FAMILY STRUCTURE AND THE TRANSMISSION OF POLITICAL VALUES*

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ABSTRACT

Considerable controversy and gaps of knowledge exist over the relative and differential impact of the family as an agent of political socialization. One segment of this question rests on the transmission of particular values from parent to child. Data from a representative sample of American high school seniors and their parents are utilized to examine transmission patterns; parent-student pairs are used as the units of analysis. Correlations are obtained for a variety of political values, and a brief look at religious values provides a point of comparison.

Parent-student correspondences differ widely depending upon the values considered, with party identification standing highest, though even that value represents a distinct departure from perfect transmission. Parent-child congruences for other values taper off from this high, ranging from moderate at best to very low. This is true of attitudes on specific issues, ratings of socio-political groupings, political cynicism, and political cosmopolitanism. Similar patterns prevailed in the religious arena. Life cycle effects, other socialization agencies, and unstable attitudes appear to account for some of the aberrations from the model which posits high rates of transmission.

Select family characteristics provide little discrimination in accounting for high and low transmission rates. Sex of child and sex of parent, singly or in combination, make almost no difference in agreement patterns. The same proves true for affectional and control relationships between parent and child. It was hypothesized that individual and family politicization would be related to the transmission of political beliefs, but the data also lead to a rejection of this hypothesis.

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In establishing the political development of the pre-adult one of the central questions hinges on the relative and differentiated contribution of various socializing agents. The question undoubtedly proves more difficult as one traverses a range of polities from those where life and learning are almost completely wrapped up in the immediate and extended family, to those which are highly complex social organisms and in which the socialization agents are extremely varied. To gain some purchase on the role of one socializing agent in our own complex society, this paper will take up the specific question of the transmission of certain values (or orientations) from parent to child as observed in late adolescence. After noting parent-child relationships for a variety of political values, attention will be turned to some aspects of family structure which conceivably affect the transmission flows.

ASSESSING THE FAMILY'S IMPACT

"Foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family." So begins Herbert Hyman's discussion of the sources of political learning.[1] Hyman explicitly recognized the importance of other agents, but he was neither the first nor the last observer to stress the preeminent position of the family.[2] This viewpoint relies heavily on both the direct and indirect role of the family in shaping the basic orientations of offspring. Whether the child is conscious or unaware of the impact, whether the process is role-modelling or overt transmission, whether the values are political and directly usable or "nonpolitical" but transferable, and whether what is passed on lies in the cognitive or affective realm, it has been argued that the family is of paramount importance. In part this view draws heavily from psychoanalytic theory, but it is also influenced by anthropological and national character studies, and by the great emphasis on role theory in sociological studies of socialization. In part the view stems also from fortuitous findings in the area of partisan commitment and electoral behavior indicating high intergenerational agreement. Unfortunately for the general thesis, such marked correlations have been only occasionally observed in other domains of political life. Indeed, other domains of political life have been rarely explored systematically with respect to the central question of articulation in parent-child political values.[3] Inferences, backward and forward extrapolations, and retrospective and projective data have carried the brunt of the argument.

A recent, major report about political socialization during the elementary years seriously questions the validity of the family's overriding importance. In contrast to the previously-held views that the family was perhaps preeminent or at least co-equal to other socializing agents stands the conclusion by Robert Hess and Judith Torney that "the public school is the most important and effective instrument of political socialization in the United States," and that "the family transmits its own particular values in relatively few areas of political socialization and that, for the most part, the impact of the family is felt only as one of several socializing agents and institutions."[4] Hess and Torney see the primary influence of the family as the agent which promotes early attachment to country and government, and which thus "insures the stability of basic institutions."[5] Hence, "the family's primary effect is to support consensually-held attitudes rather than to inculcate idiosyncratic attitudes."[6] The major exception to these

conclusions occurs in the area of partisanship and related matters where the family's impact is predictably high.

The Hess and Torney argument thus represents a major departure from the more traditional view. In essence this report sees the family's influence as age-specific and restricted in its scope. Not that the authors dismiss the family. In fact, those scholars most interested in the persistence and maintenance of a political system through the peaceful means of socialization might well contend that the findings underscore the emphasis previously attached to the family. This is so because Hess and Torney do subscribe to the notion that these basic attachments come prior to school entry, although even here other elements could be at work.

In effect, however, the restriction of the family's role removes its impact from much of the dynamic qualities of the political system and from individual differences in political behavior. The consensual qualities imparted or reinforced by the family, while vital for comprehending the maintenance of the system, are less useful in explaining adjustments in the system, the conflicts and accommodations made, the varied reactions to political stimuli, and the playing of diverse political roles. In short, if the family's influence is restricted to inculcating a few consensual attributes (plus partisan attachment), it means that much of the socialization which results in individual differentiation in everyday politics and which effects changes in the functioning of the political system lies outside the causal nexus of the parent-child relationship. Conversely, if the school thus becomes all-important, it suggests that the educational process may be used as the major instrument for the manipulation of new generations.

The first and primary objective of the present paper will be to assay the flow of certain political values from parent to child. Our attention will be directed toward examining the variation in the distributions of the offsprings' values as a function of the distribution of these same values among their parents. This is not to say that other attitudinal and behavioral attributes of the parent are unimportant in shaping the child's political orientations. For example, children may develop authoritarian or politically distrustful attitudes not because their parents are authoritarian or distrustful but because of other variables such as disciplinary and protection practices.[7] Such transformations, while perhaps quite significant, will not be treated here. Rather, we will observe the degree to which the shape of value distributions in the child corresponds to that of his parent. Most of the values explored do not reflect the basic feelings of attachment to the political system which supposedly originate in the early years,[8] but much more of the secondary and tertiary values which tend to distinguish the political behavior of individuals and which contribute to the dynamics of the system.

Study Design

The data to be employed come from a study conducted by the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan in the spring of 1965. Interviews were held with a national probability sample of 1669 seniors distributed among 97 secondary schools (public and nonpublic). Whenever possible each student's mother or

father, designated randomly, was interviewed. In the permanent absence of the designated parent (such as by death, divorce, or separation), the other parent or a parent-surrogate bringing up the child was interviewed. For a random third of the students both parents were designatated as respondents; it was hoped that after the inevitable drop-off due to one-parent families, we would have interviews for both parents of about a quarter of the students. Interviews were actually completed with at least one parent of 94 percent of the students, and with both parents of 26 percent of the students, or 1992 parents altogether.

Additional interviews were conducted with 317 of the students' most relevant social studies teachers and with the school principals. Finally, some 21,000 paper-pencil questionnaires were administered to all members of the senior class in 85 percent of the sample schools. In this paper we shall deal only with the parent and student samples because our essential interest lies in examining parent-child relationships; in other efforts we shall extend not only the range of political orientations but also the range of socializing factors so that the relative impact of the family in combination with other factors may be ascertained.

