

FAMILY INFLUENCE AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN JAPAN:  
SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE\*

ARCHIVES

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For some time it was generally held by American social scientists that in the United States the family was normally the single most important agency of political socialization where children are concerned and that many political attitudes and values tended to be transmitted from one generation to another via the medium of the family.<sup>1</sup> Recent research has expanded and refined our knowledge in political socialization and has questioned the view of family influence as either too simplistic or misleading an explanation of the causality involved.<sup>2</sup> Despite such reassessments, however, the weight of the currently available evidence still favors the view that in the United States the family, if not predominant, is still regarded as one of the more important agencies of political socialization and that this is particularly true with respect to such seminal traits as party identification on the part of the child.<sup>3</sup>

Given a somewhat shifting point of view in this respect on the local scene, it is of special interest and importance to look abroad at the results of research relating to the process of political socialization in other modern political systems to see if they confirm or disaffirm our current hypotheses. The present article represents a preliminary and somewhat tentative effort to do so with respect to contemporary Japanese experience in this field.

Political socialization has not been a popular subject of study among Japanese social scientists. The relevant literature is scant and tends to be ephemeral and semi-popular in quality. If there has been any single focus that stands out, it has probably been on shifts that are alleged to have been taking place in the electoral behavior of young voters and the probable effects of these on the future of particular political parties. Also, since the survey approach is expensive and still little used by Japanese social scientists, the evidential basis for those viewpoints that have been expressed is apt to be impressionistic and episodic.

Despite such shortcomings there has grown up on the basis of both indigenous and foreign commentary a sort of lore about the process of political socialization in Japan. It is notable that this does not usually correspond to the popular stereotypes of Japan widely held abroad. Many might be tempted to see in modern Japan a society where the centrality of the family's role is historically reinforced by centuries of Confucian tradition, and, until recently, by the mythology of a family-centered state and the socio-political circumstances of a preponderantly agrarian culture as well. The ready conclusion would be that the role of the family as an agent of political socialization is, if anything, more dominant and

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salient than in a more atomized American society.

While continuity in this sense is an important attribute of Japanese culture it is, however, possible to view the society from another perspective--that of change. This leads to the perception that since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 Japan has been more or less constantly involved in a process of society-wide change that has certainly been revolutionary in effect if not in format. Defeat in the Second World War and its aftermath, the Allied Occupation, with its attempts to remake the society along more democratic and western lines, is simply the latest in a series of wrenching episodes that stretch back for at least a hundred years. Seen from this viewpoint rapid and disturbing changes in the economic, social, and political spheres have been more or less normal in modern Japan. They have, inevitably, exacted a price in terms of inter-generational harmony. Older generations in Japan have been complaining for a century about a lack of rapport with and influence over their children. The term "generation-gap" was widely used in Japan long before it became popular in the United States.<sup>4</sup> It is this aspect of the society on which students of political socialization have elected to concentrate with the result that the influence of the family as an agent of political socialization tends normally to be discounted.<sup>5</sup>

Contemporary Japanese culture affords, however, theoretical grounds for looking at the process of political socialization in two quite different--indeed, almost polarized--ways: one of which emphasizes continuity and the primacy of the family as a socializing agent, while the other focuses on change, discontinuity, and the salience of such non-familial agencies of socialization as peer groups, life cycle effects, education, and the mass media. Neither hypothesis need completely exclude the other; overlays and sectoral differences in causality are possible. Despite this, the resultant confrontation is challenging in theoretical terms and of obvious comparative importance in the attempts of social scientists to comprehend the process of political socialization in modern societies in general. The issues involved are complex and anything approximating a satisfactory solution will require investigation in depth and over a substantial period of time. All that the present paper hopes to do is to provide--in a national case marked so far by a paucity of "hard" data--a few leads and guidelines derived from a national public opinion survey that the authors recently conducted in Japan.

Our data are based on a larger study that we conducted in connection with the general election of members of the lower house of Japan's National Diet or Parliament held on January 29, 1967. Three surveys were involved, two mass and one elite. The two mass surveys were conducted just before and just after the election. They were based on a single stratified national probability sample (N = 2,371 individuals) of the Japanese population aged fifteen and above, drawn from 50 of the 123 election districts that returned candidates to the lower house. The elite survey was carried out after the election and involved a sample of 315 candidates running for parliamentary office from the same fifty election districts. The response rate on the pre-election mass survey was 81%, that on the post-election mass survey 76%, while the figure for the elite survey reached 90%.

The data relating to political socialization constitutes but a small portion of the product of the two mass surveys. We were also interested in political attitudes and voting behavior in general, especially as they display generational characteristics, and in a variety of matters relating to political representation.

For the present paper we are, therefore, excerpting from a much larger and still incompletely analyzed body of material our findings with respect to political socialization.

The findings are based primarily on a sample of 177 child-parent pairs included within the sample. They are augmented where appropriate by information from the total sample. Several other characteristics of the data require explanation. First, although they are derived from a nationwide sample so that their means are unbiased estimates of true national means, it should be clear that the sampling errors involved are quite large in comparison with those of a standard national cross-section sample of 1,500 or more respondents. Second, the sampling errors of age-related variables are considerably reduced since age was one of the variables about which our sample was stratified. This should increase the potency of the data in analyzing problems related to generational continuity or discontinuity. Finally, the sample was specifically designed with a view toward maximizing the quality of our measurements of family influence. We attempted to do this by selecting our child-parent pairs from the same family. This was done by first drawing a sample of adults; i.e., twenty years of age and above (who were also electors; twenty is the legal voting age in Japan) and by examining if they had children aged fifteen through nineteen. If they did, we then drew a sample of those in this age bracket on a probability basis. The chief purpose of this was to enable us to measure family influence on the basis of both direct or observed data and indirect or perceived data; both children and parents could be questioned directly about their own attitudes and behavior as well as about their perceptions of the other's views and actions. The results of the two approaches are by no means identical.

There are obvious limitations to the methodology of this sort of investigation. It is for this reason that we referred to the study earlier as preliminary and tentative. We do hope, however, that in a field marked largely by speculation, these findings may serve to suggest approaches and hypotheses for further field investigation.

Much of the argumentation for the popular thesis that the family is not a particularly effective agency of political socialization in contemporary Japan derives from rather generally held beliefs about the generation gap. This is viewed as being widespread and basic. One conclusion is that one must look primarily to agencies of political socialization other than the family to explain the consequent differences in generational attitudes and behavior. There is a good deal of evidence that seems to argue in favor of such a conclusion.

Some of the most striking evidence of this sort is provided by the way in which party identification in Japan varies with age. The common claim is that younger generations tend to be more "progressive" (*shimpoteki*) and older generations "conservative" (*hoshuteki*) in their party identifications. The principal objects of the identifications involved are usually the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) for the progressives and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for the conservatives. Ignoring the semantic appropriateness of the labels, our data set forth in Figure 1 support such a view subject to the qualification that this should not be taken to mean that most younger voters are "progressive" in their party identifications. It is simply that they are more apt to display such a tendency than their seniors.<sup>6</sup> It is obvious, however, that age is positively

correlated with identification with Japan's major conservative party, the LDP, and negatively correlated with identification with the largest socialist party, the JSP. The tendency is particularly marked from the late thirties.

(Figure 1 about here)

Data of this sort suggest that in many Japanese households there is virtually no transmission of party identification from one generation to another.


Once one has begun along lines such as this to discount the role of the family as a socializing agent, reference to alternative and putatively more effective agents lends added support. There is no doubt that in Japan as in other modern societies the socializing influence of peer groups, the educational system, and the mass media is a significant factor. Most of these seem to display a fairly marked bias toward "progressive" attitudes and values and thus may be viewed as reinforcing the hypothesis that Japanese youth are moving away from the political views of their parents.

