orientation and without fully understanding the intricacies of Greek values, could write his superiors in London: "There can be few countries where people are so democratically-minded as Greece or where

there is less reverence or respect for important persons" (Papacosma, 1981:21).

7. It has been observed: "Paralysis in action coterminous with verbal criticism reinforces the sense of powerlessness, the belief that 'nothing can be done'" (Pollis, 1977:6).
8. Although there is no lack of theological and historical literature on the Greek Orthodox Church, "there is hardly any empirical research on the meaning of orthodoxy in the daily life of rural and urban Greeks...Greek social scientists have devoted very little attention to the role of religion and the church in contemporary Greek society" (Vermeulen, 1983:122).
9. Anti-Western attitudes among Greeks hardened beyond repair when the Fourth Crusade diverted its route to conquer Constantinople in 1204 and partitioned the Byzantine Empire. The Latin Empire collapsed in 1261 when Constantinople was recaptured. In 1453 with the fall of the Byzantine capital to the Ottoman Turks, a common refrain was: "Better the turban of the Muslim than the Latin mitre." The church hierarchy would later condemn the Enlightenment and the ideas and movements inspired by the French Revolution.
10. For example, one British diplomat wrote London in 1923: "The lack of logic in this country is to my mind extraordinary" (Papacosma, 1981:20). Another envoy commented in 1935: "I fear that common sense is not a long suit with this nation" (Papacosma, 1981:20). Constantine Karamanlis, during the earlier stage of his political career, confided to a friend: "But where can you find logic in this blessed country?" (Woodhouse, 1982:23). Nikos Dimou, a Greek philosopher and writer who regularly comments on Greek character, wrote that "...logic is not quite our national virtue. Each of our great decisions depends on sympathies and antipathies, on impulses and instincts" (Dimou, 1983:15).
11. On the same theme, Karamanlis, in an address to parliament in 1975, stated: "History shows that what the Greeks win in war, they proceed to lose in peace. We lose because we have the bad habit of putting political antagonism first and our national interest second" (Woodhouse, 1982:222).
12. Part of the reason for muted class movements in the earlier part of this century is that many Greeks sought relief for their economic distress through emigration. For centuries Greeks had emigrated throughout the Mediterranean basin, Eastern and even Western Europe, but nothing compared to the mass exodus of Greeks to the United States which began in huge numbers following Greece's defeat by Turkey in 1897. Between 1900 and 1921, 383,993 Greeks streamed to America, most of them uneducated and disenchanted peasants seeking a better life. The positive effects were many but on the negative side their departure from Greece created labor shortages in certain areas and a loss of energetic individuals since the overwhelming majority of the emigrants were male (95 percent from 1901 to 1910) and aged 15 to 45, prime years for labor productivity. In the age bracket from 15 to 29 a definite decline in numbers occurred from 1900 to 1912, and had not the Balkan War conquests and later events intervened, Greece would have suffered a serious population decrease with continuation of this high level of emigration.