Two features of the student and parent samples should be underscored. First, since the sample of students was drawn from a universe of 12th graders, school drop-outs in that age cohort, estimated at around 26 percent for this time period, were automatically eliminated. Some approximation of the possible effects of this fact may be gathered by a control of socio-economic class and certain family characteristics. Second, the sample of parents is composed of about 56 percent mothers. The greater proportion of mothers than fathers is due mainly to the fact that more mothers than fathers constitute the head of household in single parent families.[9]

Our basic procedure will be to match-up the parent and student samples so that parent-student pairs are formed.[10] Although the actual number of students for whom we have at least one parent respondent is 1562, the base number of pairs used in the analysis is 1992. In order to make maximum usage of the interviews gathered, the paired cases in which both the mother and father were interviewed (430 such cases) are each given half of their full value.[11] A further adjustment in weighting, due to unavoidably imprecise estimates at the time the sampling frame was constructed, results in a weighted total of 1927 parent-student pairs.[12]

Using 12th graders for exploring the parental transmission of political values carries some distinct characteristics. In the first place most of these pre-adults are approaching the point at which they will leave the immediate family. Further political training from the parents will be minimal. A second feature is that the formal civic education efforts of society, as carried out in the elementary and secondary schools, are virtually completed. For whatever effect they may have on shaping the cognitive and cathectic maps of individuals, these various formal and informal modes of citizenship preparation will generally terminate, although other forms of educational preparation may lie ahead, especially for the college bound. A final consideration is that while the family and the educational system have come to some terminal point as socializing agents, the pre-adult has yet to be much affected by way of actual political practice. Neither have other potentially important experiences, such as the establishment of his own nuclear family and an occupational role, had an opportunity to exert their effects. Thus

the 12th grader is at a significant juncture in his political life cycle and it will be instructive to see the symmetry of parental and student values at this juncture.

Adolescent Rebellion

It should be emphasized that we are not searching for patterns of political rebellion from parental values. Researchers have been hard pressed to uncover any significant evidence of adolescent rebellion in the realm of political affairs.[13] Pre-adults may differ politically from their parents--particularly during the college years--but there is scant evidence that the rebellion pattern accounts for much of this deviance. Data from our own study lend little support to the rebellion hypotheses at the level of student recognition. For example, even of the 38% of the student sample reporting important disagreements with their parents less than 15% portrayed these disagreements as residing in a broadly-defined arena of political and social phenomena. And these disagreements do not necessarily lie in the province of rebellion, as one ordinarily construes the term.

There is, furthermore, some question as to whether adolescent rebellion as such occurs with anything approaching the frequency or magnitude which has graced sociological writings and the popular literature. As two scholars concluded after a major survey of the literature dealing with "normal" populations:

> "In the large scale studies of normal populations, we do not find adolescents clamoring for freedom or for release from unjust constraint. We do not find rebellious resistance to authority as a dominant theme. For the most part, the evidence bespeaks a modal pattern considerably more peaceful (and dull) than much theory and most social comment would lead us to expect. 'Rebellious youth' and 'the conflict between generations' are phrases that ring; but, so far as we can tell, it is not the ring of truth they carry so much as the beguiling but misleading tone of drama."[14]

Various pieces of evidence from our own study support this view. Illustratively, slightly over three-fifths of the students reported having no important disagreement with their parents, and over four-fifths felt their parents had about the right amount of influence over their personal lives. Another indicator is that parental-child incompatibilities appear to crest in early adolescence and then taper off or remain stable rather than aggregating and developing into serious ruptures. When asked if parent-child relations had deteriorated, remained the same, or improved over the past three years (10th through 12th grades) more respondents in both the parent and student cohorts avowed the situation had improved rather than worsened and a majority reported no change.[15]

To say that rebellion directed toward the political orientations of the parents is relatively rare is not to say, however, that parent and student values are consonant. Discrepancies can occur for a variety of reasons, including the following: 1) Students may consciously opt for values, adopted from other agents, in conflict with those of their parents without falling into the rebellion syndrome. 2) Much more probable are discrepancies which are recognized neither

by the parent nor the offspring. The lack of cue-giving and object saliency on the part of parent sets up ambiguous or empty psychological spaces which may be filled by other agents in the student's environment. 3) Where values are unstable and have low centrality in a belief system, essentially random and time-specific responses to stimuli may result in apparent low transmission rates. 4) Another source of dissonant relationships, and potentially the most confounding one, is that life cycle effects are operative. When the pre-adult confronts the world of real politik at a point in his life-space which approximates the zone now occupied by his parents, his political behavior might well be expressed in forms similar to those of his parents even though his current attitudes would not suggest such congruency. This is an especially thorny empirical question and nests in the larger quandry concerning the later life effects of early socialization, a dilemma well populated for several decades by students of child development.[16]

For a variety of reasons--including the infrequent case of rebellion--the intergenerational transfer of values may thus be attenuated. At sundry points in our discussion we shall draw upon the foregoing factors as explanations of imperfect patterns of transmission, although a full treatment of the problem is clearly outside the scope of this paper.

PATTERNS OF PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCES

Confronted with a variety of political values at hand for analysis we have struck for variety rather than any necessary hierarchy of importance. We hypothesized a range of correlations dependent in part on the play of the factors which we assumed serve to alter the parent-student associations (noted above). We have purposely deleted values dealing with participative orientations and, as noted previously, those delving into sentiments of basic attachment and loyalty to the regime and its minimal normative requirements. The values selected include party identification, attitudinal positions on four specific issues, evaluations of socio-political groupings, and political cynicism. For comparative purposes we shall cast a sidewise glance at parent-student congruences in the sphere of religious values.

To measure agreement between parents and students we rely primarily on correlations, either of the product-moment or rank-order variety. While the obvious alternative--percentage agreement--may have an intuitive appeal, it has several drawbacks. Percentage agreement is not based on the total configuration of a square matrix but only on the "main diagonal." Thus two tables which are similar in percentage agreement may represent widely differing amounts of agreement if deviations from perfect agreement are considered.[17] Moreover, percentage agreement depends heavily on the number of categories used, so that the degree of parent-student similarity might vary for totally artificial reasons. Correlations are more resistant to changes in the definition of categories. Finally, correlations are based on relative rankings (and intervals in the case of product-moment correlations) rather than on absolute agreement as percentage agreement usually is. That is, if student scores tend to be higher (or lower) than parent scores on a particular variable, but the students are ranked similarly to their parents, a high correlation may be obtained with very little perfect agreement.

One precaution is in order. Obtaining significant correlations among the parent-student pairs does not establish a necessary causal relationship. Parents and children could agree because of other agents common to both. Positive correlations would establish a prima facie case for suspecting transmission, especially in those spheres where other forces could not reasonably be expected to be operative. On the other hand, weak correlations enable us to state with some assurance that little transmission is occurring.

Party Identification

Previous research has established party identification as a value dimension of considerable importance in the study of political behavior as well as a political value readily transmitted from parents to their children. Studies of parent-youth samples as well as adult populations indicate that throughout the life cycle there is a relatively high degree of correspondence between respondents' party loyalties and their parents'. Our findings are generally consistent with these earlier efforts. However, the data allow us to permeate this general conclusion in order to document carefully parent-child agreement at an important stage in the life cycle and to study the disagreement which does emerge.

The substantial agreement between parent and student party affiliations is indicated by a tau-beta of .47, a statistic nearly unaffected by the use of three, five, or all seven categories of the party identification spectrum generated by the question sequence.[18] The magnitude of this statistic reflects the twin facts of the presence of a large amount of exact agreement and the absence of many wide differences between students and parents. If the full 7x7 matrix of parent-student party loyalties is arrayed (Table 1), the cells in which parents and students are in unison account for a third of the cases. The cells representing maximum disagreement are very nearly empty. Despite our earlier contention, collapsing categories and considering percentage agreement in the resulting table does make good substantive sense with regard to party identification. In this instance the collapsed categories have a meaning beyond just broader segments of a continuum, and are associated with a general orientation toward one party or the other or toward a neutral position between them. Thus arrayed, 59 percent of the students fall into the same broad category as their parents, and only about seven percent cross the sharp divide between Republicans and Democrats.