These are what might be termed micro-forces affecting the process of political socialization. Beyond these lies an array of macro-forces which may also play a determining role. They consist of the entire spectrum of social, economic, and political changes that have cumulated over the last century. The record is an impressive one. No nation starting from a non-western base has ever achieved the modern condition in so short a period of time as Japan. The process of change involved has been massive, continuous and, for many, deeply disturbing. Many of the most seminal innovations have taken place since the end of the Second World War and thus have had a direct effect upon today's youth and their parents.

The educational system has been fundamentally revised along more individualistic and democratic lines. There has been a sweeping reform in the ownership of agricultural land that has reduced the traditionally high rate of rural tenancy to a nominal figure and vastly improved the circumstances of the remaining tenants. The unionization and politicization of labor has become normal rather than exceptional. The national economy has expanded and advanced in every direction and, from postwar circumstances characterized by devastation and stagnation, has recently become the third most potent and productive in the world surpassing West Germany and Great Britain. As a consequence standards of living and levels of expectation have increased enormously for almost the entire population over prewar highs and the people of Japan have for the first time been brought face to face with that peculiar problem of advanced industrial societies--what they call the reja (leisure) boom, or the problem of how to deal with unprecedented amounts of free time in an affluent society. Communication and transportation systems have changed accordingly and any effective degree of social or geographical isolation has become an artifact of the past. Politically the country has been shifted from the basically oligarchic and authoritarian structure of the Meiji Constitution to the remarkably free, open, and democratic institutions of the Constitution of 1947.

This is an impressive record of change for a twenty-five year period in the history of any country and, given the contrasts between pre- and post-war conditions and the widely variant experiences of the different age cohorts involved,

Figure 1. Party Identification and Age



certainly a set of circumstances calculated to maximize all possible aspects of the generation gap and accordingly reduce the conservative influence of the family as a socializing agency.

One can muster in this manner a number of arguments to demonstrate that in Japan macro-forces have been combining with micro-forces to enhance the generation gap and diminish familial influence. Some might be tempted to go beyond this and claim that such a circumstance is normal for rapidly modernizing or changing societies.<sup>7</sup> The thesis is attractive, but it is not without difficulties. One such difficulty derives from the fact that a rapid rate of change at the macro-level does not necessarily lead to a comparable rate of change at the micro-level, especially where individual attitudes and behavior are concerned. While there is probably a long-run tendency for the two to converge, in the short run attitudes and behavior are apt to remain much more stable than one would expect given the scope of macro-changes in the environment. In Japan, for example, the distribution of partisan support and the distribution of political power have remained remarkably stable over the postwar period.<sup>8</sup> There have been no changes at this level that correspond in scale or importance to the truly remarkable changes noted earlier in the economy or society at large.

If such a discrepancy exists between the thrust of socializing forces operating at the societal macro-level and actual patterns of attitudes and behavior at the individual level, it, of course suggests the action of intervening causes and thus redirects our attention to forces operating at the micro-level, and in the present case, specifically to the family. The socializing influence of the family tends to be profound and tends to be conservative. It normally attempts to transmit to the next generation its own values and standards of the moment.<sup>9</sup> It is for this reason that states dedicated to programs of drastic and rapid social change, such as the People's Republic of China, have so often found it necessary to try to alter the structure and influence of the family. Beyond this, however, there are at least two other reasons for emphasizing the importance of the family as an agent of socialization. One is timing and the other magnitude of exposure.<sup>10</sup> Greenstein and others claim that the earlier the exposure to given attitudes and values, the greater their impact.<sup>11</sup> Although there may be more than a single phase to early political learning and the processes involved may be even more complicated than we now realize, there is no question that the family normally plays a dominant role in the child's early life.<sup>12</sup>

Sheer magnitude of exposure is another reason. For reasons of physical proximity alone, children are usually most intensively and comprehensively exposed to the families into which they are born.<sup>13</sup> This degree of exposure seems well calculated to affect at least the child's earlier political perceptions and attitudes. As the child grows older, of course, this monolithic influence of the family is progressively diluted by competing agencies such as peer groups, schools, the mass media, work groups, etc., and these tend to become relatively more salient sources of socializing pressures.

If we then juxtapose in the Japanese case the two levels of socializing influences that we have been discussing--the macro-level and the micro-level--an interesting situation results. Approaching the problem of political

socialization from the macro-level, we should be inclined to hypothesize that the changes involved have been severely restrictive of the effectiveness of parents as agents of political socialization. Viewing it from the micro-level, however, we find reasons to affirm the existence of an appreciable degree of parental influence over the socialization process. Recognizing that there is probably some validity to both approaches leads us to speculate that the macro- and the micro-forces probably interact on individuals and to some extent cancel each other out. This in turn leads to the further speculation that one will in fact be able to detect family influence on the political socialization process but that this will be moderate in degree. What do the survey data show in this respect?

## II

The findings of both the first and the second wave of the mass survey clearly confirm the existence of a moderate degree of correspondence between parent's party identification and that of their children. Table 1, reflecting the results of the first or pre-election wave of the survey, shows a tau-beta correlation of .39. Table 2, reflecting the results of the second or post-election wave, shows a tau-beta correlation of .38. These rule out either extremely strong relationships between the two variables or, at the other extreme a significant degree of independence of one variable from the other, and lead one back to the middle-ground hypothesis that

(Tables 1 and 2 about here)

there is a moderate degree of overall association between the variables under examination. In other words the data furnish some basis for belief that a child's party identification may to some extent be related to that of his parents and that party identification is in a significant number of cases transmitted from parents to children in Japanese households.

Two further factors add to the probability of this hypothesis. First, there is very little change in the correlation coefficient from one wave of the survey to the other. Given a highly visible and strenuously competitive national political campaign, it is to be expected that some changes in partisan attitudes and identifications will take place over the campaign period. Insofar, however, as the correlation coefficient involved reflects an effective process of generational transmission of party identification, one would expect the coefficient to remain reasonably stable when measured at two such intervals. This is the present case. The difference between the two scores is remarkably small.

Second, when respondents below voting age (from fifteen through nineteen) were queried as to their memory of the party with which they had first identified as children (rather than their current party identifications) and the answers were correlated with their parent's party identifications, we obtained tau-beta scores of .45 for the first wave and .48 for the second wave.<sup>14</sup> While similar to the coefficients in Tables 1 and 2 they are, of course, somewhat higher. This may, of course, be due in part to distortion

Table 1. Child Parent Pairs and Party Identification (1st Wave)

		<u>Child's Party Identification</u>					
		LDP	CGP	DSP	JSP	JCP	TOTAL
Parent's	LDP	67.1%	2.6	5.2	25.1	0.0	100.0%
Party	CGP	33.3	50.0	0.0	16.7	0.0	100.0%
Identification	DSP	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0%
	JSP	19.2	0.0	7.7	73.1	0.0	100.0%
	JCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0%
	Total	53.4%	6.4	4.8	32.2	3.2	100.0%

Legend:

$$T_b = .39$$

- LDP Liberal Democratic Party
- CGP Clean Government Party
- DSP Democratic Socialist Party
- JSP Japan Socialist Party
- JCP Japan Communist Party

Table 2. Child Parent Pairs and  
Party Identification (2nd Wave)

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		<u>Child's Party Identification</u>					
		LDP	CGP	DSP	JSP	JCP	TOTAL
Parent's	LDP	68.4%	2.6	2.6	26.4	0.0	100.0%
Party	CGP	0.0	66.7	0.0	33.3	0.0	100.0
Identification	DSP	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
	JSP	38.4	0.0	15.4	46.2	0.0	100.0
	JCP	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	75.0	100.0
	Total	55.0%	5.0	5.0	30.0	5.0	100.0%

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$T_b = .38$

attendant upon the recall process involved.<sup>15</sup> It seems more probable to us, however, that it is related to the process whereby adult party identifications develop and emerge during early childhood.<sup>16</sup> This upward shift in the value of the coefficients is consistent with the interpretation that the family is most effective as an agent of political socialization during the child's younger years and that as the child matures and is progressively exposed to more and competitive socializing agencies he tends in many cases to move away from the sphere of family influence in this and other respects. This is a dynamic aspect of the process of political socialization that needs more systematic investigation, but the above interpretation does reinforce the view that the degree of inter-generational agreement in party identification described above is not merely accidental.