13. A recent example of the malleability of the church is with the longevity of the current Archbishop of Athens, Seraphim, who was installed in the aftermath of George Papadopoulos's ouster in November 1973 by the even more rightist junta. Seraphim is still archbishop, having sworn in Constantine Karamanlis's civilian government after the junta's fall in July 1974 and all other governments since, including those of Andreas Papandreou. In turn, Papandreou's socialist governments have made statements reiterating the traditional position that the church has played a crucial role in maintaining the *ethnos*. The KKE hardly refers to the church. Moreover, several years ago, Archbishop Seraphim and KKE leader, Charilaos Florakis, contemporaries from the same region of north central Greece, were photographed together—an occasion that would have been considered impossible in earlier years.
14. During her early fall 1987 visit to the United States to announce officially a major exhibition of ancient Greek treasures, Greece's minister of culture, Melina Mercouri, busily engaged in a number of official and non-official activities. *The New York Times* noted: "Although her portfolio is technically cultural rather than political, Miss Mercouri explained in throaty tones that 'every act is political—even to eat'" (*The New York Times*, October 2, 1987).
15. This writer vividly recalls a conversation with a member of PASOK's lower cadre who stated that with a second electoral victory "they will never dislodge us."
16. The parliamentary election of Greece's current president, Christos Sarzetakis, in March 1985 provides an example of the "flexibility" of Greek law at the highest level. Apart from measures that abused the secrecy of voting required by the Constitution, controversy centered around the constitutional legality of parliament's president stepping down from his temporary position as acting president of the Republic (after Karamanlis' resignation) to vote as a member of parliament. Only with the inclusion of the acting president's vote did Sarzetakis acquire the minimum number of 180 votes for election in the third round of voting. Sarzetakis, a lawyer and judge, did not question the validity of his election, which was, however, by New Democracy, the main opposition party. Because of the call for elections in early June, New Democracy did not press the legal issue as it might have under other conditions.
17. Public opinion surveys indicate that Greeks rank above the European Community average in satisfaction with the way democracy works (*Eurobarometer*, June 1986:7-12).
18. Shortly after making the decision in the spring of 1980 to be considered for the presidency, Karamanlis published a statement that included the observation, "in our country no one knows how he will end his political life" (Woodhouse, 1982:286). Little did he know that, basing his statement on historical precedent, he was also prophesying his own unforeseen departure in 1985.
19. The hierarchy of the Church successfully warded off attempts by the drafters of the new constitution to write articles that ultimately might allow the state to take a neutral position on religious questions. The Holy Synod argued that proposed articles "violated harmony which should exist between church and state in an Orthodox country. Disestablishment was to be avoided since church and state had to cooperate in mutual activities for the improvement of society" (Frazee, 1980:156). These positions reflect an extension of the Byzantine policy of caesaropapism, a relationship of interdependence between church and state.
20. Despite declining attendance (apart from the major holidays), the Church continues today to serve as a source of identity, as the following anecdote reveals. Kallistos Ware, a convert to Orthodoxy, was accused of betraying his nation by a Greek dentist in Jerusalem because, as an Englishman, he should be a member of the Anglican Church. The Greek continued by stating: "Personally, I am an atheist; but, because I am Greek, I am of course a member of the Orthodox Church" (Ware, 1983:308).
21. Characteristics of membership in this upper bourgeoisie usually include knowledge of French and English, elite private school education, and study in foreign universities. Culturally, Western European cosmopolitanism prevails as a point of distinction between this group and other Greeks. Others who can afford to, and even those who cannot, imitate the affluent lifestyles of the social elite. If a family succeeds in retaining its wealth for the second or third generation, it can be accepted by the elite circle.
22. In December 1986 the Papandreou government approved a measure for permitting private radio stations. The first stations appeared in cities that fell under the control of conservative mayors in the 1986 municipal elections (Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki). These stations have tried to attract listeners with open debate and discussion among the various parties and by styling themselves as "free."
23. For example, in 1986 a rumor spread like wildfire in Thessaloniki that an earthquake was forecast for the coming weekend and that the information had come from West Germany. Nothing came over news broadcasts, but in that city, already scarred by a 1978 earthquake, much of its population left for the countryside. Despite the absurdity of the scenario for an outsider, the common response was that one can not rely on the government-controlled television.
24. The distinction between what was Greek and what was Western became quite evident during the Greek War of Independence. Leaders divided on what type of political models to follow. Those supporting or emulating European ways were opposed by the traditionalists who sought the perpetuation of their own social and political influence. The former generally included those who had some wealth and contacts, whether through education or commercial dealings with Europe. Although Greeks based their constitutions of 1844 and 1864 on existing constitutions in Western Europe, the spirit and conduct of their politics were not commensurate with those of the imported institutions.
25. Nearly twenty years ago an analyst of Greek educational problems wrote: "The educational challenge of Greece in the postwar decades has been how to adapt historically evolved educational ideas and institutions to changing demands upon them by new socioeconomic, political, and intellectual conditions" (Kazamias, 1968:55).
26. The 1976 law, among other objectives, tried to liberalize some aspects of the Greek educational system (e.g. the use of *demotiki* at all levels), increased the years of compulsory schooling from six to nine years, and established a dual educational structure through the creation of a technical education sector

ultimately intended to accommodate the majority of the school population (Frangoudakis, 1981:16). The 1982 law sought to "democratize" higher education by doing away with the so-called "chair system" and forming academic departments. Students were also allowed to participate in departmental governance.

27. An emphasis on memorization within a generally authoritarian classroom setting rather than on independent critical thinking contributes to the formation of inflexible attitudes and approaches towards social and political issues. One can conjecture that negative reaction to fixed views in schools has led to the development of rigid positions—often quite opposite in spirit—outside the classroom and the tendency to proffer simplistic judgments.
28. Even without the midsummer events of 1974, the United States could have anticipated an outburst of Greek sentiment against it on the fall of the dictatorship. A study mission report of February 1974 for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs bore the ominous title: Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece. It concluded that the United States had pursued a faulty policy since 1967: "Damage has already occurred to American interests in Greece and more will occur before the present situation ends" (1974:1). The assessment commented prophetically that "it would be highly unrealistic to think that the United States will ever be able to return to the comfortable patron-client state relationship it once enjoyed with Greece" (1974:12).
29. Shortly after assuming power in late July 1974, Karamanlis began a foreign policy reorientation that departed from Greece's post-World War II dependency on the United States. After the second offensive by the Turks on Cyprus in mid-August 1974 that resulted in their control of nearly 40 percent of the island, Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the military command of NATO. Greece returned to the military arm of NATO in October 1980 but command control problems in the Aegean, because of Greek disputes in the region with Turkey, remained unresolved. Karamanlis deliberately sought to steer Greece away from the dominating influence of the United States, in part by actively working for Greece's earlier entry into the European Community as its tenth member. He also embarked on a campaign to improve Greece's relations with regional states, both communist states to the north and Arab countries to the east. In a controversial measure and as part of Karamanlis's program to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Soviet ships were accepted for repairs at the Syros shipyards. The conservative governments also balked at signing an agreement for American bases, something which would be accomplished with Papandreou in 1983.

A NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

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