The observed similarity between parents and students suggests that transmission of party preferences from one generation to the next is carried out rather successfully in the American context. However, there are also indications that other factors (temporarily at least) have weakened the party affiliations of the younger generation. This is most obvious if we compare the marginal totals for parents and students (Table 1). The student sample contains almost 12 percent more Independents than the parent sample, drawing almost equally on the Republican and Democratic proportions of the sample. Similarly, among party identifiers a somewhat larger segment of the students is but weakly inclined toward the chosen party. Nor are these configurations simply an artifact of the restricted nature of the parent sample, since the distribution of party identification among the parents resembles closely that of the entire adult electorate as observed in November, 1964 (SRC 1964 election study).

TABLE 1

Student-Parent Party Identification

Parents	Students: Strong Dem.	Weak Dem.	Ind. Dem.	Ind.	Ind. Rep.	Weak Rep.	Strong Rep.	Total
Party Identification								
Strong Dem.	9.7%	8.0	3.4	1.8	.5	.9	.5	24.7%
Weak Dem.	5.8	9.0	4.2	2.6	.7	1.6	.7	24.7
	(32.6)[a]			(13.2)			(3.6)	(49.4)
Ind. Dem.	1.6	2.1	2.1	1.7	.8	.7	.2	9.3
Ind.	1.1	1.6	1.6	2.7	1.2	.9	.5	9.7
Ind. Rep.	.1	.5	.8	.9	.9	1.3	.5	4.9
	(7.0)			(12.7)			(4.1)	(23.9)
Weak Rep.	.3	2.1	1.6	2.3	1.9	5.0	1.9	15.0
Strong Rep.	.2	.9	.8	.8	2.4	3.3	3.5	11.7
	(3.4)			(9.7)			(13.6)	(26.7)
Total	18.8%	24.2	14.5	12.8	8.4	13.6	7.7	100.0%
	(43.0)			(35.7)			(21.3)	

tau-beta = .47 N = 1852

[a]The full 7x7 table is provided because of the considerable interest in party identification. However, for some purposes, reading ease among them, the 3x3 table is useful. It is given by the figures in parentheses; these figures are (within rounding error) the sum of the numbers just above them.

A number of factors might account for the weakened partisanship of the students, and we have only begun to explore some of these alternatives. On the one hand, the students are simply lacking their parents' long experience in the active electorate, and as a consequence have failed as yet to develop a similar depth of feeling about the parties.[19] On the other hand, there are no doubt specific forces pushing students toward Independence. The experience of an ever-widening environment and the gradual withdrawal of parental power may encourage some students to adopt an Independent outlook. The efforts of schools and of teachers in particular are probably weighted in the same direction, even if teachers try to refrain from openly discussing politics.[20] If these forces are at work, it suggests that high school students may be gradually withdrawing from an earlier position of more overt partisanship.[21] But, whatever the exact nature of the causes, they clearly draw off from the partisan camp a small but significant portion of the population as it approaches full citizenship. If the relationship between partisanship and efficacy, involvement, and a host of other political variables is the same for pre-adults as adults, the consequences of weakened partisan feelings among high school seniors cannot be overlooked.

Turning to the party identifiers, we find that the ratio of Democrats to Republicans is almost the same in both samples. In the transmission process some changes in party loyalties have occurred, but the net balance does not favor either party. It should be noted that the balance between new Republicans and new Democrats is not a result of two equally attractive alternatives. The Democratic party has a visibly greater retaining and drawing power among the students in our sample. The data in Table 2 demonstrate this. Among students with a Democratic parent, almost two-thirds retain the parental party preference; the same is true of only half of the children of Republican parents. Among students who do not follow their parent's preference, a slightly larger percentage of the Republican offspring shift to the opposing party rather than to an Independent position. Similarly, children of Independent parents who adopt a party preference move disproportionately into the Democratic column. In short, whatever the nonfamily influences acting on today's pre-adults, such as Democratic majorities in nation and states or the partisan climate of the school community,[22] they are significantly stronger in the direction of Democracy than of Republicanism.

TABLE 2

Student Party Identification by Parent Party Identification

	Students				
Parents	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Total	N
Democrat	65.9%	26.8	7.3	100.0%	(914)
Independent	29.4	53.2	17.2	100.0	(442)
Republican	12.7	36.5	50.8	100.0	(495)

Opinions on Specific Issues

One way in which political values are expressed is through opinions on specific issues. As Converse has shown, opinions or idea elements not only tend to be bounded by systems of low constraint but are also quite unstable over relatively short periods of time among mass publics.[23] Hence in comparing student responses with parent responses the problem of measurement may be compounded by instabilities among both samples. Rather than being a handicap, however, instabilities actually sharpen the test of whether significant parent to child flows occur. One would not expect unstable sentiments to be the object of any considerable political learning in the family. It seems unlikely that many cues would be given off over matters about which the parents were unsure or held a fluctuating opinion based on low centrality. Even in the event of numerous cues in unstable situations, the ambivalent or ambiguous nature of such cues would presumably yield instability (assuming optimal transfer) in the child. In either case the articulation between parent and child beliefs would be tempered.

We have selected four specific issues for examination. Two of these involve public schools; given the populations being studied, schools are particularly relevant attitude objects. Furthermore these two issues envelop topics of dramatic interest to much of the public--integration in the schools and the use of prayers in schools. After an initial screening question weeded out those without any interest at all on the issues, the respondents were asked if they thought the government in Washington should "see to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools" or if the government should "stay out of this area as it is none of its business." On the prayers in school question the respondents were asked if they believed "schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer" or that "religion does not belong in the schools."[24] Taken in the aggregate the high school seniors proved less likely to sanction prayers in school than did the parents (although a majority of both answered in the affirmative) and more willing to see the federal government enforce segregation than were the adults (with both yielding majorities in favor). These differences are moderate; no more than 14 percentage points separate like-paired marginals on the prayer issue and no more than 10 points on the integration issue. The cross-tabulation of parent and student responses produces moderately strong coefficients as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Correlations Between Parent-Student Attitudes on Four Issues

Federal government's role in integrating the schools	.34[a]
Whether schools should be allowed to use prayers	.29
Legally elected Communist should be allowed to take office	.13
Speakers against churches and religion should be allowed	.05

[a]Each of the figures in this table is based on at least 1560 cases. The statistics are tau-beta coefficients.

Combining as they do some very visible population groupings along with topics of more than usual prominence in the mass media and local communities, it would be surprising indeed if there were not at least a moderate amount of parent-student overlap. The wonder is not that the correlations are this high, but rather that they are not higher. If correlations no higher than this are produced on issues which touch both of these generations in a manner which many issues assuredly do not, then one would speculate that more remote and abstract issues would generate even less powerful associations.