Before turning to a more comparative dimension of the significance of the correlation coefficients developed in Tables 1 and 2, it is worth commenting briefly on the political implications of these data. The differences by party in the relative effectiveness of parents in transmitting their own party identifications to their children are intriguing. Due to sizeable variations in the first and second wave responses, they are also difficult to interpret and subject to very large margins of error. They do suggest, however, that parents of communist persuasion are the most effective socializers of their children in this respect and that, surprising to say, they may be followed by parents favoring the LDP. The relative consistency of the LDP responses across the two waves is interesting in this respect. So, too, are the quite consistent totals for the percentages of the 15 - 19 year-old bracket identifying with each of the five parties and particularly the ranges of 53.4-55.0% for the LDP and 32.2-30.0% for the JSP. Both ranges exceed the percentage of the total vote polled by the LDP (48.8%) and the JSP (27.9%) in the 1967 general election but, to the degree that they are reliable, this showing of the partisan inclinations of the upcoming cohorts of new voters suggests a far more serious problem for the Socialists than for the Liberal Democrats. The Japan Socialist Party has tended to rely heavily on its appeal to the youth vote (See Figure 1).<sup>17</sup>

Comparatively speaking, party identification has been a focal point in the American study of electoral behavior. Voting studies, especially those emerging from the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, have persistently pointed to important relationships between party identification and various forms of electoral behavior.<sup>18</sup> This emphasis on party identification has also been carried over to studies of political socialization and has emerged as one of its main branches. This is due in part to the fact that voting behavior is viewed as being closely linked with political socialization. But also involved is the fact that in studies of political socialization party identification has been found to exhibit some unusual characteristics. It seems to be an area in which the largest degree of positive generational transmission takes place.<sup>19</sup>

It should also be pointed out, however, that recent research indicates that the degree to which parents in the United States pass on their party identifications to their children is not as great as it was once thought to be. A major study by Jennings and Niemi, for example, found a tau-beta correlation of .47.<sup>20</sup> Niemi has suggested separately that the higher correlations found in earlier studies may result from the practice of using perceived rather than observed data and that in such cases the respondent's tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance is apt to distort the resultant statistics.<sup>21</sup> If this difficulty is avoided through reliance only on directly measured data, the lower levels of correlation found by the Jennings-Niemi study and the present one may prove to be the more accurate.

The correlation coefficients of .39 and .38 for the two waves of this study are lower than but not markedly different from the Jennings-Niemi figure of .47. This is interesting both in view of the higher correlations normally assigned in the United States by earlier studies and the rather widely held view described earlier that in Japan the degree of correlation is very low. Our figures linked to those of Jennings and Niemi suggest that actually there is not a great deal of difference in the extent to which parents in the two societies transmit their party identifications to their children. If so, this is a comparative finding of considerable potential importance, if it can be confirmed by more extensive and specifically focussed research. At this point, however, it seems appropriate simply to note the correspondence of findings and to refrain from premature speculations as to the degrees of similarity that may obtain in so complex a process as political socialization in two societies of such disparate cultural and political heritages.

Still if one presses this line of inquiry as far as our data permit and seeks other points that argue in favor of the hypothesis that the processes of political socialization are in important respects similar in Japan and the United States, some evidence is available. Figure 2 sets forth in scaled and comparative fashion a group of correlation coefficients between children's and parent's political attitudes and attributes in Japan and the United States. Some items on the scale are, of course, more directly and meaningfully comparable than others; e.g., party identification and, perhaps, political interest. The rest, with the exception of political ideology, represent degrees of correlation between


(Figure 2 about here)

parent's and children's responses to questions calculated to elicit information about attitudes on currently salient issues of major political importance. They, of course, differ between the two countries.

Similarities of some importance do emerge from an analysis of Figure 2. This is particularly true of the categories of party identification and political interest. In the case of the former the values are not too discrepant in absolute terms and are similar in rank order as well. In the latter the numerical values are almost identical. Where the remaining correlations are concerned, they demonstrate primarily the thesis that where specific political issue orientations are concerned the degree of generational transmission involved is quite small in both Japan and the United States.

It has been repeatedly demonstrated in American voting studies that issues tend to play only marginal roles in campaigns, that issue orientations tend to be less central and less stable than other political attitudes--notably party identification--and that issue attitudes tend to be only weakly inter-related and poorly organized.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that in the United States the extent of generational transmission of issue orientations is quite meager. This seems to be at least equally true in the Japanese case. The fact that in Japan often twenty to thirty percent of the sample respond with "Don't Know" (wakaranai) to most standard issue questions suggests further that their issue attitude structure is even more disorganized than in the United States.<sup>23</sup> It is interesting to note with respect to both countries that the extent of generational consonance tends to increase somewhat as one moves from less to more controversial issues.

Figure 2. Generational Agreement of Political Attitudes:  
Japan and the United States



<sup>a</sup>M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, 'The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child,' American Political Science Review, vol. 62, no.1, (March 1968), pp. 169-184 and unpublished statistics supplied by M. Kent Jennings.

<sup>b</sup>( ) = numbers that represent the waves of the survey

Another aspect of Figure 2 deserving mention is that in both countries party identification stands highest in the list of correlation coefficients. In other words this is the area where the greatest amount of generational transmission seems to take place. The American figure is somewhat higher than its Japanese counterpart and the gap that separates it from the next highest coefficient on the scale is wider. The Japanese scale is not as complete as the American in these respects. We did in our survey find a few attitudes that scaled higher than those for party identification. These were of two sorts. The first includes coefficients that fluctuated wildly and inexplicably from the first to the second wave or which were measured in only one of the two waves.<sup>24</sup> They were viewed as unstable or uncertain and are excluded from Figure 2. The second excluded category consists of coefficients concerning party-related attitudes which vary greatly from party to party in the Japanese multi-party system.<sup>25</sup> These last, however, tend to support the view that it is in the area of party identification that one finds the largest amount of generational transmission of political attitudes.

The question naturally arises as to why this should be so. Campbell and his associates present an extended account of the perception of parties, candidates, and issues in the American case but it is essentially due to the fact that political parties are both more concrete and more salient than most other political objects.<sup>26</sup> So far as the mass public is concerned, parties and personalities are far more visible than issues and, since personalities come and go, parties tend to acquire a superior historical dimension and continuity that makes them one of the most important variables in the cognitive processes of the public. By and large we believe this to be the case in Japan, although with the qualification that, since the history of Japanese political parties is much briefer than that of American or British parties and since the party scene in Japan has been notably less stable, we do not expect Japanese party identifications or attitudes to be as well or deeply developed.<sup>27</sup> Still political competition is keen in Japan and public interest high especially at election times.