This hypothesizing is borne out by the introduction of two other issues. Both parents and students were asked to agree or disagree with these two statements: "If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, the people should allow him to take office"; and "If a person wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, he should be allowed to speak." In general, the pre-adults took a slightly more libertarian stance on the two issues than did the parents but the differences in any of the like-paired marginals do not exceed 14%. These similarities mask extremely tenuous positive correlations, however, as the second pair of items in Table 3 reveals.

These two issues carry neither the immediacy nor the concreteness which may be said to characterize those two issues dealing with integration and prayers in the schools. Indeed, one might question whether the two statements represent issues at all, as the public normally conceives of issues. At any rate it is improbable that the students are reflecting much in the way of cues emitted from their parents, simply because these topics or related ones are hardly prime candidates for dinner table conversation or inadvertent cue-giving.[25] Nor do they tap some rather basic sentiments and attitude objects which permeate the integration and prayers issues. Such sentiments are more likely to be embedded in the expressive value structure of the parents than are those having to do with some of the more abstract "fundamental" tenets of democracy as exemplified in the free speech and right to take office issues. That adults themselves have low levels of constraint involving propositions about such fundamental tenets has been demonstrated by McClosky, and by Prothro and Grigg.[26] Given this environment, the lower correlation for the two more abstract propositions is predictable.

Although the issues we have examined by no means exhaust the variety of policy questions one might pose, they probably exemplify the range of parent-student correspondences to be found in the populace. On all but consensual topics--which would perforce assume similar distributions among virtually all population strata anyway--the parent-student correlations obtained for the integration and prayer issues probably approach the apex. In part this may be due to unstable opinions and in part to the effects of agents other than the family. Neither is it inconceivable that delayed socialization is occurring; under the proper circumstances the children may exhibit greater correspondences to their parents as they step further into the life cycle. But for this particular point in time, the articulation of political opinions is only moderately strong on salient, concrete issues and virtually nil on more abstract issues.

Evaluations of Socio-Political Groupings

Collectivities of people who are distinguished by certain physical, locational, social, religious, and membership characteristics (the list is obviously not exhaustive) often come to serve as significant political reference groups for individuals. While distinguishable groups may carry affective neutrality, it seems to be in the nature of mass behavior that these groups most often come to be viewed with greater or lesser esteem and that evaluations of groupings will vary with an individual's own properties, including his membership or nonmembership in the group. The intersticing of group evaluations and the political process comes when claims or demands are made by or upon significant portions of such groupings. The civil rights movement of the past decade is perhaps the most striking contemporary example. As Converse has suggested, social groupings are likely to have greater centrality for mass publics than abstract idea elements per se.[27] Thus when particular issues and public policies become imbued with group-related properties, the issues acquire considerably more structure and concreteness for the mass public than would be the normal case.

To what extent is the family crucial in shaping the evaluations of social groupings and thus--at a further remove--the interpretation of questions of public policy? Some insight into this may be gained by comparing the ratings applied by the parents and students to eight socio-political groupings. While the groups all carry rather easily recognized labels, they do differ in terms of their relative visibility and their inclusive-exclusive properties. They include Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, Whites, Labor Unions, Big Business, and Southerners.

To measure the attitudes toward these groups, an instrument dubbed the "feeling thermometer" was used. The technique was designed to register respondents' feelings toward a group on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. Respondents were instructed to give the group a 50 degree rating if they did not know much about the group or if they did not feel particularly warm or cold toward it. Warm feelings about the group were registered from 51 to 100, while negative feelings were recorded on the lower end of the scale. In the analysis we will treat this scale as interval level measurement. We have also looked at all of the data using tables and ordinal statistics; our conclusions are the same regardless of the method used.

Turning first to the mean ratings, given in Table 4, we find a striking similarity in student and parent aggregate scores. The largest difference is five points and the average difference is only 2.2 points. Additionally, the standard deviation scores for the two samples (not shown) are extremely similar across all groupings. Nor were there significant tendencies for one sample to employ more than the other the option of "unawareness" or "no feelings" (a reading of 50 on the thermometer) about the groupings. Moreover, the aggregate differences which do occur are not immediately explicable. For example, students rate Southerners slightly lower than parents, as we expected, but the difference in ratings of Negroes is negligible, which was unanticipated. Students rate Whites and Protestants somewhat lower than parents. This is not matched, however, by higher evaluations of the minority groups--Jews, for example.

TABLE 4

Correlations Between Parent-Student Group Evaluations

Group Evaluated	Parent-Student Correlations	Mean Ratings Parent	Student
Catholics	.36[a]	72	70
Southerners	.30	66	62
Labor Unions	.28	60	60
Negroes	.26	67	69
Jews	.22	67	63
Whites	.19	84	83
Protestants	.15	84	79
Big Business	.12	64	63

[a]Each of the figures in this table is based on at least 1880 cases. The statistics are product-moment coefficients; the corresponding tau-betas are (top to bottom) .28, .22, .22, .20, .18, .19, .13, .08.

Given these extraordinarily congruent patterns it is rather startling to see that they are patently not due to uniform scores of parent-child pairs. As shown in Table 4, the highest correlation between the parent and student ratings is .35 and the coefficients range as low as .12. Even the highest correlation is well below that found for party identification (where the product-moment coefficient was .59 for the seven-fold classification), and for several groupings the relationships between parent and student scores are very feeble. If the child's view of socio-political groupings grows out of cue-giving in the home, the magnitude of the associations should exceed those observed here.

It is beyond the task of this paper to unravel these findings. The range of correlations, however, provides a clue as to the conditions under which parent-student correspondences will be heightened. In the first place the three categories producing the lowest correlations appear to have little socio-political relevancy in the group sense. Whites and Protestants are extremely inclusive categories and, among large sectors of the public, may simply not be cognized or treated in everyday life as groupings highly differentiated from society in general. They are, in a sense, too enveloping to be taken as differentiated attitude objects. (This, of course, would not hold under certain conditions of perceived inter-group strife.) If they do not serve as significant attitude objects the likelihood of parent to child transmission would be dampened. In the third case--Big Business--it seems likely that its visibility is too low to be cognized as a group qua group.

As the parent-student correlations increase we notice that the groupings come to have not only highly distinguishable properties but that they also have high visibility in contemporary American society. Adding to the socio-political saliency thereby induced is the fact that group membership may act to increase the parent-student correlations irrespective of or in addition to parental values per se. That is, one would hypothesize that parent-student pairs falling into a distinguishable, visible grouping would exhibit higher correlations in rating that same grouping than would nonmembers. Taking the four groupings for whom the highest correlations were obtained, we divided the pairs into those where both the parent and the child--except in the case of labor unions--were enveloped by the groupings versus those outside the groupings. Although none of the hypothesized relationships were contravened, only the coefficients for evaluations of Southerners provided a distinct demarcation between members and nonmembers (tau-beta = .25 for Southern pairs, .14 for non-Southerners). It is quite possible that measures capturing membership identification and intensities would improve upon these relationships.

As with opinions on specific issues, intra-pair correlations on group evaluations are at best moderately positive and they vary appreciably as a result of socio-political visibility and, to a small degree, group membership characteristics. What we are beginning to discern, then, is a pattern of congruences which peak only over relatively concrete, salient values susceptible to repeated reinforcement in the family (and elsewhere perhaps), as in party identification and in certain issues and group evaluations. It is conceivable that these results will not prevail if we advance from fairly narrow measures like the ones previously employed to more global, unidimensional value structures. We now turn to an illustrative example. It so happens that it also provides an instance of marked aggregate differences between the two generations.

Political Cynicism

Political cynicism and its mirror image, trust, offer an interesting contrast to other variables we are considering. Rather than referring to specific political issues or actors, cynicism is a basic orientation toward political actors and activity. Found empirically to be related to political participation, the presence of distrust and skepticism presumably pervades all encounters with political objects. In addition, political cynicism has been found to be positively correlated with measures of a generally distrustful outlook (personal cynicism).[28] Political cynicism appears to be a manifestation of a deep-seated suspicion of others' motives and actions. Thus this attitude comes closer than the rest of our values to tapping a basic psycho-political predisposition.

Previous research with young children suggests that sweeping judgments, such as the essential goodness of human nature, are formed early in life, often before congitive development and information acquisition make the evaluated objects

intelligible. Greenstein, and Hess and Easton, have reported this phenomenon with regard to feelings about authority figures; Hess and Torney suggest similar conclusions about loyalty and attachment to government and country.[29] Evaluative judgments and affective ties have been found among the youngest samples for which question and answers techniques are feasible. This leads to the conclusion that the school, mass media, and peer groups have had little time to influence these attitudes.

It seems to follow that the family is the repository from which these feelings are initially drawn. Either directly by their words and deeds or indirectly through unconscious means, parents transmit to their children basic postures toward life which the children carry with them at least until the development of their own critical faculties. Although our 12th graders have been exposed to a number of influences which could mitigate the initial implanting, one should expect, according to the model, a rather strong correspondence between parent and student degrees of political cynicism.

To assess the cynicism of parents and students, a Guttman scale was constructed from five questions asked of both samples. All questions dealt with the conduct of the national government.[30] The items were of a "forced alternative" variety; that is, rather than simply agreeing or disagreeing, respondents had to verbalize at least a few key words to indicate their response. One advantage of this format is that it tends to reduce response-set errors. In addition, two of the items were worded so that the first alternative indicated a trusting attitude while in three items the cynical response was placed first. In each sample the items formed a scale, with coefficients of reproducibility of .93 and .92 for parents and students, respectively, The first two items in the parent scale were reversed for the students, but the proportion of positive responses for these items was so similar that few respondents were affected by the item reversal. The same reversal happened for the last two items of the scale.

The aggregate scores reflect a remarkably lesser amount of cynicism among students than among parents. This is apparent in the marginal distributions in Table 5, which show the weight of the parent distribution falling much more on the cynical end of the scale. Similarly, while a fifth of the students were more cynical than their parents, three times this number of parents were more cynical than their children. The students may be retreating from an even more trusting attitude held earlier, but compared to their parents they still see little to be cynical about in national political activity. Here is a case where the impact of other socialization agents--notably the school--looms large. The thrust of school experience is undoubtedly on the side of developing trust in the political system in general. Civic training in school abounds in rituals of system support and in glorification of the system in the formal curriculum. These rituals and curricula are not matched by a critical examination of the nation's shortcomings or the possible virtues of other political forms. Coupled with a moralistic, legalistic, prescriptive orientation to the study of government is the avoidance of conflict dimensions and controversial issues.[31] A direct encounter with the realities of political life is thus averted or at least postponed. It would not be surprising, then, to find a rather sharp rise in the level of cynicism as high school seniors move ahead in a few years into the adult world.

TABLE 5

Relationship Between Parent-Student Scores on the Cynicism Scale

	Students						
	Least Cynical					Most Cynical	
Parents	1	2	3	4	5	6	Row Totals	Marginal Totals[a]
Least Cynical - 1	25%	27	33	13	1	2	101%	8%
2	19	28	38	9	1	5	100	12
3	18	28	37	10	3	4	100	33
4	16	23	41	13	3	4	100	17
5	15	19	35	19	3	9	100	9
Most Cynical - 6	12	22	36	18	4	8	100	21
Marginal Totals[a]	17%	25	37	13	3	5		100%
			taubeta = .12					N = 1869

[a]Marginal totals show the aggregate scalar patterns for each sample.

Students on the whole are less cynical than parents; relative to other students, however, those with distrustful, hostile parents should themselves be more suspicious of the government, while those with trusting parents should find less ground for cynicism. Against the backdrop of our discussion, it is remarkable how low the correspondence is between parent-student pairs. Aside from faint markings at the extremities, students' scores are very nearly independent of their parents' attitudes (Table 5). The cynicism of distrustful parents is infrequently implanted in their children, while a smaller group of students develop a cynical outlook despite their parents' views. Political cynicism as measured here is not a value often passed from parent to child. Regardless of parental feelings, children develop a moderately to highly positive view of the trustworthiness of the national government and its officials. We imagine that if we had interviewed younger students, we would have found the same, nearly unanimous positive images of trust that other investigators have found for images of authority and the nation.

These findings do not mean that parents fail to express negative evaluations in family interaction nor that children fail to adopt some of the less favorable attitudes of their parents. What is apparently not transmitted is a generalized cynicism about politics. Thus while warmth or hostility toward specific political

objects with high visibility may be motivated by parental attitudes, a more pervasive type of belief system labelled cynicism (trust) is apparently subject to heavy, undercutting influences outside the family nexus. These influences are still operative as the pre-adult stands on the verge of adult status.

Working with another encompassing set of values we encountered much the same patterns as with cynicism. After obtaining their rank orderings of interest in international, national, state, and local political matters the respondents were allocated along a 7-point scale of cosmopolitanism-localism through an adaptation of Coombs' unfolding technique for preference order data.[32] On the whole the students are considerably more oriented to larger geo-political domains (more cosmopolitan) than the parents, and the paired correlation is a modest .17. Both life cycle and generational effects are undoubtedly at work here,[33] but the central point is that the students' orientations only mildly echo those of their parents.

What results from juxtaposing parents and their children on these two measures of cynicism and cosmopolitanism-localism is the suspicion that more global orientations to political life do not yield parent-student correspondences of greater magnitude than on more specific matters. If anything, the opposite is true--at least with respect to certain specifics. It may be true that the child acquires a minimal set of basic commitments to the system and a way of handling authority situations as a result of early experiences in the family circle. But it appears also that this is a foundation from whence arise widely diverse value structures, and that parental values are an extremely variable and often feeble guide as to what the pre-adult's values will be.

Religious Beliefs

Up to this point we have traversed a range of political and quasi-political values, and have witnessed varying, but generally modest degrees of parental-student correspondences. To what extent does this pattern also characterize other domains of social values? For comparative purposes we can inject a consideration of religious beliefs. Like party preferences, church affiliation among pre-adults is believed to be largely the same as parental affiliation. Such proves to be the case among our respondents. Of all parent-student pairs 74% occupied the same cells of denominational preference. That this percentage is higher than the agreement on the three-fold classification of party identification (Democrat, Republican, Independent) by some 15% suggests that by the time the pre-adult is preparing to leave the family circle he has internalized the church preference of his parents to a moderately greater extent than their party preference.

There are some perfectly valid reasons for this margin. To a much greater extent than party preference, church preference is likely to be reinforced in a number of ways. Assuming attendance, the child will usually go to the same church throughout childhood; the behavior is repeated at frequent intervals; it is a

practice engaged in by greater or lesser portions of the entire family and thus carries multiple role-models; formal membership is often involved; conflicting claims from other sources in the environment for a change of preference are minimal except, perhaps, as a result of dating patterns. Religious affiliation is also often imbued with a fervid commitment.