There are other arguments derived from theorizing about the American experience that also seem applicable to Japan in this connection. Greenstein holds, for example, that party identification is transmitted from parent to child at a very early stage of political socialization and that the development of a party orientation thus clearly precedes those of candidate or issue orientations. He goes on to argue that the younger the child is, the more uncritical and receptive he is apt to be toward values or attitudes that his parents display either purposefully or inadvertently. He concludes that party identification is a field in which the greatest degree of such transmission is apt to take place. Greenstein also reinforces this thesis with a concept borrowed from acculturation studies, namely those attitudes that are learned earliest are likely to be the most internalized and those learned later more superficial and unstable.<sup>28</sup>

We would like at this point to return to our former hypothesis about the interaction of macro-forces and micro-forces in the process of political socialization in Japan. It will be recalled that the effect of the macro-forces (major trends of economic, social, and political change over time) was to diminish the inter-generational transmission of political attitudes while the effects of the micro-forces, in this case the family, was to enhance the degree of generational continuity. The question is how does the interaction of macro- and micro-forces take place? Are there intervening sociological or attitudinal variables that significantly affect the process of generational transmission? If so, which are apt to be more significant at the individual level?

Table 3 has been prepared in an attempt to shed some light on these questions. It is based upon a division of our sample of parent-child pairs into two groups, one of which has been subjected to particular experiences that are often, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, regarded as change-oriented such as urban as opposed to rural residence, union membership as opposed to non-union status, high social class, income, or degree of parental education versus their low equivalents, etc.;

(Table 3 about here)

and the other of which is composed of those sharing the reciprocal experiences to the above that are here regarded as being oriented toward continuity. These two groups have then been examined in terms of the degree to which the status designated as change-oriented and that designated as continuity-oriented has produced agreement between the parent's and the child's party identifications in order to determine if in fact the variable concerned seems to have enhanced or diminished generational continuity in this respect. The correlation coefficients that result should be conservatively interpreted, however, because of the small size of the sample as a whole and the limited number of cases in each cell. The double column of entries under the rubric "codes" in Table 3 is explanatory of the categories being used. For example, where the entries opposite "Population" at the top of the table are concerned, the coefficients .23 under the first wave and .29 under the second are associated with large populations, while the coefficients .60 and .50 are associated with small populations.

When we divide our sample in this manner into change-oriented and continuity-oriented contingents, we find considerable variation in the correlation coefficients between parent's and children's party identifications. Urbanization, for example is generally regarded as a key element in the process of social change. Our coefficients support the view where the generational transmission of party identification is concerned. Whether measured by size of population or by administrative distinctions between urban and rural civil subdivisions and whether measured by first or second wave responses there is a markedly greater tendency for inter-generational changes of party identification in cities and for inter-generational continuity in this respect in the countryside.

Where union membership is concerned the results are consistent but would argue an initial error in assigning union status to the "change" rather than to the "continuity" group. The coefficients indicate a very marked tendency for the children of union parents to share the party identifications of their parents compared to a relatively low tendency for such transmission to occur in non-union families. This is interesting but not really surprising in terms of the fact that our mass survey data as a whole indicate that union membership is one of the most significant variables in predicting both the party identification and the electoral choice of voters in general. Beyond this, however, union membership turns out to be remarkably issue-free. It is not related to stands on most partisan issues.

According to Table 3, social class at first seems to play the anticipated role as an intervening and change-oriented variable, the thesis being in this case that the middle class tends to be more receptive to new information and ideas, and hence more susceptible to change, than does the working class. Yet it is difficult to reconcile the coefficients for social class with those that follow for household income if one grants that higher social class is correlated with higher income. The two sets of coefficients are mutually opposed in this

Table 3. Agreement Between Child's and Parent's Party Identifications, by Demographic and Attitudinal Variables

Control Variables	1st Wave		2nd Wave		Codes	
	Change	Continuity	Change	Continuity		
Population	.23 <sup>a</sup>	.60	.29	.50	Large	Small
Administrative Level	.36	.49	.34	.46	Urban	Rural
Union Membership	.62	.34	.63	.20	Yes	No
Social Class	.24	.52	-.02	.50	High	Low
Household Income	.52	.36	.43	.32	High	Low
Parent's Education	.18	.65	.42	.32	High	Low
Parent's Political Interest	.36	.53	.45	.23	High	Low
Child's Political Interest	.55	.20	.42	.32	High	Low
Child's Attitudes Toward:						
Individual or Family	.13	1.00	.16	.89	Indiv	Family
New or Old Man	.02	.55	.28	.43	New	Old
Spending or Saving	.31	.37	.32	.39	Spend	Save
Youth Discipline	.49	.28	.59	.34	Less	More
Respect for Elder's View	.41	.32	.37	.24	No	Yes

<sup>a</sup>Entries are tau-b coefficients

case and we do not understand why this should be so. The same is true when one uses the level of parent's education as a critical variable. The results for the second wave reverse those of the first for unknown reasons.

If we compare these findings from our parent-child sample with the results of our mass survey as a whole, it is clear from the latter that these three variables--social class, income, and educational level--are inter-correlated to a significant degree. However, it also emerges that, with the partial exception of educational level, all of them are in the Japanese case either unrelated or only weakly correlated to partisan attitudes or to change versus continuity issues that were used in Table 3. In comparative terms one expects an inter-correlation of these three variables in any developed society, but the lack of a further relationship between them and other political attitudes and issues in the Japanese case is rather surprising to those familiar with the American and British experiences. It may be that the impact of such demographic variables on partisan attitudes and change versus continuity issues in Japan is different than elsewhere, a point that deserves further investigation.

When we move from demographic to psychological variables, we first find that the level of parental political interest plays an ambiguous role. In the first wave high parental interest is negatively correlated with the degree of generational transmission, but in the second wave that relationship is reversed. When we turn to the level of the child's political interest, however, the pattern is consistent for both waves: higher political interest is associated with a higher degree of generational transmission of party identification, and low political interest with a lower degree of generational transmission of party identification.

Here, too, it is possible to approach the problem of generational transmission of party identification from either the macro- or the micro-level. At the former one can hypothesize that a high level of major social, economic, and political change in a society is apt to produce a higher level of political interest among youth, and that this higher level of interest conjoined with the presence of major changes in the social environment is apt to produce discordance between the political views and party identifications of children and parents who were exposed to different socializing influences. The comparable hypothesis at the micro-level would be that a high level of political interest among children makes it more probable that the child will be more aware of political cues, and, given the timing and intensity of his exposure to his parents and the cues they provide, will be more apt to share their party identification.

Our data provide support for the micro-level hypothesis. Whether we are examining the child's interest in the election, concern with the outcome of the election, or his political interest in general, and whether we are dealing with the results of the first or second wave of the survey, we invariably find a positive relationship between the level of the child's interest and the extent of generational transmission of party identification.

We turn next to the last five variables in Table 3 that deal with the child's attitudes. When we control with specific reference to the way in which the child perceives his relationship to his family, dramatic confirmation is obtained.<sup>30</sup> This is a variable that not surprisingly displays a very strong

relation to the degree of generational transmission of party identification, as Table 3 makes clear. Some aspects of this family-individual or child-family relationship issue are probably more salient in Japan than in the United States or Great Britain. There have since the war been critical legal and social changes that have drastically affected the traditional structure of the Japanese family. The predominant view in education and the mass media is now restrictive with respect to the family and supportive of increased individualism. As a consequence the family itself and its proper role and internal relationships has become something of a political issue in contemporary Japan. Whatever the degree of Japan's peculiarity in this respect, however, it would seem probable from these coefficients that the family does exert an influence on the political socialization of its children and that the extent of generational transmission of party identification is sharply affected by the child's view of his relationship to his family.