In contrast, party preference is something which the child, himself, cannot transform into a behavioral manifestation except in rather superficial ways; reinforcement tends to be episodic and varies according to the election calendar; while the party preference of parents may vary only marginally over the pre-adult years, the voting behavior itself fluctuates more and thus sets up ambiguous signals for the child; other sources in the environment--most noticeably the mass media--may make direct and indirect appeals for the child's loyalty which conflict with the parental attachments; and finally no binding acts of formal membership are involved in party attachments. Given the factors facilitating intrafamilial similarities in church preference, and the absence of at least some of these factors in the party dimension, it is perhaps remarkable that congruity of party identification approaches--at this stage in the pre-adult's life cycle--the zone of church preference congruity.

We found that when we skipped from party identification to other sorts of political values that the parent-student correlations decreased perceptibly. May we expect to encounter similar behavior in the realm of religious values? One piece of evidence indicates that this is precisely the case. Respondents were confronted with a series of four statements having to do with the literal and divine nature of the Bible, ranging all the way from a description of the Bible as "God's word and all it says is true" down to a statement denying the contemporary utility of the book.

Both students and parents tended to view the Bible with awe, the parents slightly more so than the students. But the correlation (tau-beta) among parent-student pairs is only a moderately strong .30. As with political values, once the subject matter moves out from central basic identification patterns the transmission of parental values fades.[34] And, as with political values, this may be a function of instability--although this seems less likely for the rendering of the Bible--the impingement of other agents--particularly likely in this case--or the relative absence of cue-giving on the part of the parents. Obviously, combinations of these factors may also be at work. The more generalizable proposition emerging from a comparison of political and religious orientations is the diminution of the correlations obtained when the less concrete value orientations are studied. Whether similar results would emerge from a consideration of other social values we cannot be sure, but the probabilities lie in that direction.

FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSMISSION PATTERNS

We have found that the transmission of political values from parent to child varies remarkably according to the nature of the value. Although the central tendencies lie on the low side, we may encounter systematic variations in the degree to which values are successfully transmitted according to certain properties of the family structure itself. That is, whether the transmittal be conscious and deliberate or unpurposive and indirect are there some characteristics of the family unit which abet or inhibit the child's acquisition of parental values? We shall restrict ourselves to a limited set of variables having theoretical interest.

In order to dissect the parent-student relationships by controlling for a variety of independent variables, two strategies were considered. One was to retain the full parent-student matrices and then observe agreement rates (in the form of correlations) within categories of the independent variables. A more parsimonious method was to develop agreement indexes and to relate the independent variables to these indexes. This would result in a single statistic and contingency table for each independent variable rather than one for each category of each independent variable. The index approach will be used in the remainder of the paper.[35]

The agreement indexes were developed as follows. Perfect agreement corresponds to the cells on the main diagonal of a square table in which parents' and students' responses are represented by the rows and columns of the table. Parent-student pairs falling into these cells were ranked 1. Then, moving out from the main diagonal, a rank of 2 was given to those falling just above or just below this line, a rank of 3 was given to those two units from the diagonal, and so on. The number of scores depends on the number of categories in the variable being used. Some collapsing was usually done among the highest scores because of the few cases of extremely sharp disagreement.[36] Four- and five-category indexes resulted from these operations.

Parent and Student Sex Combinations

Various adolescent studies have illustrated the discriminations which controls for sex of parent and sex of child may produce in studying the family unit.[37] Typically these studies have dealt with self-development, adjustment problems, motivational patterns, and the like. As indicated earlier (see note 9), initial sex controls of the parent-student values matrices suggested only minor differences according to parent and student sex combinations, but we shall now probe this topic more fully.

Part of the common lore of American political behavior is that the male is more dominant in political matters than the female, both in his role of husband and father. And pre-adult males are usually found to be more politicized than counterpart females. While our findings do not challenge these statements, they do indicate the meager utility of sex roles in explaining parental-student agreement. Illustrative of the findings are those presented in Table 6 which show

the percentages for combinations of mother-daughter, mother-son, father-daughter, and father-son across the agreement indexes for party identification and political cynicism.

TABLE 6

Sex of Parent and Child Related to Parent-Child Agreement Indexes

		Mother-Daughter Pairs	Mother-Son Pairs	Father-Daughter Pairs	Father-Son Pairs
	N^a =	(505)	(538)	(388)	(420)
Party Identification Agreement Index					
High -	1	38%	29%	32%	32%
	2	31	34	38	34
	3	15	19	14	19
Low -	4	15	18	17	15
	Total	99%	100%	101%	100%
Cynicism Agreement Index					
High -	1	22%	22%	24%	20%
	2	35	35	31	28
	3	20	23	18	27
Low -	4	24	20	26	25
	Total	101%	100%	99%	100%

[a]These are the smaller N's of the two percentage sets.

A perusal of the table leaves little doubt that the values of the father are not more likely to be internalized than are those of the mother, inasmuch as pairs involving the father do not differ consistently from those engaging the mother. Indeed, the single cell showing the very highest parent-student agreement is the mother-daughter combination for party identification. It is also apparent that the sex of the student accounts for little variance. Sons are no more likely to register consistently differential rates of agreement than are daughters. Finally, it is also quite clear that the particular sex mix of parent and child makes little difference. The same picture of uniformity was obtained when we considered the other values presented earlier--opinions on specific issues and

group evaluations. Furthermore, the few differences obtained are inconsistent across the four political values. We also found that the use of sex combinations as controls on other bivariate relationships, while occasionally yielding discriminations worth noting, usually resulted in minor and fluctuating differences. Whatever family characteristics affect differential rates of value transmission they are only marginally represented by sex roles in the family.

Our findings most assuredly should not be taken to mean that political learning is unassociated with sex roles in the family. Nor do they necessarily mean that the father is not setting the political tone of the family, although preliminary investigation casts serious doubt on the correctness of that too. Rather, they show that sex roles are relatively neutral with respect to the taking on of parental political values by the young.

Affectivity and Control Relationships

Another set of family characteristics employed with considerable success in studies of the family and child development has to do with the dimension of power or control on the one hand, and the dimension of attachment or affectivity on the other.[38] One salient conclusion has been that children are more apt to use their parents as role models where the authority structure is neither extremely permissive nor extremely autocratic and where strong (but not overprotective) supportive functions and positive affects are present.

Although these dimensions have been employed in various ways in assessing the socialization of the child, they have rarely been utilized in looking at value transmission per se. In the nearest approach to this in political socialization studies, Middleton and Putney, working with college students' reports, concluded that perceived ideological differences between parent and child were higher when there was emotional estrangement, when the parental discipline was perceived as either too high or too low, and when the parent was believed to be interested in politics.[39] Somewhat related findings by Robert Lane, and by Maccoby, et al.,[40] support the idea that affective and power relationships between parent and child may affect the transferral of political orientations.

Affectivity and control relationships between pre-adults and their parents were operationalized in a number of ways, too numerous to give in detail. Suffice it to say that both samples were queried as to how close they felt to each other, whether and over what they disagreed, the path of compatibilities over the past few years, punishment agents, perceived level of parental control, parent and student satisfaction with controls, the nature and frequency of grievance processing, and rule-making procedures.

In accordance with the drift of previous research we hypothesized that the closer the student felt to his parent the more susceptible he would be to adopting, either through formal or informal learning, the political values of the parent. This turned out to be untrue. The closeness of parents and children, taking either the parent's report or the child's report, accounted for little variation in the distribution of scores on the agreement indexes. This was true whether closeness to mother or father was considered and regardless of the student's sex. Similarly,

other measures of affective relationships gave little evidence that this dimension prompted much variation in agreement among pairs.

Turning to the power relationships between parent and child we hypothesized two types of relationships: 1) the more "democratic" versus autocratic and permissive these relationships were the greater congruency there would be; and 2) the more satisfied the child was with the power relationships the greater would be the congruency. Again our expectations bore little fruit. The power configuration, either in terms of its structure or its appraised satisfactoriness, generated few significant and consistent differences. Moreover, this proved generally true whether we relied on the parent's account or the student's.

As with sex roles, the affective and control dimensions thus prove to possess weak explanatory power when laid against parent to student transmission patterns. Again, this does not mean that these characteristics are unimportant for the political socialization of the young. It simply means that they are of little help in trying to account for the differential patterns of parent-student congruences. One might argue that there are types of power and affective relationships not easily tapped by the measures and methodologies employed here, and to this argument we would agree. However, these are measures or variants previously shown to have discriminatory power for other forms and stages of development and behavior.[41] If they do not resonate with the phenomena to be explained, the reason seems more likely to lie in the nature of the phenomena rather than the methods utilized. It should also be noted that other aspects of family structure not explored here may have greater utility--e.g., the conjugal power structure, nuclear versus nonnuclear families, and the sibling structure.

Levels of Politicization

Another set of family characteristics concerns the saliency and cue-giving structure of political matters within the family. One would expect parents for whom politics is more salient to emit more cues, both direct and indirect. Other things being equal, the transmission of political values would vary with the saliency and overt manifestations of political matters. Cue-giving would structure the political orientations of the child and, in the absence of rebellion, bolster parent-student correspondences. The absence of cue-giving would probably inject considerable instability and ambiguity in the child's value structure. At the same time this absence would invite the injection of other socializing agents whose content and direction might vary with parental values. In either event parental-offspring value correspondences should be reduced in the case of lower political saliency and cue-giving.

Turning to our data, we could not find a much more blatant denial of our hypothesis. The degree of parent-student agreement is not related to any of our measures of family politicization. This is all the more surprising since we used a number of measures to capture the various ways in which family politicization might be manifested. Considering parental responses first, we used questions about attention paid to politics in the mass media, about husband-wife political conversations, about disagreements regarding political and social matters, and about participation in political campaigns, and in school and community affairs. Student

responses about their own and their family's politicization were also considered. The student's attention to media, frequency of political conversations with his parents and other people, parent-student disagreements in socio-political realms, and an assessment of his own political interest were all cross-tabulated against the degree of parent-student correspondence.

Relating each of these measures of politicization to the parent-student agreement indexes for the values discussed earlier, no correlation (tau-beta) rose above .08, and many were slightly negative. Inspection of the tables did not reveal any curvilinear patterns obscured by the low correlations. Parent-student agreement rates are essentially the same regardless of the degree of parent or student politicization.[42]

Nor was the intensity of parental feelings related in any consistent fashion to the amount of parent-student correspondence. At times such a relationship does emerge.[43] For example, acceptance of the parental party identification is somewhat greater for strong partisan parents than for weak partisan parents, greater for weakly identifying parents than Independent but leaning parents, and greater for leaners than true Independents. However, as we pointed out earlier, acceptance of the parental affiliation is less frequent for children of Republican parents so that the identification of strong Republican parents is adopted less than that of weak Democratic parents and the deviation from weak Republican parents is almost as great as for parents who are Independent but leaning Democratic.

It is true that the case of party identification might be easily explained; given the greater drawing power of the Democrats, we might predict the observed deviation from the hypothesized relationship between intensity and parent-student agreement. It is not so easy, however, to dispose of departures from the hypothesized relationship when the same kind of analysis is done for parent and student ratings of groups. Taking the more extreme ratings as the more intensely held, we find that student deviations from parental judgments yield with about equal frequency a linear pattern (greatest deviations among the most intense and vice versa), a rectangular pattern, and a curvilinear pattern (greatest deviations among the least and most intense, with moderate parents in between).

Our results should not be interpreted as showing that familial politicization in general is unrelated to political attitudes and values or that the level of politicization among parents has no bearing on their children's interest in politics. They do indicate, however, that the degree of parent and student politicization is virtually unrelated to the congruency of parent and child values. Whether it is measured in terms of student or parent responses, taps spectator fascination with or active engagement in politics, or denotes individual-level and family-level properties, varying amounts of politicization barely alter the level of correspondence between values of parents and their offspring.

With hindsight reasons for the lack of the hypothesized relationship can be suggested. But to give a clear and thorough explanation and to test alternative hypothesis will be a difficult and time-consuming task. One exploratory avenue, for example, brings in student perceptions of parental attitudes as an intervening variable. Another is concerned with the relative homogeneity of the environment

for children of highly politicized backgrounds versus youngsters from unpoliticized families. A third possibility is the existence of differential patterns of political learning and, in particular, a differential impact of the various socializing agents on children from politically rich versus those from politically barren backgrounds. It is also possible that knowledge about later political development of the students would help explicate these perplexing configurations. Models incorporating such features will be more complex, but they will hopefully adhere more closely to empirical findings.

A Concluding Note

In our opening remarks we noted the conflicting views regarding the importance of the family as an agent of political learning for the child. In this paper we have been primarily concerned with a fairly narrow aspect of this question. We sought evidence indicating that a variety of political values held by pre-adults were induced by the values of their parents. Thus our test has been rather stringent. It has not examined the relative impact of the family vis-a-vis other socializing agents, nor has it assessed other ways in which the family may shape political orientations.

Having said this, it is nevertheless clear that any model of socialization which rests on assumptions of pervasive currents of parent to child value transmissions of the types examined here is in serious need of modification. Attitude objects in the concrete, salient, reinforced terrain of party identification lend support to the model. But this is an exception. Our data suggest that with respect to a range of other attitude objects the correspondences vary from at best moderate support to virtually no support. We have suggested that life cycle effects, the role of other socializing agents, and attitude instabilities help account for the very noticeable departures from the model positing high transmission. Building these forces into a model of political learning will further expose the family's role in the development of political values.



FOOTNOTES

[1]Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 69.

[2]See, e.g., James C. Davies, "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," The Annals, 361 (September, 1965), pp. 10-19.

[3]These few studies are cited by Hyman, op. cit., pp. 70-71. Most of the reports are based on extremely limited samples and nearly all took place between 1930-1950.

[4]Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship During the Elementary School Years, Part I (Cooperative Research Project No. 1078, U.S. Office of Education, 1965), pp. 193, 200.

[5]Ibid., p. 191.

[6]Ibid., p. 192.

[7]Illustrative of this argument is Frank A. Pinner's careful rendering in "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust," The Annals, 361 (September, 1965), pp. 58-70. See, in the same issue, Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," pp. 81-95.