The new-or-old man dimension is a variant of the preceding variable.<sup>31</sup> The two dimensions are moderately correlated and are considered to be ideologically inter-related in Japan. Table 3 indicated that a child considering himself as a new type person often deserts his parent's party identification while those considering themselves as old type persons are relatively much more apt to inherit the parent's attitude in this respect. The degree of variation in the coefficients is smaller though than in the case of the "individual or family" variable.

A third dimension that is quite important in the life of the average Japanese seems to have little effect on the transmission of party identification. The save-spend issue is both a favorite topic of daily conversation among Japanese and also a matter of real national importance.<sup>32</sup> It is closely linked to the system of traditional values that strongly and effectively encourages saving. The savings rate even in the present affluent and consumer-oriented society is among the world's highest. Despite this, it apparently has little relation to the generational transmission of party identification.

The last two variables in Table 3--youth discipline and respect for elder's view--seem to affect the process of generational transmission in a somewhat surprising way.<sup>33</sup> One would normally expect that a child who thinks that today's youth needs more discipline would be more apt to accept his parent's party identification. The coefficients in Table 3 indicate that the opposite is the case; a discipline-oriented youth is more apt to desert his parent's identification in this regard than is a freedom-oriented child. The same is true in the case of respect for the elder's view, although in neither case is the extent of the variation in coefficients particularly large.

It is difficult to explain this relationship adequately. It should be noted, however, that questions concerning the generation gap provide the basis for very lively and widespread controversy in Japan and that these matters of youth discipline and respect for elder's views lie close to the heart of the issue. They tend to elicit emotionally charged reactions and are in this sense fairly sensitive. They are, for example, considerably more sensitive than the two earlier questions about family-individual relationships and the new versus old man dimension. In fact our data on the two more sensitive questions are slightly negatively correlated with the other two variables.<sup>34</sup>

III

Another area of major interest with respect to the generational transmission of party identification is the relative roles of the father and the mother in the transmission process. Which is the more influential? There is no question that within the average Japanese household each parent plays a markedly different role.<sup>35</sup> This is true with respect to division of labor, parental responsibilities, authority, or even in the area of religion where the role of the father appears to differ from that of the mother in either factual or normative terms. In general in the Sino-Japanese culture area it is customary for the father to be recognized as the dominant and authoritative figure within the household. Such a status is legitimated by the centuries of Confucian orthodoxy which has not only recently been undermined in law. Against such a background it is tempting to assume that the Japanese father plays the predominant role in the political socialization of his children. But is this true in fact? Do Japanese parents have specifically differentiated roles and influences in this sphere? What happens in the case where father and mother are themselves of different partisan persuasions?

When we look beyond Japan we see that ostensibly the male in general plays the leading role in the politics of all modern nations. Again, one is tempted to conclude by extension that fathers do also in the area of transmitting party identification to their children. Research in the United States, however, does not confirm such a hypothesis. Maccoby, Mathews, and Morton were among the first to point out in their experimental study that the role of the mother is more important than that of the father in the transmission of party identification.<sup>36</sup> Jennings and Langton later confirmed this finding on the basis of a nationwide probability sample.<sup>37</sup>

Our findings with respect to Japan are more complex. Table 4 indicates that in the first wave of the survey mothers emerge as the more effective influence on their children where the transmission of party identification is concerned, but that in the second wave this pattern is reversed and the fathers have become the more important. A similar reversal of roles is found in the data from our mass survey as a whole.

(Table 4 about here)

Such a shift between the first and second waves of the survey was not unexpected. We are inclined to explain it along the following lines. The shift took place during a period of intense national campaigning. It is clear that in Japan men are both more interested in politics than women and that they more frequently participate in political activities. Under the circumstances it seems probable that the father is the principal agent of communication to the family of campaign and election messages from the outside world and that in performing this function he increases the political solidarity of the household along the lines of his own partisan preferences.<sup>38</sup> Such a role would be similar to that of the opinion-leader in the two-step theory of communications.<sup>39</sup> In the Japanese case it also derives added plausibility from the importance of what are called the jiban and kankei dimensions of their electoral system.

Table 4. Child's and Father's or Mother's Party Identifications

Child's Party Identification in Agreement With:	Pair Sample		Cross-Section Sample <sup>a</sup>	
	1st Wave	2nd Wave	1st Wave	2nd Wave
Father's Party Identification	.22 <sup>b</sup>	.49	.36	.38
Mother's Party Identification	.54	.29	.42	.32

<sup>a</sup>-In the cross-section sample the father's and mother's party identifications are only indirectly measured (or based upon the child's report).

<sup>b</sup>-Entries are tau-b coefficients

A jiban is a bailiwick, a definable inhabited area linked by historic and complex inter-personal ties, that at election times tends to cast its vote as a unit (the tendency varies a good deal with different levels of election).<sup>40</sup> Kankei in this sense are personal relations and refer to the intricate web of associations of family, interest, responsibility, and obligation that overlay any Japanese community.<sup>41</sup> Both of these networks are routinely activated on the occasion of elections and their impact on a given family is apt to be channeled through the father. Their effect is to subject him to pressure to mobilize his family and other dependents in support of particular candidates or causes. The effect of these phenomena, we suspect, is a tendency to move other members of the family closer to the father in terms of political identification and thus to tilt the balance of relative importance in the father's favor at the later stages of or just after a lively and hard fought election campaign.

It is not at all clear, however, that this short-span movement cancels the superiority of the mother in a longer term sense. Certainly a straightforward interpretation of Table 4 would suggest that the mother is at least as important as the father as an agent for the generational transmission of party identification. Our interpretation inclines us to hypothesize that as the unusual psychological and sociological forces surrounding the campaign period recede into history we may well find that the mother is normally the more effective agent of transmission.

If this is so, we are not certain as to why it should be the case. Japanese men are obviously more interested and more involved in politics than their wives. We suspect, however, that it may be a function of relative magnitudes of exposure where the child is concerned. A child is normally more exposed to his mother's company and attentions than to his father's. Vogel makes an interesting case as to the quite pronounced degree to which this is so in middle-class Japanese families.<sup>42</sup> Under these circumstances it seems highly probable that the mother is apt in general to have a greater effect on the socialization of the children. Where political socialization and in particular the transmission of party identification are concerned, it is not unlikely that such transmission is largely unintentional and unstructured, and that the mother is more apt to be the agent involved.

Jennings and Langton propose a similar hypothesis organized around the concept of closeness to parent.<sup>43</sup> They argue that the closer a child feels to a particular parent, the more likely he is to be influenced by that parent and, since a child is generally closer to his mother than his father, the mother is more apt to be important than the father in the generational transmission of party identification. This concept of closeness approximates our concept of magnitude of exposure and overlaps it in a number of respects although the former is really an attitudinal and the latter a more physical variable. A notable difference, however, is that while Jennings and Langton apply their concept to only those cases in which parental party identifications are heterogeneous, we apply ours to all cases.<sup>44</sup>

Unfortunately, we did not in our survey measure the extent to which a child feels closer to his mother than his father. The closest approximation

thereto was our examination of the extent to which a child feels dependent upon or independent of his family in the making of critical life decisions.<sup>45</sup> The two dimensions are clearly different but overlap in the sense that they both revolve about the child's attitudes toward parents or a parent. It may also be that to some extent the types of attitudes tapped by these two questions are inter-related. Under these circumstances, although the linkage is highly suppositious, it may be of some interest to hypothesize that the two variables represent two different ways of operationalizing the concept of magnitude of exposure in order to see what follows. If one than assumes that magnitude of exposure rather than the sex of the parent is the critical factor in the generational transmission of party identification, we would expect the superiority of mother to father to vanish once we control for magnitude of exposure. In other words, if we control for the family--individual relation in our study (or for closeness to a particular parent in the Jennings Langton study which was not done), the extent of the agreement between the child's and the mother's party identification should not be significantly greater than that between the child's and the father's party identifications. Our data indicate this to be the case. Because of sample size and the number and type of assumptions involved in the above reasoning, Table 5 obviously

(Table 5 about here)

should be treated with caution, but the coefficients obtained are dramatically similar to the anticipated result were our assumptions to be valid.