[8]In addition to the Hess and Torney report, evidence for this is supplied by inter alios, Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals, 361 (September, 1965), pp. 40-57.

[9]In any event, initial controls on parent (as well as student) sex suggest that parent-student agreement rates on the values examined here differ little among parent-student sex combinations. This will be discussed in more detail below.

[10]In this analysis we will not be concerned with mother-father-child triads.

[11]The alternative to half-weighting these pairs is to subselect among those cases where both mother and father were interviewed. Half weighting tends to reduce the error in sampling variability because it utilizes more data cases. Experimentation with half weighting versus subselection indicated only slight differences in the marginals in any event.

[12]It proved impossible to obtain accurate, recent figures on 12th grade enrollment throughout the country. Working with the data available and extrapolating as necessary, a sampling frame was constructed so that schools would be drawn with a probability proportionate to the size of the senior class. After entry was obtained into the sample schools and precise figures on enrollments gathered, differential weights were applied to correct for the inequalities in selection probabilities occasioned by the original imprecise information. The average weight equals 1.2 .

[13]Hyman, op. cit., p. 72, and n. 6, p. 89. See also Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," American Sociological Review, 24 (August, 1959), pp. 502-11; Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Matthews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 (Spring, 1954), pp. 23-39; and Russell Middleton and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (March, 1963), pp. 527-35.

[14]Elizabeth Douvan and Martin Gold, "American Adolescence: Modal Patterns of Bio-Social Change," in Martin and Lois Hoffman (eds.), Review of Child Development Research, Vol. II (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, forthcoming).

[15]Among the students 30% reported improvement, 18% deterioration, and 51% said things were about the same. Comparable figures among the parents were 17%, 13%, and 69%.

[16]A notable exception in this field is Jerome Kagan and Howard A. Moss, Birth to Maturity: The Fels Study of Psychological Development (New York: Wiley, 1962).

[17]One could try to capture the total configuration of agreement using percentaged tables instead of the percentage of perfect agreement; but besides lacking in parsimony, such tables are difficult to interpret and compare.

[18]This figure is based on parent-student pairs in which both respondents have a party identification; eliminated are the 2% of the pairs in which one or both respondents are apolitical or undecided. (Only 1% of the students are undecided about their party preference.) Using a product-moment correlation on these data yields a value of .59. The standard SRC party identification questions were used. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), Chap. 6.

[19]This is suggested by an analysis of different age groups among the active electorate. See Ibid., pp. 161ff.

[20]Our sample of teachers contains, if anything, only a slightly greater proportion of Independents than the electorate as a whole. But when asked whether they teach their students to vote for the man or the party, 51% said "Man" while only 12% said "Party" or even "Party and Issues." The remainder said they taught both viewpoints or did not try to teach either one.

[21]Such a developmental pattern is suggested by data presented by Hess and Torney. If one repercentages their data to eliminate those who don't know what the parties are and who haven't decided their party loyalties, there is a steady increase in the proportion of Independents between the second and eighth grades. See Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 172.

[22]For an effort to assess the climate of partisan opinion on individual party preference see Martin L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Winter, 1961), pp. 596-606.

[23]Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206-61. The following section borrows from Converse's discussion. Robert E. Agger takes a somewhat different view of instabilities in "Panel Studies of Comparative Community Political Decision-Making," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, (eds.), The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 265-89.

[24]Sizeable proportions of both parents and students elected to state a middle or "depends" response, particularly on the first question. Such responses occupy a middle position in our calculation of the rank order correlations. On the first issue 10% of the pairs were dropped because either the parent or child opted out on the initial screen; the corresponding figure for the second issue is 19%.

[25]Unfortunately, for purposes of comparison, the latter two issues were not asked in the format of the integration and prayer issues where an initial screen was utilized. A comparison of percentages for parents who opted out on these questions would have provided firmer evidence on the saliency of the two sets of issues.

[26]Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), pp. 361-82; and James W. Prothro and Charles W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 22 (May, 1960), pp. 276-94.

[27]Converse, op. cit.

[28]Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (August, 1961), p. 490; and Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, 25 (May, 1963), pp. 312-23.

[29]Greenstein, op. cit., Chap. 3; Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (Winter, 1960), pp. 632-44; and Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 73ff.

[30]The items are as follows:

1) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are?
2) Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?
3) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
4) Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing?
5) Would you say that the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

[31]These are old charges but apparently still true. After a survey of the literature on the subject and on the basis of a subjective analysis of leading government textbooks in high schools Byron G. Massialas reaches the same conclusions. See his "Teaching American Government in High Schools: 'We are the Greatest'," in Benjamin Cox and Byron Massialas (eds.), Social Studies in the United States: Essays on the State of the Profession (forthcoming).

[32]A description of this operation and some results are given in M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," (unpublished paper presented at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, 1966). The underlying theory and technique are found in Clyde Coombs, A Theory of Data (New York: Wiley, 1964), esp. Chap. 5.

[33]This is discussed in more detail in Jennings, op. cit.

[34]To compare the amount of correspondence on interpretation of the Bible with church membership information, which is nominal level data, we used the contingency coefficient. Grouping parent and student church affiliations into nine general categories, the coefficient is .88, compared to .34 for the Bible question.

[35]However, in some initial work we examined results of both methods for the same variables. The conclusions reached were similar regardless of the method. Occasionally pockets of theoretically interesting but numerically small sub-sets may be obscured by the use of the indexes.

[36]This was a straightforward procedure for the variables of party identification and political cynicism. On the four issues, however, it was first necessary to construct a composite matrix based on parent-student responses to all four issue questions. On the group evaluation measure we selected three minority group ratings--Negroes, Jews, and Catholics--and constructed a matrix in which the ratings of only these three were represented.

[37]See, e.g., Charles E. Bowerman and Glen H. Elder, "Adolescent Perception of Family Power Structure," American Sociological Review, 29 (August, 1964), pp. 551-67; E. C. Devereux, Urie Bronfenbrenner, and G. J. Suci, "Patterns of Parent Behavior in the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Cross-National Comparison," International Social Science Journal, 14 (UNESCO, 1963), pp. 1-20; and Morris Rosenberg, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), Chap. 3.

[38]A discussion of these dimensions is found in Murray Straus, "Power and Support Structure of the Family in Relation to Socialization," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 26 (August, 1964), pp. 318-26. See also Wesley C. Becker, "Consequences of Different Kinds of Parental Discipline," in Martin and Lois Hoffman (eds.), Review of Child Development, Vol. 1 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), pp. 169-208; William H. Sewell, "Some Recent Developments in Socialization Theory and Research," The Annals, 349 (September, 1963), pp. 163-81; Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Parental Power Legitimation and Its Effects on the Adolescent," Sociometry, 26 (March, 1963), pp. 50-65; and Douvan and Gold, op. cit.

[39]Middleton and Putney, op. cit.

[40]Lane, op. cit.; and Maccoby, et al., op. cit.

[41]In addition to sources cited in notes 13, 37, and 38, similar measures were also used previously in James Coleman, The Adolescent Society (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[42]Education and occupation of the parents likewise showed little relationship to agreement rates.

[43]To measure agreement between student-parent responses within categories of parental responses, we have developed a simple index defined as follows: it is the average absolute deviation of the student scores from the parent scores, divided by the maximum deviation. By using these calculations we implicitly assume interval level measurement even though some of the variables yield only ordinal data.