Our data also provide an opportunity for cross-cultural comparison with respect to the degree to which a child's ability to recall his father's party identification affects the probability that the child himself will develop some sort of party identification of his own. Comparable data are provided for France and the United States by Philip E. Converse and George Dupeux.<sup>46</sup> The resulting percentages, while not of course identical, are

(Table 6 about here)

are generally similar for the three countries and suggest a quite high degree of relationship between ability or inability to recall the father's party identification on the one hand and the disposition of the child to acquire some form of party identification of his own. One suspects that such recall implies the presence and action of other generationally transmitted cues that are involved in the genesis and subsequent development of party identification by children. No claim is made in the case of such recall either that in fact the father did have a party identification or that the particular identification recalled is accurate. In this context of psychological dynamics, the perceived fact is normally more significant than the fact itself.

A final aspect of parental influence remaining to be examined is the effect of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the parent's party identification on the generational transmission of party identification. As we have seen, both father and mother are important in the process, although in somewhat different degrees and ways. We would anticipate that in Japan as in the United States homogeneity of parental party identification would facilitate and heterogeneity

Table 5. Child's and Father's or Mother's Party Identifications, by the Family-Individual Relationship

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Agreement of Party Identification between:	1st Wave	2nd Wave
Family Oriented Child and:		
Father	1.00 <sup>a</sup>	1.00
Mother	1.00	.84
Individual Oriented Child and:		
Father	-.31	.18
Mother	.39	.13

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<sup>a</sup>Entries are tau-b coefficients.

Table 6. Recalling Father's Party Identification and Respondent's Party Identification

	Know Father's Party			Do not Know Father's Party				
	France <sup>a</sup>	USA <sup>a</sup>	Japan <sup>b</sup>	France	USA	Japan		
Proportion having some partisan self-location (party or vague <u>t</u> endance)	79.4%	81.6	85.0	47.7	50.7	61.1	64.9%	
Proportion that these are of total electorate	24.0%	75.0	37.0	42.9	63.0	8.0	40.2	37.3%

<sup>a</sup>From Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, op. cit., (1966), p. 282

<sup>b</sup>The first column of statistics are from the first wave, and the second column from the second wave of our cross-section survey.

impede generational transmission.<sup>47</sup> Table 7 supports such a view.

(Table 7 about here)

We feel that the striking degree to which the coefficients in Table 7 support such a hypothesis is due in part to the fact that we relied upon indirect data in measuring the extent of parental homogeneity in this respect.<sup>48</sup> There is little question that children tend to over-report the degree of parental homogeneity and that this tendency inflates the statistical relationship involved. But in the Japanese case such a tendency does not seem great enough to affect the basic validity of our findings. Japanese children were found to over-report the extent of agreement between their own party identification and that of their parents only in rather small degree, smaller than we anticipated in fact.<sup>49</sup> It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the child's tendency to over-report homogeneity between the parent's party identifications is comparably small. In any event given the spread between the coefficients in Table 7 it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that parental homogeneity is a strong factor in generational transmission of party identification.

What of the relationship between parental partisan homogeneity and the family individual relationship? We reported earlier a high coefficient of correlation between the way in which the child perceives his relation to the family and the generational transmission of party identification. Now we find a similar relation between parental partisan homogeneity and such transmission. These are the two variables that, on the basis of our data, seem to be most significantly involved in the process of generational transmission of party identification. How do they relate to one another? Is parental partisan homogeneity independent of the family-individual relationship? If so, does each of these variables affect generational transmission independently and cumulatively? Or are they correlated and, if so, does one of them maintain only a spurious relationship with generational transmission?

We find largely affirmative answers for the first of these sets of questions. The two variables are largely independent of each other. When we correlate parental partisan homogeneity and family-individual relationship, we obtain tau-b scores of -.04 and -.06 for our pair sample and .01 and .03 for our mass sample as a whole. Also each of these variables generally contributes to the process of generational transmission independently and cumulatively. Except for the coefficient in the upper left hand corner in the first wave matrix, Table 8 is consistent with such a supposition. This is a view that, despite some differences in design and objective, would seem to be supported for the United States by the Jennings-Langton study.

(Table 8 about here)

#### IV

This brings us back to one of the principal themes of the present paper, namely the surprising degree of similarity that seems to exist between Japan and

Table 7. Generational Transmission of Party Identification, by Parental Homogeneity<sup>a</sup>

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Parental Homogeneity in Party Identification	Agreement Between Child's and Parent's Party Identifications	
	1st Wave	2nd Wave
High	.67 <sup>b</sup>	.49
Low	-.32	-.47

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<sup>a</sup>Parental Homogeneity is based upon indirectly measured data.

<sup>b</sup>Entries are tau-b coefficients.

Table 8. Generational Transmission of Party Identification, by Parental Homogeneity and Family-Individual Relationship

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Parental Homogeneity: in Party Identification	Agreement between Child's and Parent's Party Identifications			
	1st Wave		2nd Wave	
	Individual Oriented	Family Oriented	Individual Oriented	Family Oriented
High	.85 <sup>a</sup>	.38	.21	.59
Low	-1.00	.41	-.88	.00

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<sup>a</sup>Entries are tau-b coefficients

the United States with respect to the aspects of the process of political socialization that we have investigated. Methodologically speaking, one reason for our emerging with such a finding is, of course, our obvious and extensive debt to American students of political socialization. We have borrowed liberally from and adapted to Japanese circumstances a variety of hypotheses and theories that have been developed in the course of what are obviously far more advanced and impressive studies than those available for any other single modern society. In tentative terms at least, we are gratified by the results and encouraged to believe that the tactic should be more broadly and systematically applied to explorations of the process of political socialization in other advanced societies.

We would not wish, however, to be construed as predicting that the degree of cross-cultural similarity that we think we have detected in this quite limited investigation is also apt to obtain in most other areas of the Japanese political socialization process. We are too well aware that degrees of family influence on political socialization are more readily predictable and measurable than are the influences of most other socializing agencies and of the advantages that accrue from our having focussed upon one of the most researchable and promising aspects of the socializing process, the generational transmission of party identification. We suspect that many other areas will not display a comparable degree of similarity, but the point is that we do not now know to what degree this is true. This being so, we are simply suggesting the value of an informed, systematic, and culturally sensitive adaptation of the relatively well-developed methodology and propositions of American scholarship in this field to the study of political socialization in other modern societies. One needs in comparative studies some sort of benchmark or point of departure. In practical terms there is much to be said for using the best-developed one available.

Before turning to a few concluding remarks, it might be well at this point to reiterate a few scattered earlier remarks about the basic character of our study. So far as political socialization is concerned, it is intended as a pilot study. This is true both in terms of its sampling design and of limitations on the data gathered. It is not comparable in either sense to a standard nationwide survey in Japan or the United States. Its goals are to explore neglected frontiers, to demonstrate feasibility, and to establish guidelines for and encourage the conduct of more definitive studies in the future, not to arrive itself at definitive conclusions. We have also, of course, been interested in raising theoretical issues of broader scope about the role of the family and its members as agents of political socialization and in attempting to devise ways to operationalize such issues. We are aware that this interest has on occasion led us to quite liberal interpretations of some of the data. Still the constraints involved go far beyond those of the normal speculative study and the technical requirements of data analysis have been carefully followed. In this respect it has, of course, been possible to present only a very small proportion of the thousands of tabulations involved. The result, we hope, is a study that is more than speculative in character and in value.

With these qualifications in mind, we would like to comment on three aspects of the overall findings of this study:

- 1) the extent of family influence as an agent of political socialization in Japan,
- 2) the role of the family in the larger and overall process of political socialization and political change in Japan, and

- 3) problems associated with the study of political socialization in comparative and cross-cultural terms.

The study establishes a probability that in a particular area, the generational transmission of party identification, the Japanese family does play an important and demonstrable role. This is contrary to the view that, largely on the basis of speculative commentary, has come to be rather widely held among both Japanese and foreign scholars. It is notable also that the degree of influence found for Japan is similar to, although lower than, that held to prevail in the United States.

This does not mean that the influence of the family is either dominant or necessarily significant where other areas of the political socialization process are concerned. In fact our data indicate that, when the focus of inquiry shifts from party identification to issue orientations, family influence--at least for our fifteen through nineteen year bracket--seems to play only a marginal and negligible role (it might prove higher for younger age groups). This, too, is similar to the American case.

It is also of interest under this first rubric to note that when we look more intensively at the details of parental influence on their children's party identification that the role of the mother seems at least as prominent as that of the father and possibly more so. This, too, resembles the American experience but with the addition of a more pronounced, if possibly temporary, role for the father in the later stages of electoral campaigns.

Turning to the role of the family in the larger and overall process of political socialization and political change in Japan, we found it much more difficult to uncover evidence of any clear-cut or large-scale influence by the family. It was partly in this connection that we suggested the desirability of distinguishing between the impact of macro-forces and micro-forces on individual attitudes and behavior. In this context the family, of course, represents a micro-force. The case of Japan is particularly interesting in this respect because the volume and intensity of major social, economic, and political changes have been so great during the last century as a whole and since the Second World War in particular.

Unfortunately, the absence of systematic survey data on public attitudes with respect to such changes and the very limited temporal dimensions of our own survey (the two waves were separated by only a few weeks) make it impossible to analyze the causality of such changes with any precision. Still it is obvious that, for example, on the war-peace dimension, the private-public welfare dimension, or the personal sacrifice and savings--personal enjoyment dimension Japanese attitudes have changed markedly since the war. It is difficult in a positive sense to assign any significant share of the responsibility for such shifts to micro-forces such as the family. It is more the macro-forces that seem to be involved, probably operating over time and largely through agents of socialization other than the family at the micro-level. Still there is also another facet to this picture of large-scale social change in postwar Japan, a facet featuring a greater element of continuity. One aspect of this is encountered in the realm of party identification. While it is true that there have been significant shifts in popular partisan orientations in connection with the rise of new parties since the war, it is also true that there have been notable continuities. The bulk of the Japanese electorate was "conservative" in their partisan identification before the war and they continue so today, although

the spectrum of available choice has been very substantially expanded.

One is led to juxtapose these findings that in recent Japanese political history issue-oriented attitudes have tended to be relatively unstable and partisan-oriented attitudes relatively stable with the conclusion emerging from our data that the extent of generational transmission is small where issue-oriented attitudes are concerned but relatively large where party identification is concerned. This suggests that the extent to which generational transmission takes place in political socialization may be related to the degree of stability manifested by the attitude or value in question. If so, this is, of course, another way of saying that a micro-force such as the family has with respect to this relatively stable phenomenon of party identification played a significant role in the longer-term process of political socialization and political change in Japan. The point obviously requires much further investigation however.

Finally, a somewhat puzzled and indeterminate word about the problems of studying political socialization or other political phenomena in comparative and cross-cultural terms when the mode of study employed is the survey method. This was our approach and we like to think that the comparative content that was so obviously involved in our sampling design, questionnaire drafting, and theoretical suppositions has enriched the results and made them less remote approximations to the level of culture-free generalization about important political phenomena. But it is precisely the problems suggested by the intimidating compound adjective "culture-free" that continue to trouble us. Permit us to cite just two examples that, while certainly not novel, are characteristic of this sort of endeavor, especially where the terms of comparison involve cultures as historically disparate as those of Japan and the United States. Both are aspects of the problem of equivalence, one at the conceptual, the other more at the technical semantic or linguistic level.

Take the concept of party identification as the first example. There are obvious differences between the Japanese and the American party systems. The United States has only two major national parties and these have been stable for many years. Japan now has five and has historically experienced a good deal of instability on her party scene. Party allegiance in Japan is also less stable and perhaps less salient than in the United States, although Japanese party orientations are somewhat more strongly correlated with actual partisan vote choices than in the American case. These are differences between the two systems. We can also find a good deal of common ground. Which is more significant where the concept of "party identification" is concerned? Is there a high enough degree of similarity to the concept across the two cultures to legitimate comparisons of the type we have been attempting or are the differences more controlling. If the latter, are there ways of adjusting for such differences? We really do not yet know, and in this sense something of an act of faith or at least an implicit request for a suspension of judgment is required in many such experiments. The problems may be less troublesome where more closely related cultures are involved.

Then there are a range of problems relating to the translation of questionnaires from English to Japanese and of the results back into English again. What degrees of freedom should be involved? Does one strive for literal accuracy in translation or for cultural equivalence and, if the latter, how can you tell when you really have it? It is really remarkable how variant the judgments of so-called

experts and bilinguals can be in these respects, especially when dealing with a language as remote from English and as intrinsically vague by Western standards as ordinary spoken Japanese.

Unhappily, we have no answers for these questions. Our instinct and our endeavor has been to seek cultural equivalence. We are not really certain that in all cases we obtained it, however, and, when dealing with a technology such as survey research, one likes to be as certain as possible of the rigor and reliability of all his instruments. Cross-cultural research of this sort simply seems inherently to involve--under present circumstances at least--a somewhat greater degree of uncertainty on scores of this sort than does mono-cultural research. One imagines that such degrees of uncertainty may multiply as do the numbers of cultural elements involved. Such issues, of course, affect ultimately almost all aspects of a cross-cultural research project. The answers one gives to them condition the design and wording of the questionnaire, the quality of the responses elicited, and the data analysis process itself. Consequently, they merit very serious consideration.

We seek to highlight these issues because of our impression that insufficient attention has been paid them so far in the design and conduct of cross-cultural survey research, and also because they caused us a good deal of concern in designing and administering our own survey. We would not like to leave the impression, however, that we consider them so serious that they need invalidate attempts to apply the survey method on a cross-cultural basis. Such attempts seem to us both essential and promising at this level for pretty much the same reasons advanced with respect to the application of survey methodology on the domestic scene. Where applicable, it lends itself to greater rigor, greater control, greater precision, and greater certainty than do more qualitative approaches. It is, furthermore, essential to the advancement of our capacities to make really generalized statements about political attitudes and behavior. It is wise to be aware, however, of the added pitfalls involved and to give these the most serious attention.

## FOOTNOTES

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1. See, for example, Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization, New York: Free Press, 1959, p. 69; Frederick Elkin, The Child and Society, New York, Random House, 1960, p. 46; or James C. Davies, "The Family's Role In Political Socialization," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 361 (September, 1965), pp. 10-19.
2. Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government and Citizenship during the Elementary School Years, Part I, U. S. Office of Education, 1965, pp. 193 and 200; Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969, pp. 105-108; or M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child" American Political Science Review, vol. 62, no. 1 (March, 1968), pp. 169-184.
3. The Jennings-Niemi article cited above is of particular interest and relevance on this score.
4. Robert J. Lifton, "Youth and History: Individual Change in Postwar Japan," Daedalus, vol. 91, no. 1., (Winter, 1962), pp. 172-197.
5. See, for example, Kuroda Yasumasa, "Agencies of Political Socialization and Political Change: Political Orientation of Japanese Law Students," Human Organization, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter, 1965), pp. 328-331.
6. In fact both Figure 1 and recent studies of this subject in Japan indicate that the JSP is losing support among the youngest cohorts of new voters. See Nishihira Shigeki, "Are Young People Becoming More Conservative?", Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, vol. 2, no. 3 (December, 1964), pp. 137-143. The original and full form of the article may be found in Asahi Janaru, July 26, 1964, pp. 12-19. Japanese personal names cited in this paper are given in the Japanese manner; i.e., with surname first.
7. See, for example Kuroda Yasumasa, op. cit., p. 328.

8. Nishihira Shigeki, Nihonjin no Iken, Tokyo, Seishindo, 1963, pp. 93-136.
9. Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., pp. 124-125. With respect to the stability of the Japanese family in this respect, see Ezra F. Vogel, "Kinship, Structure, Migration to the City, and Modernization," in R. P. Dore, ed., Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 91-111.
10. A third may be the family's role as the main source of satisfaction for an infant's basic needs. Davies, op. cit., p. 10.
11. Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965, p.80; Melford Spiro, "The Acculturation of American Ethnic Groups," American Anthropologist, vol. 57 (1955), p. 1249.
12. Greenstein, ibid., pp. 55-84; Elkin, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
13. Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., pp. 107-108, expand upon this theme.
14. Because of the difficulty in reliably pinning down the point in past time for which the child was specifying his first party identification and the problems of parental recall associated therewith, we used the current status of parental party identifications rather than some earlier status in running these correlations. Our data indicate little change over time in the past and present status of parent's party identifications.
15. We have encountered a similar recall problem in our attempt to measure generational agreement of party identification in our mass survey data as a whole. Although the numerical values of these correlation coefficients (.38 for the first wave and .32 for the second wave) closely resemble those of the comparable coefficients for our parent-child pairs, the substantive relationship in the former is probably weaker than in the latter because of the problem of distortion in recall. Also the fact that the Japanese party system has been relatively unstable makes it very difficult to recover substantive relationships on the basis of perceived data of the mass survey alone.
16. It seems improbable that a perceived "fact" of this sort will in a statistical sense be totally different from the fact itself. In our Japanese data there is a high degree of agreement between the parent's report of his own party identification and the child's report of his parent's party identification:

Father	.64 <sup>a</sup>	.81
Mother	.86	.88

<sup>a</sup>Entries are tau-b coefficients.

17. The figures for JSP identification accord closely to those cited by Nishihara Shigeki on p. 199 of the article cited at footnote 6 above, but our figures for LDP identification are substantially higher than his.

18. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, New York, Wiley, 1960, pp. 64-77.
19. See Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., pp. 172-174, or Hyman, op. cit., pp. 70-72 and 74-82.
20. Op. cit., pp. 172-173.
21. Richard G. Niemi, A Methodological Study of Political Socialization in the Family, unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan, 1967,
22. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, New York, Free Press, 1964, pp. 206-261; Campbell et al. op. cit., (1960) pp. 188-265.
23. Although it is difficult to compare issue attitudes cross-culturally in any meaningful manner, it appears that Japanese more frequently say, "Don't know," to a standard issue question than Americans. It is not unusual to find a 20% or 30% DK ratio in Japan whereas in America a comparable ratio tends to remain in the 10 - 20% level, and it occasionally surpasses the 20% mark.
24. Examples would be attitudes toward the Self Defense Forces which scaled at .40 for the first wave and .20 for the second; or attitudes toward protesting official decision on legitimate claims (.41), the power of Big Business (.47), or the power of labor unions (.49), all of which were measured only once.
25. Examples would be coefficients relating to which party the respondent first liked (.55 and .45), party vote intention (.42), and the ranking of the Democratic Socialist Party on a like-dislike scale (.40). There are currently five major national parties in Japan. There have been upwards of twenty in the 1945-1969 period alone.
26. Op. cit., (1960), pp. 42-88.
27. A complicating factor in Japan is the existence of a multi-party system based on a system of multi-member electoral districts. This may be conducive to an added degree of instability in party attitudes. See Robert E. Ward, Japan's Political System, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 52-75 for an explanation of the systems concerned.
28. Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 71-75 and 80.
29. More specifically, we obtained the following statistics:

Child's:	First Wave		Second Wave	
	High	Low	High	Low
Interest in election	.49	.10	.63	-.05
Concern with outcome	.54	.25	.50	.09
Political Interest	.55	.20	.42	.03

30. The question used to measure this relationship is as follows:

In dealing with such problems as education, occupation, and marriage, how do you make a decision? Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?

- a) Decide on the basis of my own interests;
- b) Decide more or less on the basis of my own interests;
- c) Decide more or less on the basis of my family's interests;
- d) Decide on the basis of my family's interests; and
- e) No opinion/D.K.

31. The question used to measure this dimension is as follows:

Would you say you are more or less a new type of person or an old type of person?

32. The question used to measure this dimension is as follows:

Would you say you are the type of person who tends to save money or the type of person who tends to spend it so as to have a good time?

33. The questions used to measure these variables are as follows:

Do you feel that today's youth need more discipline or not?  
Do you feel that today's youth should pay more respect to their parents' opinion or not?

34. We obtain the following tau-b correlation matrix:

	family individual	new-or- old man	youth discipline	respect for elder's view
family-individual	---			
new-or-old-man	.184	---		
youth discipline	-.093	-.104	---	
respect for elder's view	-.109	-.106	.472	---

35. See, for example, Vogel, op. cit., passim

36. Eleanor E. Maccoby, Richard E. Mathews, and Anton S. Morton, "Youth and Political Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1, (Spring, 1954), pp. 23-39.

37. M. Kent Jennings and Kenneth P. Langton, "Mothers versus Fathers: the Formation of Political Orientations Among Young Americans," unpublished (1968) 34 pp.

38. Our index of homogeneity increases in the following manner:

	High 1	2	3	Low 4	Total
First wave	57.3%	20.5	18.3	3.9%	100.0%
Second wave	70.5%	14.8	10.4	4.3	100.0%

39. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944), Chap. 16.
40. Richard K. Beardsley, John W. Hall, Robert E. Ward, Village Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 424-445.
41. Scott C. Flanagan, "Voting Behavior in Japan: The Persistence of Traditional Patterns," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 1, no. 3 (October 1968), pp. 391-412.
42. Op. cit., passim
43. Jennings and Langton, op. cit., pp. 16-18, 25-26.
44. Ibid.; Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., p. 181.
45. See footnote 30 above for the text of the question.
46. Campbell et al., op. cit., (1966), pp. 281-283.
47. Campbell et al, op cit., (1960), pp. 146-148; Jennings and Langton, op. cit., pp. 5-15.
48. Since our sample is based upon one-child and-one-parent pairs rather than upon one-child-and-father-mother-triples, we have no choice but to rely upon perceived data for the information pertaining to the remaining parent.
49. See footnote 16.